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Throughout the evolution of economic ideas, it has often been asserted
that experimentation in economics is impossible. Yet, the historical record
shows that the idea of “experimentation” has, in fact, been important in
the field of economics, and has been interpreted and put to use in many
ways. These range from the “thought experiment”, where counterfactuals
are explored in the mind of the theorist, to social experiments, where
alternative economic arrangements have been tried out historically, and
laboratory experimentation, which is currently a burgeoning field of
empirical research.
This book provides testament to the great variety of ways in which
experimentation has mattered in the creation of economic knowledge. The
accessible essays contained within this volume will interest all those
seeking to broaden their historical understanding of the discipline and will
be essential reading for students who wish to acquire a greater knowledge
of how economics has grown and developed.
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is a historian of game theory and contemporary economics. His work has
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Introduction
Robert Leonard and Philippe Fontaine
Experiment (ekspe•riment), 3. An action or operation undertaken in order
to discover something unknown, to test a hypothesis, or establish or illus-
trate some known truth.
Oxford English Dictionary
It was with a generous definition of both “action” and “operation” implic-
itly in mind that, in April 1999, a number of people gathered at Cachan,
near Paris, to discuss what it means when we speak of an “experiment” in
economics. The term was to be understood broadly, embracing not only
the examination, in deliberately contrived situations, of how human sub-
jects make economic choices, but other, less obvious, forms of action or
operation, designed to establish economic truths.
The impetus for the meeting stemmed from what might be described as
a certain cognitive dissonance surrounding the concept of experimentation
in the economics field. On the one hand, there was the long resistance
throughout the history of the discipline to the idea that economics can
lend itself to experimentation. Going back at least as far as J. S. Mill and
continuing until very recently, it was widely held that economics was not
an experimental discipline: “Economics . . . cannot perform the controlled
experiments of chemists or biologists because [it] cannot easily control
other important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, [economists]
generally must be content largely to observe” (Samuelson and Nordhaus,
1985, p. 8). On the other hand, it was a fact that, once one began to think
about it, the concept of an “experiment” has been persistently present, in
various guises, throughout the history of the field. Most obvious was the
rapid rise of the new area of behavioural economics, to which experimen-
tation is central. Indeed, just as this volume was being prepared for press,
that area received “official” recognition in the form of the attribution of
the Bank of Sweden Nobel Memorial Prize in October 2002 to Daniel
Kahneman and Vernon Smith. As if in direct contradiction of the Samuel-
son and Nordhaus view, the Swedish Academy, in awarding the prize,
wrote that “laboratory results . . . can crucially inform the development of
economic theory . . . [just as] laboratory results concerning small-scale phe-
nomena in physics (such as those pertaining to elementary particles and
thermodynamics) can crucially inform the development of theoretical
physics” (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2002, p. 3). Once the defin-
ition was extended beyond this experimentation of the laboratory kind,
there were many other kinds of action that could be regarded as “experi-
mental” in some sense. Most obvious were experiments in economic
policy, where conclusions are drawn, “knowledge” is created, from a kind
of experiment that has little to do with laboratory procedure; or “thought”
experiments, where it is the disciplined imagination that might be said to
be the source of knowledge; or the exploration of different scenarios
through the use of comparative statics or computerised simulation with
theoretical and quantitative models. Indeed, it quickly became obvious
that, in economics, it was not at all clear what the term “experiment”
really meant.
The selected essays in this volume approach the topic from several
angles, forming an interrelated and coherent set of reflections on the
various meanings that may be attached to “experimentation” in eco-
nomics. Three of them deal with the emergence of the field of experimen-
tal economics and, as such, are particularly timely. Robert Dimand
examines the roots of experimental gaming in the activities of the RAND
Corporation in the postwar US, and claims that it was the development of
game theory and the openness of game theorists to cross-disciplinary col-
laboration that created the path by which laboratory experimentation
entered economics. However, by the time the latter was well established,
he suggests, the experimenters and game theorists had become quite sepa-
rated from each other. Another account, which deals, in part, with the
same period, is Sophie Jallais and Pierre-Charles Pradier’s examination of
the so-called Allais Paradox. Drawing on interviews with some of the
participants in the French decision-theory community of the 1950s, and
examining the interactions between Allais and Savage, Jallais and Pradier
provide a detailed reconstruction of the process by which a casual
lunchtime puzzle posed by Allais came to be regarded as experimental val-
idation of a “Paradox”. Moving from microscopic detail to overarching
historical thesis, Abu Turab Rizvi offers an answer to a question implicitly
raised in the Dimand essay, namely, why, if it began in the early 1950s, did
economic experimentation not become an activity acceptable within the
disciplinary mainstream until some thirty years later? Rizvi’s explanation
is that it was not until the demise of general equilibrium theory, the
dominant analytical framework for an entire generation from the 1950s,
that experimentation became acceptable. With the emphasis in general
equilibrium theorising being placed on logical coherence rather than on
empirical plausibility, this formalist orientation made little room for exper-
imental investigation of any kind. Not until the dominance of that pro-
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gramme was challenged, says Rizvi, with the announcement of a series of
theoretical results concerning stability in the 1980s, would there result a
breach of sorts, into which stepped the game theoretic and experimental
approaches that figure prominently today.
As we move through the other contributions, the “actions” and “opera-
tions” considered grow in range. Although, as Viennese economists in the
1930s, neither Oskar Morgenstern nor Friedrich Hayek placed emphasis
on the experimental investigation in the sense considered above, in their
theorising, both of them engaged freely in what may be regarded as
“thought experiments”. Alessandro Innocenti and Carlo Zappia, in their
essay, examine how such “mental chains of deductions and conjectures”
were used by these Austrians in order to reach theoretical conclusions
about the meaning of economic foresight and the possibility of equilib-
rium. Starting from a shared intellectual background, Hayek and Morgen-
stern developed quite differently, with the former remaining faithful to the
“thought experiment” idea in his campaign against scientism in social
science, while the latter moved away from that to embrace the use of com-
putation as an experimental method.
If part of the Austrian anti-socialist tradition involved imagining altern-
ative economic possibilities – only to then disregard them as infeasible –
something similar underlined the work of Belgian industrialist Ernest
Solvay and Swedish economist Knut Wicksell, discussed here by Mauro
Boianovsky and Guido Erreygers. Both Solvay and Wicksell were
involved, separately, in proposing non-monetary economies, systems that
relied, in the case of Solvay, on an elaborate “comptabilist” system of
accounts, or, in Wicksell’s case, on pure credit. Boianovsky and Erreygers
show how the scientist Solvay’s system was part of his broader “social
energetics” interpretation of the social order – a view that drew the
explicit criticism of Hayek – while Wicksell’s proposal for a credit system
was related to his belief in the possibilities of using economic policy as a
form of experimentation.
The final essay, by philosopher Nancy Cartwright, offers a stringent
critique of the use of analogue economies, that is, models that purport to
represent the economic system in question, be it micro- or macro- in a
highly reduced, stylised form. The manipulation of such models for the
purpose of drawing conclusions about the world, which is a prevalent kind
of “experimentation”, is claimed by Cartwright to be unreliable. This is
not because the models are built using assumptions that are unrealistic per
se, but using ones that are non-Galilean, i.e. that enter the functioning of
the model, not as “harmless” background assumptions, but in a crucial
way, concretely affecting the conclusions reached. The apparent rigour of
the formal apparatus thus becomes spurious, with the model, even though
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This essay, an offshoot of research for Volume II of A History of Game
Theory, will examine the encounters of game theory and experimentation
in the two decades following the Second World War, and the adoption of
experimental games as a characteristic feature of game theory in contrast
to the much more limited use of experimentation by economists uninflu-
enced by game theory. The theory of games of strategy has followed a dis-
tinctive path in attempting to confront its abstract theory of conflict and
cooperation with evidence about economic and social behavior. In the first
twenty years after von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (1944), game theorists began, at first tentatively and
then on a large scale, to conduct strategic games as controlled experi-
ments. In contrast, another new sub-discipline, macroeconomics, devoted
its efforts to regression analysis of large, simultaneous equations models
during the same years: Cowles monographs edited or co-edited by Tjalling
Koopmans developed econometric theory for the estimation and identifi-
cation of simultaneous equations models, while Lawrence Klein and his
associates constructed models growing beyond the Brookings and
Wharton models to CANDIDE (the Canadian Interdepartmental Econo-
metric Model) with more than two thousand equations and finally Project
LINK, which connects such models of 79 countries or groups of countries.
Demand studies in microeconomics also focussed on econometrics applied
to non-experimental data. Just as survey data has been so little used in
economics that the advocacy by Blinder (1990) of “Learning by Asking
Those Who Are Doing” struck its audience as quite daring, experiments
played little role in economics apart from game theory. This was in sharp
contrast to psychology: it is noteworthy that just as the use of survey data
in economics was sustained in the 1950s by George Katona, who was
cross-appointed in psychology and economics at the University of Michi-
gan, the psychologist Sidney Siegel played a crucial role in promoting
experimental games in economics. Some attempts had been made by psy-
chologists (notably L. L. Thurstone 1931; cf. Mosteller and Nogee 1951) to
measure preferences experimentally, but, in an influential paper, W. Allen
Wallis and Milton Friedman (1942) denied that such experiments had any
value for economics. Thirty experiments in strategic interaction were pub-
lished by the time of the first survey of experimental gaming by Anatol
Rapoport and Carol Orwant (1962). The subsequent growth of the liter-
ature was signaled by the introduction of an experimental gaming section
edited by Rapoport in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1965, and
Andrew Colman (1982, 12) reports estimates of over a thousand experi-
mental gaming studies published by 1972, and some 1500 by the early
1980s. Kagel and Roth’s Handbook of Experimental Economics needed
more than 700 pages to survey its subject in 1995 (including experiments in
economics not limited to studies of strategic interaction). A specialized
journal, Experimental Economics, began publication in June 1998; a
majority of the articles in its inaugural issue were game-theoretic. A four-
paper Economic Journal symposium on experimental economics (Loomes
1999) was the subject of an article in The Economist (May 8, 1999).
Experimental gaming in economics and the social sciences could draw
on a long heritage of war gaming (see Young 1952 for a survey and Riley
and Young 1957 for a 94-page annotated bibliography extending back to
the Kriegsspiel of 1824). Some of these war games incorporated random-
ization of outcomes, although not of strategies. In the Japanese naval war
game in May 1942 on board the battleship Yamato, flagship of the Com-
bined Fleet, before the Battle of Midway, the umpire rolled dice to deter-
mine the result of an air strike from Midway against the Japanese aircraft
carriers, and declared nine hits, sinking two carriers. The admiral presiding
over the game ordered the dice turned over to predict a more favorable
outcome, a decision that “arbitrarily resulted in Kaga’s still being sunk but
Akagi only slightly damaged. To [the umpire’s] surprise, even this revised
ruling was subsequently cancelled and Kaga reappeared as a participant in
the next part of the game. . . . The verdicts of the umpires regarding the
results of air fighting were similarly juggled, always in favor of the Japan-
ese forces” (Fuchida and Okumiya 1955, quoted by Allen 1987, 122). The
actual outcome of the battle could not be similarly amended.
1.2 Chamberlin
Experimental gaming first appeared in the economics literature with
Edward Chamberlin’s 1948 account of his classroom supply and demand
experiments at Harvard. These experiments were designed to support
Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition (1933) by demonstrating
that experimental results did not resemble perfect competition, with the
implication that trading in actual markets without possibility of recontract-
ing non-equilibrium trades would not lead to the perfectly and purely
competitive equilibrium. It was thus an outlier in the literature since,
unlike the Santa Monica conference discussed in the next section, its inspi-
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ration predated von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Chamberlin
claimed both pedagogic and scientific results from his experiments. Each
player dealt in one unit of the commodity traded, and received a card
marked with the letter B or S (for buyer or seller) and an even number
from 18 to 104, indicating that player’s Marshallian demand price or
supply price (reservation price), as the case might be. The players circu-
lated in a room and, if they negotiated a trade, handed in their cards
to Chamberlin along with the price they had reached, but these prices
were not announced during the trading. Supply and demand schedules
were constructed from the reservation prices. Chamberlin reported con-
ducting the experiment 46 times, with the actual volume of trades higher
than the equilibrium volume 42 times and the same four times, but never
lower: with trades occurring at actual prices higher or lower than the
competitive equilibrium, buyers and sellers who would choose not to
transact at the equilibrium price were able to trade. Chamberlin (1948,
102) found that
My own skepticism as to why actual prices should in any literal sense
tend toward equilibrium during the course of a market has been
increased not so much by the actual data of the experiment before us –
which are certainly open to limitations – as by the failure, upon reflec-
tion stimulated by the problem, to find any reason why it should be so.
It would appear that, in asserting such a tendency, economists may
have been led unconsciously to share their unique knowledge of the
equilibrium point with their theoretical creatures, the buyers and
sellers, who, of course, in real life have no knowledge of it whatsoever.
He viewed actual markets as a series of bilateral monopolies separated in
time, and concluded that
If it seems that strange results have been here derived by subjecting
market schedules to arbitrary manipulations, it is replied that the
“manipulations” are intended to be realistic and not arbitrary.
Perhaps it is the perfect market which is “strange”; at any rate, the
nature of the discrepancies between it and reality deserve study.
The eminent experimental economist Vernon Smith (1992, 242) reports
that when he took part in Chamberlin’s experimental game in the first
meeting of Chamberlin’s course, when Smith was a beginning Harvard
graduate student in 1952, the students viewed the experiment as an unim-
portant parlor game: they received no payment to motivate them to take
the game seriously, and Chamberlin was too obviously seeking a result
supporting his own theory. Smith (1962) conducted 11 experiments (begin-
ning in January 1956) that differed from Chamberlin’s experiment game in
involving cash rewards and a sequence of trading “days.” Contrary to
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Smith’s expectations and to Chamberlin’s results, these repeated experi-
mental games tended to converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium.
When I started graduate school at Yale in 1978, a Chamberlin-type experi-
mental market game with a single trading period and no cash payments
was played at the first meeting of the microeconomics class, without
getting close to the competitive equilibrium price.
Chamberlin confronted theory with experimental evidence, but the
participants in his experimental market game felt that his mind was
already made up about the result. Generations of Harvard graduate stu-
dents played Chamberlin’s imperfect competition game, but of them all
only Vernon Smith went on in experimental economics, and he found that
Chamberlin’s results were very sensitive to the absence of repeated play
and monetary motivation.
1.3 The Santa Monica conference
Research in the area of experimental games on a large scale began in the
summer of 1952, when the Ford Foundation sponsored an eight-week
interdisciplinary seminar on “The Design of Experiments in Decision
Processes,” held in Santa Monica, California, to be convenient for
participants from RAND (the Research and Development Corporation,
whose only client was the US Air Force), but also including leading figures
from elsewhere (several of them also RAND consultants), notably from
two key centers of game theory in the 1950s, Princeton and the University
of Michigan, and from the Cowles Commission in Chicago (including John
von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, John Nash, Lloyd Shapley, and Martin
Shubik from Princeton, Gérard Debreu, Tjalling Koopmans, Jacob
Marschak, and Herbert Simon from Cowles, and Howard Raiffa from
Michigan). The proposal for the seminar originated at the University of
Michigan, where a game-theory seminar was jointly sponsored by Robert
Thrall, an algebraist (and a contributor, with Michigan graduate students
Howard Raiffa and Gerald L. Thompson, to the second volume of Contri-
butions to the Theory of Games), and Clyde Coombs, a social psychologist.
In addition to RAND and Ford Foundation, the US Office of Naval
Research sponsored several participants, Oskar Morgenstern being a
founding editor of ONR’s Naval Research Logistics Quarterly. Although
27 of the 37 listed participants were sponsored at least partially by RAND
or ONR (that is, by the US Air Force or Navy), Vernon Smith (1992,
260n) notes that
none of the papers presented and none of those published in Thrall,
Coombs, and Davis (1954) dealt, or was concerned, with military
applications of game theory or decision theory. In this case military
support appears to have been for basic research unconnected with mil-
itary applications.
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(Others at RAND, notably Thomas Schelling, did examine nuclear strat-
egy in informal game-theoretic terms, and there were applications of
formal game theory to military tactics at RAND.)
Only five of the 19 papers in the resulting volume on Decision Processes
(Thrall et al. 1954) reported experimental results. “Some Experimental
n-Person Games” by G. K. Kalisch, John W. Milnor, John F. Nash, and
E. D. Nering (1954) is of particular interest, both for its influence in stimu-
lating later experimental work (e.g. by Reinhard Selten; cf. Luce 1959) and
for its place in Nash’s body of work on game theory. Nash and others at
Princeton were interested in playable games (such as “So Long Sucker”)
but this exercise in experimental gaming was exceptional. The authors
noted that “The field of n-person games has had very little empirical inves-
tigation; for this reason, and because of the relatively undeveloped status
of the theory, the authors feel that the use of the experimental approach is
strongly indicated” (1954, 302; see also Innocenti and Zappia, and Rizvi in
this volume).
Kalisch, Milnor, Nash, and Nering played six constant-sum, cooperative
games with side payments: four were four-person games played eight times
each, the others a five-person game played three times and a seven-person
game played twice. Players were rotated to discourage permanent coali-
tions. They found what they considered “a reasonably good fit between the
observed data and the Shapley value” but found that results differed
between games that were strategically equivalent and that symmetries
between games were not well reflected in observed outcomes. They also
played a three-person cooperative game with no side payments, and
attempted to ascertain the workability of a negotiation model, defined as “a
non-cooperative game based on a strictly formalized negotiation procedure
applied to a cooperative game” (1954, 316), the solution to which could be
considered as a possible solution to the underlying cooperative game. This
last effort represents a tentative but striking move toward attempting
implementation of what has come to be called “the Nash program” of con-
structing non-cooperative bargaining models to test the axioms of the Nash
bargaining solution (Nash 1953). Nash did not follow up this beginning, due
to his absorption in problems of pure mathematics and then to his illness
and intermittent institutionalization. The most important direct impact of
this paper was an inspiration to Reinhard Selten (see the interview with
Selten reported by Vernon Smith 1992, 258).
The psychologist William Estes (1954) reported an experiment (similar
to that of Humphreys 1939) in which subjects predicted on each trial which
of two or more events would occur, and were rewarded with some probab-
ility if they were right. Estes found that the subjects adaptively converged
to a “probability matching” strategy (guessing each outcome with the
same probability with which it was observed to occur), rather than always
predicting the most-frequent outcome, the strategy that would maximize
the probability of predicting correctly. Several game theorists at the Santa
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Monica seminar objected that the subjects were behaving irrationally.
Merrill Flood (1954b, 288) rejected this attribution of irrationality on two
grounds: “there is a reasonable payoff matrix that would rationalize the
reported behavior” and “The von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is
inapplicable in this situation unless the organism can assume safely that
the experimental stimulus is generated by a stationary stochastic stimu-
lus.” The second point turned out not to make a difference in later experi-
ments by Sidney Siegel and others in which the constancy of probabilities
was explained to the subjects (Smith 1992, 262–263). The first point proved
much more significant, and was taken up by Herbert Simon (1956) and
Sidney Siegel (1959). Simon (1956, 271) argued that
Perhaps the most useful lesson to be learned . . . is the necessity for
careful distinction between subjective rationality (i.e. behavior that is
rational, given the perceptual and evaluational premises of the
subject), and objective rationality (behavior that is rational as viewed
by the experimenter).
In addition to Merrill Flood’s two chapters on learning in games (1954a,
1954b), his 1958 article “Some Experimental Games” on a prisoner’s
dilemma game (in which jointly dominating strategies are not Pareto effi-
cient, and the Pareto-efficient outcome is not a Nash equilibrium)
repeated a hundred times was a condensation of a 1952 RAND memoran-
dum, written before his 1953 departure from RAND to Columbia Univer-
sity (and from there to the University of Michigan). (Prisoner’s dilemma is
called “Hangman’s Paradox” in a footnote in Flood (1958), quoting a
letter from Nash.) The appendix to Flood (1958) amusingly records the
running comments of the two players during the frustrating repetitions of
prisoner’s dilemma.
The prestige of the seminar participants and of the sponsoring institu-
tions of the Santa Monica seminar gave some impetus to an approach
outside conventional economic and social-science methodology, but
Vernon Smith (1992, 261) judges that “quantitatively, its success in stimu-
lating experiment must be judged more modest than in furthering theory.
The seminar’s integrating theme was not experimental design, but the use
of mathematics in the social sciences” (cf. Roth 1993). Thrall et al. (1954)
passes unmentioned even in Andrew Colman’s critical survey of Game
Theory and Experimental Games (1982).
Game theory at RAND had already suffered a blow when intolerance
of homosexuality led to the dismissal of J. C. C. McKinsey, whose Intro-
duction to the Theory of Games (1952) was published as a RAND study:
“McKinsey committed suicide in 1953 within two years of being fired by
RAND” (Nasar 1998, 188). John Nash’s 1954 arrest for indecent exposure
led RAND to withdraw his security clearance and cancel his consulting
contract (Nasar 1998, Chapter 25). Von Neumann gave up his RAND con-
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sultancy the same year upon being named to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. Beyond these individual departures, there was a general fading of
interest in game theory at RAND in the late 1950s, as RAND perceived
that its support had contributed more to pure research than to military
strategy. Thomas Schelling (1960) noted that “Whenever we speak of
deterrence, atomic blackmail, the balance of terror . . . we are evidently
deep in game theory, yet formal game theory has contributed little to the
clarification of these ideas.”
1.4 Siegel and Fouraker at Penn State
The most substantial body of early experimental work in strategic games
and decision theory resulted from the collaboration at Pennsylvania State
University of the psychologist Sidney Siegel and the economist Lawrence
Fouraker, a flourishing interdisciplinary research program ended by
Siegel’s death of a heart attack in November 1961 at what Vernon Smith
(1992, 247) terms “the beginning of a brilliant career. I am convinced that
his death impeded substantially the subsequent development of experi-
mental economics, which did not really take off until the late 1970s.”
Siegel came from a discipline in which experimentation was an accepted
procedure, and was co-author of a volume on Decision Making: An Exper-
imental Approach (Davis et al. 1957). Some of his experimental work
(Siegel and Goldstein 1959 and Siegel et al. 1964, the latter published after
his death) examined non-optimal strategic choice under risk, inspired by
the light-guessing experiment of Humphreys (1939), which was considered
a classic in the literature of experimental psychology (see Colman 1982,
21–22). Seated in front of two light bulbs, subjects are asked to predict
which one will be lit next. The bulbs are lit randomly, according to proba-
bilities set in advance. Subjects usually begin distributing their predictions
evenly between the two choices, but after one or two hundred repetitions,
converge to matching the distribution of their predictions to the pre-set
probabilities – even though the strategy that would maximize the probab-
ility of a correct prediction would be to always predict the most frequently
illuminated bulb. Siegel was also influenced by the contributions of Flood
and especially of Estes to Thrall et al. (1954) (see Siegel 1959).
Martin Shubik (in an interview reported by Vernon Smith 1992, 250)
gives a remarkable account of meeting Siegel around a campfire in
Tuolomne Meadows in Yosemite National Park in 1955 or 1956:
[Martin] Beckman and I (instead of singing “Clementine”) were dis-
cussing utility theory – when a shadowy figure near us started to
eavesdrop and then could not contain himself and joined in the con-
versation. From there I learned about Siegel’s two-light experiments
with rewards – as I knew [William] Estes’s learning theory I was
immediately fascinated. I immediately said to Sid that Mayberry,
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Nash, and I [1953] had written an article on duopoly (Cournot and
Cooperative) and did he think that this might be worthwhile. He said
yes, but that an economist at Penn State – Larry Fouraker – had
already talked with him about bilateral monopoly and that he was
committed to finish that work before looking at duopoly.
Lawrence Fouraker (1957) critiqued the assumption of complete
information in the bilateral monopoly analysis of William Fellner (1947,
1949; see Dimand and Dimand 1996, Chapter 4, for the earlier history of
bilateral monopoly theory). Instead, Fouraker proposed assuming that the
bargainers knew only their own functions, with a seller knowing the cost
conditions but not the revenue function, and the buyer knowing the
revenue relations but not the cost function. According to a letter from
Fouraker to Vernon Smith in 1990 (Smith 1992, 250n), Fouraker’s “inter-
est in the experimental testing of economic theory started with a master’s
candidate, Dave DiFedo, who wanted to test my bilateral monopoly model
against Fellner’s. I knew of Siegel’s experiments on choice theory and sug-
gested we talk with him.” David D. DiFebo was among the five research
assistants credited in the resulting book, Bargaining and Group Decision
Making (Siegel and Fouraker 1960). Fouraker was a rising young star of
Penn State’s Economics Department: while the first article by him listed in
the American Economic Association Index of Economic Journals was in
1955, his 1957 article on Fellner was already his eighth.
Siegel and Fouraker (1960, vi–vii) noted that:
reliance on the usual sources of economic data has not provided
observations suitable for disposing of alternative hypotheses emerging
from economic theories of bilateral monopoly behavior. We have
turned to the methods of experimental social psychology to create a
context within which data relevant to hypotheses from bilateral mon-
opoly theory could be collected.
They emphasized that:
In the past, psychologists and economists have worked together most
commonly on applied topics, such as marketing. Our research, in con-
trast, is concerned with fundamental topics in economic and psycho-
logical theory, and we have not given special attention to possible
applications of our work. . . . Since the problem of choices among
alternatives is fundamental in all the social sciences, the study of
decision-making processes is of central interest to these sciences. The
theory of games and decision-making theory may well provide the
base for a unified conceptual structure for the social sciences (cf.
Shubik, 1959, and Luce and Raiffa, 1957).
(Siegel and Fouraker 1960, vi, 2)
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The award of the Monograph Prize of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences in social sciences for 1959 confirmed that others shared this view
of the significance of Siegel and Fouraker (1960) as an interdisciplinary
methodological innovation dealing with fundamental issues of theory.
Siegel and Fouraker (1960, 17–23) recruited 116 Penn State students (58
bargaining pairs), all but one male, from an undergraduate principles
section and through the campus student employment service:
the subjects obtained through the student employment service were
ostensibly hired to perform routine clerical work for wages of $1.00 an
hour, a procedure that was used in an attempt to recruit subjects
having a relatively high utility for the amounts of money used in the
experiments.
The bargaining pairs communicated only through an intermediary, and did
not know the identity of their bargaining rivals. They were given iso-profit
tables for combinations of price and quantity, and were paid in cash when
agreement was reached, but did not know the payoff of their bargaining
rivals. Participants took part only in one bargaining session, and were
asked not to discuss the experiment with anyone. Siegel and Fouraker
(1960, 41) found a tendency for bargainers to maximize joint payoff by
negotiating Pareto-optimal contracts, and that this tendency was strength-
ened by increasing the amount of relevant information and the difference
in payoff between Pareto-optimal and near-optimal contracts. Further
experiment with 11 bargaining pairs of Penn State undergraduates indi-
cated that increasing the amount of relevant information available to the
bargainers tended to produce a more equal division of the joint payoff:
“bargainers with complete information have more realistic expectations
with respect to their own profit than less informed bargainers, and are
under a sort of moralistic pressure for a fifty-fifty split of the joint payoff”
(Siegel and Fouraker 1960, 70).
At the end of their book on bilateral monopoly, Siegel and Fouraker
identified duopoly as a promising field for experimental games, and this
was the subject of their second joint book, Bargaining Behavior (Fouraker
and Siegel 1963; cf. Dimand and Dimand 1996, Chapters 2 and 3, for
earlier strategic analysis of duopoly and oligopoly). The 1963 book
included a bilateral bargaining game, in which the seller first chose the
price and the buyer then chose the quantity, and duopoly and triopoly
experiments, in which the sellers chose quantities and demand was then
simulated. Much of this work was circulated in 1961, before Siegel’s death,
as four research reports issued by the Psychology Department at Penn
State: “Bargaining Behavior I” by Fouraker, Siegel, and a Penn State
graduate student, Donald Harnett; “Bargaining Behavior II” by Fouraker
and Siegel; “Bargaining, Information, and the Use of Threat” by Siegel
and Harnett; and “Oligopoly Bargaining: The Quantity Adjuster Models”
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by Fouraker, Shubik, and Siegel. Martin Shubik, a Princeton-trained game
theorist, was an adjunct research professor at Penn State from 1959 to
1961 while working for General Electric (overlapping with a visiting
appointment at Yale for the 1960–61 academic year). While Siegel had
been listed as first author, out of alphabetical order, on the 1960 book, the
authors were listed alphabetically on the book that Fouraker produced
after Siegel’s death. In both the 1960 and 1963 volumes, the full instruc-
tions and data given to the participants were included.
Sidney Siegel’s untimely death ended a promising interdisciplinary
venture in experimental gaming. Fouraker completed and published their
second book, and a volume on Choice, Strategy, and Utility (Sidney Siegel,
Alberta Siegel, and J. M. Andrews 1964) appeared, but Penn State ceased
to be a center of such research. Shubik was not affiliated with Penn State
after 1961. He moved from General Electric to IBM in 1961, and then
took a permanent appointment at Yale in 1963. Jessie Bernard, a Penn
State sociologist introduced to game theory by Sidney Siegel, had
acclaimed game theory as the basis for a modern sociology of conflict, but
later moved away from game theory (see Dimand 2000). The influence of
Siegel and Fouraker was felt elsewhere, notably by Vernon Smith, who
was inspired by meeting Siegel in Stanford in the autumn of 1961 to read
all his books and articles, and by James Friedman, who was a Yale gradu-
ate student when Tjalling Koopmans lent him the “Bargaining Behavior I
and II” working papers (Smith 1992, 247, 256). Siegel’s extensive contacts
outside his own discipline might well have furthered the spread of experi-
mental economic gaming had he lived longer: for instance, the opening
footnote of Siegel (1959) credits consultations with John C. Harsanyi and
the information theorist Claude Shannon, and “many discussions with
Robert M. Solow”, while Solow, Shubik, Fellner, George J. Stigler, and
the statistician John W. Tukey were thanked for “helpful and incisive com-
ments and suggestions” by Siegel and Fouraker (1960, viii).
1.5 Rapoport at Ann Arbor
Anatol Rapoport, a mathematical biologist then at the University of
Michigan (now in peace science at the University of Toronto), was another
pioneer in experimental games in the 1950s and 1960s. He was particularly
active in experiments related to prisoner’s dilemma, which were the
subject of a comprehensive monograph by Rapoport and Chammah with
Orwant (1965), and together with Carol Orwant, Rapoport surveyed the
existing literature on experimental games (Rapoport and Orwant 1962).
Rapoport’s approach to games was deeply influenced by the work between
the World Wars of the pacifist Lewis Fry Richardson (see Boulding 1962,
Chapter 2, and Dimand and Dimand 1996, Chapter 6), who also influenced
Kenneth Boulding, who was closely associated with Rapoport in founding
the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957 and the University of Michigan’s
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Center for Research in Conflict Resolution in 1959. Rapoport saw in
games such as prisoner’s dilemma and chicken analogies (at a very
abstract level) to the problems of avoiding nuclear war between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Allowing communication in pris-
oner’s dilemma failed to eliminate the Pareto-inefficient outcome if the
players were unable to make binding commitments. Repetition, however
often, also failed to remove the problem in theory if the number of repeti-
tions was finite, since there would be an incentive to defect from the coop-
erative result on the last play, and therefore (anticipating that result on the
last play) on the penultimate play, and so on. Nonetheless, Rapoport’s
experiments indicated more cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoner’s
dilemma games than the theory would predict.
Robert Axelrod, in The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), conducted an
experiment in the finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma, in which expert
game theorists wrote computer programs that were matched against each
other in a tournament, with the game ending at each stage with a small,
fixed probability. The players thus would not lack understanding of the
game, and were amply motivated by the prospect of glory. The most suc-
cessful program, a “tit for tat” program rewarding cooperative choices by
the other player and punishing defections, was written by Anatol
Rapoport.
1.6 Journal of Conflict Resolution
Related to Rapoport’s work, another strand in the literature of experi-
mental gaming was motivated by disarmament concerns about nuclear
deterrence and arms races, and appeared primarily in the Journal of Con-
flict Resolution, of which Rapoport was an editor. Scodel et al. (1959) and
Minas et al. (1960) reported experiments with two-person, non-zero-sum
games, including the game that A. W. Tucker named prisoner’s dilemma,
but which they called G-type games. They argued (Scodel et al. 1959, 118)
that
The mathematical origin and normative emphasis of game theory have
inevitably led to a general neglect of psychological and sociological
variables that must be assesses in order to assign utilities to outcomes.
In our games, for example, the necessity to avoid an ego-deflating
experience that could result from attempted collaboration that is not
reciprocated could very well account for the prevalence of red plays
[non-cooperation]. In G games this need to maintain self-esteem so
dominates the monetary values in the matrix that subjectively players
are not really in a dilemma.
In the second part of the article (Minas et al. 1960, 197), the authors
found such Pareto-inefficient outcomes even in H-type games, in which
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non-cooperation was not a dominant strategy: “The most plausible
account we can give of our results is that subjects tend to perceive the
game as primarily a competitive one.” Thomas Schelling (1961) also
reported experimental results, and advocated the use of non-zero-sum
gaming in the study of international relations and as a didactic tool.
1.7 Experimental games in business and economics
Experimental business gaming (Bellman et al. 1957; Ricciardi 1957;
Hoggatt 1959) was used as a tool in management education, and influ-
enced economists interested in experimental games such as Shubik and
Selten. Linking several centers of game theory and experimental eco-
nomics, Martin Shubik, part of the game-theory community at Princeton
in the early 1950s, collaborated with Fouraker and Siegel on a working
paper on oligopoly bargaining that became part of Fouraker and Siegel
(1963). Shubik then played a crucial role at Yale (as a visiting professor in
1960–61, and permanently since 1963), both through his own experimental
work (e.g. Shubik 1962) and through stimulating the work of Yale gradu-
ate students (Dolbear 1963; J. Friedman 1963, 1967). Shubik (1962, 229)
drew on the work of Flood and Siegel on game learning (learning about
the rules when the players are not fully informed initially), and argued that
experimental games
appear to provide a promising tool to help separate out variables in
the study of bargaining, threats and other aspects of competition and
cooperation. In particular the relationship among theories of games,
learning and gaming need further clarification. Many of the propo-
nents and opponents of games and of gaming have failed to appreciate
the need for extreme care in interpreting and relating the axioms
behind the various theories of games to the experimental conditions.
In addition to work that he published at the time (such as Shubik 1962),
Shubik also constructed a computerized oligopoly game for his 1960 Yale
seminar on oligopoly theory, but published the game only twenty years
later in a book with Richard Levitan (Shubik and Levitan 1980). Despite
the publication lag, Shubik’s oligopoly game followed directly from his
theoretical book on Strategy and Market Structure (1959), based on his
Princeton thesis, and his collaboration with Siegel and Fouraker.
James Friedman was one of the three students in Shubik’s oligopoly-
theory seminar in 1960, and he wrote his doctoral dissertation on “Indi-
vidual Behavior in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Study” (1963).
Friedman noted in the summary to his thesis that “These experiments
build on earlier work, primarily that of Lawrence Fouraker and the late
Sidney Siegel,” and he thanked Shubik “for his encouragement and for ini-
tially arousing my interest in this area.” William Fellner chaired Fried-
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man’s dissertation committee (which also included John W. Hooper and
John F. Muth, of rational expectations) and that of F. Trenery Dolbear,
Jr., who wrote on “Individual Choice Under Uncertainty – An Experimen-
tal Study” (1963). (Dolbear’s committee also included James Tobin and
Edmund Phelps, and Dolbear thanked Friedman and Muth for com-
ments.) Dolbear moved into other areas of economics, but James Fried-
man remained active in game theory and oligopoly, and continued to
contribute to experimental games, for instance Friedman (1967) and a
paper in one of Sauermann’s conference volumes (Friedman 1972).
Vernon Smith (1962, 1965) also began to publish in experimental eco-
nomics at that time, and has gone on to become the leading researcher in
the field (see also Stone 1958). Smith’s strong interest in experimental eco-
nomics was stimulated by taking part in Chamberlin’s classroom game and
by meeting Sidney Siegel shortly before Siegel’s death. Smith (1992) sup-
plemented his fascinating participant-memoir of early experimental eco-
nomics with interviews with Martin Shubik, Herbert Simon, James
Friedman, and Reinhard Selten.
1.8 Early experimental gaming beyond North America
At the very end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, experimental games in eco-
nomics began to spread beyond the United States to Japan and Germany.
(A number of early game theorists, notably Mayberry, Shubik, Tucker,
and Vickrey, were born in Canada, but their work was done in the United
States.) Minoru Sakaguchi (1960), reporting on two pairs of subjects in
simple, two-person saddle-point, strictly competitive games, found that in
each pair one player approached the minimax strategy after fifty or sixty
repetitions while the other did not. This did not, however, demonstrate
any irrationality on the part of the players who did not adopt a minimax
strategy. As long as one subject played minimax, the other would get the
same payoff with any strategy. Sakaguchi also reported forty trials of a
three-player, non-zero-sum, non-negotiable game, in which the players
tended to start near the Nash equilibrium point but move toward a co-
operative solution. Five years earlier, Sakaguchi had published in the same
journal on minimax tests of hypotheses (statistical decision theory). Martin
Shubik (interviewed by Vernon Smith 1992, 251) recalls that, while he was
at Yale as a visiting professor, “On 5 October 1960, I talked with Masuo
Toda of Tokyo on his 3 3 matrix game results.”
The first paper by the future Nobel laureate Reinhard Selten was an oli-
gopoly experiment that he conducted with his economics teacher at Frank-
furt, Heinz Sauermann (Sauermann and Selten 1959), a paper that was
translated into English the following year in a yearbook co-edited by
Rapoport. Their experiment was a multi-period Cournot oligopoly model
played by volunteer Frankfurt undergraduates. A mathematics student,
Selten also took psychology courses in which he took part in experiments.
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Influenced by Kalisch et al. (1954) and by Ricciardi (1957), the American
Management Association’s booklet on its computerized business game
(Sauermann and Selten also cited Chamberlin 1948), Selten persuaded his
teacher Sauermann of the promise of experimental work in economics
(interview with Selten in Smith 1992, 258–259). Sauermann went on to edit
three conference volumes on experimental economics in 1967, 1970, and
1972, with Selten contributing to the first two and James Friedman (1972)
to the third. Sauermann also edited a volume of experimental studies of
Coalition Forming Behaviour (1978). Appropriately, Selten contributed to
the inaugural issue of Experimental Economics in 1998. Only the very
beginnings of experimental economic gaming in Germany and Japan
occurred in the period covered by the present essay, but they foreshad-
owed substantial later activity, most notably at Selten’s Bonn research
laboratory.
1.9 Conclusion
This essay has examined the development of experimental gaming in eco-
nomics from its origins as an approach completely outside mainstream
economic methodology (although more compatible with accepted method-
ology in psychology) up to a point where, although still far from being
generally accepted in the discipline of economics, it could be the subject of
doctoral dissertations in economics at a major graduate school (James
Friedman at Yale) and articles in one of the leading mainstream eco-
nomics journals (Smith 1962, 1965 in the Journal of Political Economy)
and had begun to spread beyond its country of origin (Sauermann and
Selten 1959; Sakaguchi 1960). Experimental gaming in economics suffered
some significant setbacks in its early years, especially the early death of
Sidney Siegel in 1961 and the departure from RAND of key participants
such as Flood and Nash by the time that Thrall et al. (1954) appeared in
print, so that volume marked the end rather than the beginning of such
work at RAND. Nonetheless, important advances were made in this
period in how to conduct experimental games: the importance of meaning-
ful remuneration, completeness or incompleteness of information, possi-
bility of communication, the potentially differing results of one-shot and
repeated games, recognition of subjective rationality.
Contrary to the methodology that was generally accepted in economics,
game theory became in this period a field that looked to controlled experi-
ments for empirical testing of its theories. Although econometrics was
spreading across fields of economics, attempts to apply game theory in the
era 1945–60 were attempts to use game theory in applied fields (see
Dimand 2000), not empirical applications to data sets. It was through
experimentation that theories of strategic interaction encountered evid-
ence. Interest in game theory crossed disciplinary boundaries, and served
to bring game theorists in economics and in applied mathematics into
18 Robert W. Dimand
close contact with researchers from such fields as psychology and biology,
for whom experimentation was a matter of course. Clyde Coombs, one of
the organizers of the University of Michigan game-theory seminar and of
the Santa Monica conference, and an editor of Thrall et al. (1954), was a
psychologist, as was William Estes, a key participant in the Santa Monica
conference. Experimental gaming at Penn State resulted from the collabo-
ration of the economist Lawrence Fouraker with the psychologist Sidney
Siegel. Anatol Rapoport was a mathematical biologist at the University of
Michigan and a founder of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, which took a
cross-disciplinary approach to peace and conflict studies, with a strong
emphasis on game theory. The distinctive path of game theory within eco-
nomics, making use of experimental gaming when other sub-disciplines of
economics typically eschewed experimentation, reflected the exceptional
degree to which economists interested in game theory interacted and col-
laborated with researchers from other disciplines in the period studied in
this essay. This began with John von Neumann’s and Oskar Morgenstern’s
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), which, despite the adjec-
tive “economic” in the title, offered its approach to a wide range of social
sciences and applied mathematics, and was the result of collaboration
between a non-economist (from mathematics, physics, and computing)
and an economist, both of whom attended the Santa Monica conference.
The game-theory community inspired by their work included such econo-
mists as Martin Shubik (Morgenstern’s assistant and doctoral student) but
was by no means limited to economists. Other areas of economics had far
less contact with disciplines in which experimentation was traditional.
While Shubik, Rapoport, Siegel and Fouraker, and the contributors to
Thrall et al. (1954), explicitly drew inspiration from von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s game theory, Chamberlin (1948) stands as an exception, an
exercise in experimental economic gaming rooted in Chamberlin’s earlier
work on monopolistic competition. However, Chamberlin (1948) had little
influence, except on Vernon Smith, and even Smith did not at first appreci-
ate the significance of what Chamberlin had attempted (Smith 1992, 242).
Some of the results, notably the very first economic experimental game
used by Chamberlin in 1948 to deny that markets converge to the
competitive equilibrium price, were found to be too hasty. The experimen-
tal, strictly competitive games surveyed by Colman (1982, 76–82) are char-
acterized by him as “confusing and confused” with “wild departures from
minimax observed in the subjects’ strategy choices.” Some of these obser-
vations resulted because any strategy is optimal against a minimax player,
and because a non-minimax optimal strategy can be found to exploit an
opponent’s observed, persistent choice of a particular non-minimax strat-
egy. Even allowing for these factors, these experimental results provide a
challenge to game theory, just as experimentation outside strategic games
has produced the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes as challenges to accepted
utility theory.
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Colman (1982, 82–83) also notes that
Over the years, a growing chorus of commentators has expressed mis-
givings about the ecological validity of experimental games . . . the
extent to which the results of an experiment can be generalised to
non-experimental, naturally occurring situations. . . . One cannot help
being struck, however, by the paucity of “new research tasks” that
have sprung from concern with the ecological validity of experimental
games. In particular, few attempts have been made to compare
behaviour in abstract experimental games with behaviour in more life-
like strategic interactions.
For instance, Rapoport (1970) argues that abstract laboratory games are
interesting enough in themselves to warrant study, and warns against gen-
eralizing their results to the real world. In addition, Colman’s 1982 book
was motivated by his complaint that, with increasing specialization and
intellectual division of labor in a growing subject, “Game theorists, in
general, remain largely oblivious of the empirical studies that have been
inspired by the theory, and experimental investigators have tended to
assume that the nuts and bolts of the theory do not concern them.” This
increasing specialization, and its consequences in the form of diminished
communication between game theorists and experimental gamers, is
ironic, since the emergence of experimental economic games as a distinc-
tive feature of game theory within economics in the 1950s reflected the
cross-disciplinary intellectual interaction of economists and such non-
economists as psychologists and biologists involved in game theory. These
two criticisms, insufficient comparison of the results of experimental
games with empirical evidence and inadequate communication between
theorists and experimenters, can be viewed as setting an agenda for
further work, and one can observe promising indications of such work, for
instance in Experimental Economics.
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2 The Allais Paradox and its
immediate consequences for
expected utility theory
Sophie Jallais and Pierre-Charles Pradier
2.1 Introduction
The Allais Paradox, which nobody knew of 30 years ago, has become a
cornerstone of both decision theory and experimental economics. More-
over, it earned its inventor the Nobel Prize and a degree of fame much
greater than that afforded by his theoretical work. To the extent that it lay
at the heart of the experiment initiated during the 1952 Paris Conference,
the Allais Paradox can be said to have grounded modern decision theory
in experimental practice, and may be acknowledged as marking the birth
of a discipline. Before 1952, decision theory (from Pascal to Ramsey)
implied an a priori approach, and was thus part of mathematics; it might
even have been confused with probability theory.1 After Allais’ experi-
ment, it was no longer possible to think entirely a priori, without regard
for experimental feedback. The new field of study attracted many new
people. From the 1970s onwards, countless papers were devoted to testing
expected utility theory (hereafter EUT). Alternative decision theories
were developed, numerous journals were founded to support the effort,
and myriad researchers joined the quest for a decision theory that was
descriptively adequate – and, as Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky would
have added, normatively unassailable.
This account of the historical significance of the Allais Paradox may
seem somewhat exaggerated insofar as it neglects the role of, among
others, American psychologists, such as Edwards, Coombs and Nogee
(along with Mosteller who was a statistician).2 Nonetheless, the fact
remains that Allais was one of the first to do something. The question is
thus: what did he really do in 1952? In 1979, Allais edited Expected Utility
Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox, an entire book dedicated to the 1952
experiment and its consequences. However, upon reading this book, one is
struck by the fact that the schedule of events is somewhat blurred. In order
to shed some light on the matter, therefore, we met with some of the
participants of the conference. Notwithstanding the fact that these
participants mistrusted their memories of events occurring over 50 years
ago, their testimonies constitute precious evidence. We also benefited
from the papers collected by Georges Guilbaud during these years.3 We
thus had the opportunity to trace the development of Allais’ thought from
the very first drafts of 1950 to the last 1955 paper. It appeared to us that
this context greatly helped in understanding the process which led Allais
to oppose EUT the way he did. This story is at the heart of the essay
(section 2.3). We try, in particular, to distinguish between the Paradox and
the 1952 experiment.
It would have been tempting to review the consequences of the
Paradox, but this would have led us far from our subject, for most of the
consequences of Allais’ work in decision theory followed Expected Utility
Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox (1979). They involved replications of
the original experiment, with some follow-ups adding different evidence,
and were thus probably very indirect consequences of the original 1952
experiment. In our historical account of the Allais experiment of 1952,
therefore, we focus on its immediate consequences. These constitute the
main subject of section 2.4.
In particular, we consider a luncheon with Allais and Savage, where the
American was confronted with a bitter discovery. It seems that the imme-
diate impact of the Allais Paradox was felt by Savage, in relation to the
interpretation of his own theory, and resulted in his moving from a posit-
ive interpretation of EUT to a “normative” one. The meaning of this
adjective will be made more precise in the following, as it is related to
Allais’ exposition of his paradox. This will allow us to discuss the meanings
of these adjectives in decision theory, as well as the location of the frontier
between their relative fields. We hope that this work will help the reader
to deal with “the subtlety and complexity of the normative/descriptive
interface”,4 emphasized by Slovic in relation to rationality. We begin in
section 2.2 with the interpretation of the theory before Allais entered the
scene.
2.2 Interpretations of EUT by American authors before
1952
In 1952, as today, EUT stated that choice among risky prospects can be
represented as a comparison between the mean utility of each prospect.5
Given a utility function u(.) (defined up to a linear transformation) the
value index of any6 lottery f=(p1, f1, . . . , pi, fi, . . . , pn, fn) (giving prize fi





where W stands for the initial wealth of the decision-maker to which the
random variable f is added. This being a generalization of a formula by
Daniel Bernoulli (which appeared in Bernoulli 1731 with a log function in
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place of u(.)), Allais has called it “the neo-Bernoullian formulation” of
EUT (Allais 1952d: 78).
It should be noted that, in contrast to Bernoulli’s theory, EUT is an
axiomatized construction. In 1952, there existed several axiom sets impos-
ing restrictions on preferences, each of which could lead to the same
decision functional (see, for example, von Neumann and Morgenstern
1944; Friedman and Savage 1948; Marschak 1950; Friedman and Savage
1952). It is not our task here to review these axiomatizations, as this has
been done elsewhere (see, for example, McClennen 1990; Fishburn and
Wakker 1995). In particular, we shall set aside the rather “technical”
axioms (such as continuity), to stress the importance of only the so-called
“independence” condition. This axiom is somewhat tricky. Missing in  von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s original work, many times reformulated (cf.,
for instance, the sure-thing principle of Savage 1954), it has most recently
been examined by Fishburn and Wakker 1995.7 The reason why we
mention this crucial axiom is that it implies linearity in probability of the
preference functional, a restriction that was attacked by later critics.
Before the 1952 Paris Conference, several interpretations of EUT were
maintained in the United States. For example, Marschak (1951) inter-
preted it as a prescriptive theory, that is, a theory that tells individuals how
they ought to behave. For his part, Samuelson writes that “the new
significance of the Bernoulli theory to me is of an aesthetic and semantic
character” (Samuelson 1952a, p. 128, p. 130). But most of the prominent
American contributors to decision theory (Friedman, Morgenstern, von
Neumann, Savage, etc.) presented EUT as a positive theory, that is, a con-
jecture about actual behaviour.
The first to present EUT as positive were von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, who revived this field of study. More precisely, these authors
claimed an empirical content for the concept of utility they used through
an analogy with physics and the subsequent possibility of this concept’s
being invalidated by empirical evidence8, 9:
It is sometimes claimed in economic literature that discussions of the
notions of utility and preferences are altogether unnecessary, since
these are purely verbal definitions with no empirical observable con-
sequences, i.e., entirely tautological. It does not seem to us that these
notions are qualitatively inferior to certain well established and indis-
pensable notions in physics, like force, mass, charge, etc. That is, while
they are in their immediate form merely definitions, they become
subject to empirical control through the theories which are built upon
them – and in no other way. Thus the notion of utility is raised above
the status of a tautology by such economic theories as make use of it
and the result of which can be compared with experience or at least
with common sense.
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, pp. 8–9)
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It would seem then that the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility
theory (as presented in Chapter I of the Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior) can be interpreted as a conjecture about actual or observable
choice involving risk.10
Friedman and Savage were more explicit, and prolific, on the subject. In
their 1948 and 1952 papers, they assert that EUT allows for the rational-
ization (Friedman and Savage 1948, p. 279, p. 282, p. 287), explanation
(p. 279), description (p. 297) and even prediction (Friedman and Savage
1952, pp. 464–465) of actual choices among alternatives involving risk. The
only “decisive test” of the theory’s validity, they argue, is comparison of its
consequences or predictions with observation: “It should be accepted . . . if
it leads to ‘correct’ predictions usually or more frequently than any equally
useful alternative; it should be rejected if its predictions are generally con-
tradicted by observation” (Friedman and Savage 1952, p. 473).
This methodological stance comes from both Friedman’s flirtation
with falsificationism in the early 1950s and Friedman and Savage’s
overconfidence in their “promising conjecture” (Friedman and Savage
1952, p. 466).11 Such confidence was partly derived from direct evidence
or “direct survival of ‘critical’ experiments” (Friedman and Savage 1952,
p. 466).12 But, such tests being rare, confidence derives mostly from what
the authors call “indirect evidence” (Friedman and Savage 1952, p. 466).
The idea is that the axioms (or postulates) are “convincing”, and so,
according to Friedman and Savage, EUT will in general fail to be refuted
by experiment. For instance, after a thorough exposition of their third
postulate, the so-called “independence axiom”, Friedman and Savage
conclude:
We anticipate that if the reader considers the principle . . ., he will
concede that the principle is not one he would deliberately violate.
This in turn we consider to be some reason for supposing that people
do actually tend to avoid flagrant violation of the principle.
(1952, p. 469; emphasis added)
2.3 The 1952 Paris conference and the Allais experiment
2.3.1 Allais and the “French marginalist school” in the 1950s13
In the usual accounts of the Paris 1952 conference, it seems that Allais
stood alone against what he called the American school.14 However, it
would be easy to cite several less well-known names to show that Allais
was neither the only Frenchman to pay attention to EUT, nor the only one
to interpret this theory in a prescriptive sense, nor the only one to think of
alternative theories, nor the only one to design counterexamples.
First of all, EUT was important to French economists before 1950.
According to the evidence collected by Guilbaud, who attended the semi-
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nars of Allais, Darmois and Roy (the only three research seminars in
mathematical economics in France by this time), no less than 16 sessions
of research seminars were devoted to the discussion of EUT between 1949
and 1952.15 It seems that the interest in decision theory emanated mainly
from Pierre Massé’s trailblazing work in the early 1940s. As chief engineer
in an electricity company, Massé (1898–1987) designed decision rules for
both water reserves management and investment selection (see, for
example, Massé 1944, 1946 and 1964). It is well known among the French
that Massé independently discovered the “principle of optimality” of
dynamic programming, or “principle of Pontryagin” (see Dreze 1964, p. 5
or Boiteux 1993, p. 95). When Electricité de France (EDF) was created in
1946, Massé was appointed engineering director and shortly thereafter,
president.16 Later (in 1958), he became the charismatic head of the French
planning authority (Commissaire Général du Plan). Massé was thus at the
heart and soul of both the French planning system and the research
community in mathematical economics.17 It must be emphasized here that
the Plan had a didactical role as it was directed towards not only macro-
economic equilibrium but also the modernization of management.
Decision theory was part of this effort to modernize France. Henceforth,
the story of decision theory expresses a typically French trait: the econo-
mists were high-ranking civil servants who considered it their duty to
enlighten the masses of less-educated economic practitioners.18 The ideas
developed in research seminars were broadcast by the planning authority
(Carré et al. 1973, p. 246) and by the CNRS (the 1954 papers by Guilbaud
and Massé resulted from public lectures published in a single CNRS
volume). We shall now introduce the other French authors who (together
with Massé and Allais) contributed to the development of decision theory,
and try to characterize their attitude toward EUT.
By the time of the Paris conference, French authors were divided
among two groups: the engineer-economists around Allais, and the mathe-
maticians with the Institut de Statistique de l’Université de Paris (ISUP).
Among the former, Massé’s research was quickly backed by Allais and his
students at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris (ENSMP),
among whom were Marcel Boiteux (1922–), Gerard Debreu (1920–2004),
Edmond Malinvaud (1923–) and Jacques Lesourne (1928–). Some high-
ranking civil servants also attended the Allais research seminar.19 On the
other hand, Georges Darmois (1888–1960), director of the ISUP, attracted
Georges Guilbaud (1912–) and Georges Morlat (1926–), together with
Jean Ville (1910–1989) and Germain Kreweras (1916–1998), whose names
are well-known among mathematicians. Guilbaud played a central role in
the diffusion of applied mathematics, especially operations research.20
Moreover, he was the instigator of the 1952 Paris conference. As for
Morlat, although he is relatively unknown in the academic world, because
he never appeared in any organization chart, in the 1960s, he became both
the informal head of economic research with EDF and successor to
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Darmois at the Sorbonne. It should be emphasized that these subpopula-
tions of French decision theorists were somewhat intermingled: Guilbaud
attended both the Allais and the Darmois seminars,21 Allais was involved
in the creation of the SOFRO, and Massé himself hired Morlat, an ISUP
old boy, at the EDF, and so on.
Why then distinguish between engineer-economists and mathemati-
cians, if both of them were so interested in decision theory as to organize a
meeting on the subject? To put it simply, there was a real divergence as
regards EUT. The mathematicians of the ISUP were in favour of it (with
some provisos), while the engineers around Allais were opposed to it,22
and there is much evidence of criticism of EUT in Allais’ seminar. Allais
himself presented a paper at the Paris conference (Allais 1952a, which
became with some addenda the Econometrica paper) which summarized
the work done in seminar. At the very same conference, Massé and Morlat
(1952) put forward an axiomatization of choice which seemed to be a syn-
thesis of Massé’s 1944 and 1953 (written in 1951) works. These theories of
choice shared their basic postulates (consistency of choice, “absolute pref-
erence” which amounted to first-degree stochastic dominance), and both
criticized EUT for the too-strong “independence” assumption. These
“French” theories of choice accounted for behaviour that contradicted
EUT.23
It must be made clear that even the French supporters of EUT (to
whom we may add de Finetti) agreed only on a prescriptive interpretation
of EUT, which, they thought, lacked empirical support.24 Much evidence is
given in the seminars held before the 1952 conference, which was organ-
ized jointly by Allais and Guilbaud. The only role of decision theory was
to choose decision rules for the managers of the public sector.25 Therefore,
it seems clear that Allais shared with his fellow French mathematical econ-
omists an interpretation of decision theory in general that was not
positive.26
Another feature of the French attitude towards EUT is expressed in
counterexamples: pairs of choices designed to ensure that a decision-maker
will violate EUT. While what is now called the Allais Paradox, to be
reviewed below, is probably the best known of such counterexamples,
Allais was not alone in this regard. Savage claimed that “Another interest-
ing example was presented somewhat earlier by Georges Morlat” (Savage
1954, p. 101).27 According to Guilbaud,28 a key witness of the conference,
designing such counterexamples was a common occupation among the
French during the Paris conference (and this may be further evidence of
intense preparation in the many seminar sessions devoted to EUT),
although there is no other example besides that given by Savage and Mac-
Crimmon.
If most French decision theorists shared Allais’ interpretation of
decision theory, and some of them his dissatisfaction with EUT and taste
for counterexamples, what then distinguished Allais? One might be
30 S. Jallais and P.-C. Pradier
tempted to think of Allais’ theoretical works, but this would take us away
from decision theory. From the end of the 1940s, Allais showed a peculiar
interest in the empirical testing of theory. In his 1949 “paper” (which is, in
fact, a middle-sized book) on the management of state-run coal mines,
Allais offered an appendix dealing with the “objective criterion for effi-
cient management” (Allais 1949–1953, pp. 107–112, our translation). Allais
sought to infer from existing statistics a test of whether every civil servant
was an efficient manager.29 What is interesting in the test is not its object
(which did not involve uncertainty) but the construction of the sample
population: only trained decision-makers were surveyed, not ordinary
people as had been done before (such as in Mosteller-Nogee 1951). That
the survey showed inefficiency of the French civil servants is of no import-
ance for our purpose, but the idea of experimenting among a selected
population was a key feature, because it eventually brought Allais the
fame his masterworks did not give him.30
2.3.2 The Allais experiment: the Allais Paradox and the
questionnaire
What the literature commonly considers as Allais’ first contribution to
decision theory, although we have seen it was backed and anticipated by
others, is the “Allais Paradox”. This well-known pair of choices:
1° Do you prefer situation A to B? 2° Do you prefer C to D?
Situation A Situation C
– certainty of receiving 100 million – an 11 per cent chance of winning
100 million
– an 89 per cent chance of winning
nothing
Situation B Situation D
– a 10 per cent chance of winning – a 10 per cent chance of winning 
– 500 million – 500 million
– an 89 per cent chance of winning – a 90 per cent chance of winning 
– 100 million – nothing
– a 1 per cent chance of winning 
– nothing
induces approximately 45 per cent of the respondents to violate EUT.31
This 45 per cent rate seems stable and the original Allais results have been
replicated by (among others) MacCrimmon 1968, Slovic and Tversky 1974
and MacCrimmon and Larsson 1975 (Allais 1979, pp. 636–637, n. 15). As
we present it, the counterexample in itself is not really new, but the idea of
submitting the economists to such questions in a matter of inquiry was
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Allais’ specific idea. The question is when and how Allais set his experi-
ment up.
The Allais Paradox appears in print in Allais (1953, p. 527) with this
introductory note:
A first draft of this paper has been given in a more general study
called “theoretical notes on future uncertainty and risk” which was
presented at the European Econometric Congress in September 1951.
A second draft was presented as a communication at the International
Colloquium on risk which happened in Paris in 1952.
(Allais 1953, p. 503, n. 1)32
This excerpt suggests that the Paradox was presented in public twice
before its publication: once at Louvain in September 1951 and a second
time in Paris in May 1952. The subsequent literature suggests that this
presentation took place during the second of these conferences (see, e.g.,
Munier 1984 or Camerer 1995). As we shall see, these authors do not give
an entirely exact account of the Allais experiment, not because the
Paradox had been presented before but because, on the contrary, it seems
that it was not presented to the general public at all at either of these con-
ferences, but only to Savage, during a lunch-break at the second confer-
ence. This allows us to make a distinction between the Allais Paradox
itself and the related experiments, and to give a clear historical account of
the latter.
It must first be pointed out that what we currently call the Allais
Paradox appeared for the first time in papers written after the conference
and published in 1953.33 It is not mentioned in any of the hectographed
notes in the Guilbaud papers prior to this date. And there is no mention of
it either in Allais’ interventions at the conference (Allais 1952a, 1952b)
nor in any of the records of the public discussions which took place
(CNRS 1953). Boiteux, who was present at both conferences, and partici-
pated with a paper of his own, tells us that he only came across the
Paradox later on, more precisely when he received a questionnaire from
Allais.34 All this suggests that the Paradox had not been presented to the
public at the Louvain conference either, a point stressed by Malinvaud.35
We were unable to find the paper referred to by Allais as “Notes
théoriques sur l’incertitude de l’avenir et le risque”. Allais’ contribution is
the only one reported neither by an abstract nor by the records of a discus-
sion in “Report of the Louvain Meeting” which appeared in Econometrica
in 1952. It is difficult then to state categorically that the Paradox was not
presented to the public at this meeting. Let us point out, nevertheless (and
this concurs with what Boiteux and Malinvaud say), that what is presented
as the partial English translation of this text (in Allais and Hagen 1979)
does not contain the Paradox. If the famous Paradox is not mentioned in
the abstract published in this work dedicated to Expected Utility Theory
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and the Allais Paradox, it is probable that one cannot find it in the rest of
the “Notes”.
Even if no evidence of the Allais Paradox is to be found in Allais’ pub-
lished work before late 1952, one can nevertheless guess that the Paradox
was ready by the time of the conference. However, one must read between
the lines to find evidence of this. First, Allais states: “I had Savage respond
over lunch to a list of some 20 questions. His answer to each was incom-
patible with the basic axioms of the theory” (Allais 1979, p. 533).36 Then,
Savage acknowledged that he was faced with the Paradox during a lunch –
presumably the same.37 All of this suggests that Allais presented his
Paradox while the Paris conference was taking place (that is, before Allais
1952c or 1952d), but to Savage alone, and not during one of the public ses-
sions.
This point was never made clear, and many of those who attended the
conference often confuse the schedule of the conference itself with the
subsequent work immediately undertaken by Allais.
After the conference and the lunchtime “trap”, Allais decided to
extend the testing of conformity to EUT. As he could not proceed from
existing data, he designed a questionnaire which was to become famous.
This questionnaire seems to have been ready by June 1952 (Allais 1979,
p. 557, n. 17), and sent during the summer to the respondents, among
whom there were many participants of the Paris conference (Allais 1955,
p. 54).38 Only a small sample was processed by the time of Allais 1952c,
and no more until Allais 1974.39 From the final processing of the question-
naire, Allais concluded that “no subject acts according to the neo-
Bernoullian principle in respect to all the series of questions” (Allais 1979,
p. 452).
Actually, Arrow, Baumol, Friedman, Marschak and Savage successfully
passed the questionnaire (Allais 1979, p. 560, n. 48), some of them because
“they determined their answers using the neo-Bernoullian formulation”,
according to a utility function they chose a priori.40 Morgenstern and
Samuelson did not answer the questionnaire (Allais and Hagen 1979,
p. 685). Among leading members of the so-called American school, only
Malinvaud, de Finetti and Shackle fell into the trap!41 However, they were
not trapped by the Allais Paradox (Allais 1979, p. 636, n. 15), but by ques-
tions involving the calculation of certainty equivalents (Allais 1979, p. 588,
n. 258; see also pp. 628–631).
Thus, the “1952 experiment” can be summed up as a personal defeat for
the lone (and late) Leonard Jimmie Savage during a luncheon (many
authors thus criticized the questionable nature of this experiment: see, e.g.,
Allais 1979, pp. 541–543 for references, and see also Rizvi in this volume
for a general criticism of experiments); the other Americans were not
trapped by the later questionnaire.
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2.4 The normative retreat
After 1952, EUT was progressively presented by everyone who remained
involved with this subject matter as a prescriptive theory, though the posit-
ive interpretation did not completely disappear. More precisely, amongst
those who presented the theory as a positive one, before the Paris confer-
ence, von Neumann and Friedman remained silent on the subject, while
Savage and Morgenstern changed their way of introducing the theory.42
We will focus our attention on Savage, for he immediately reacted to
Allais’ criticism, during his stay in Paris, and then in The Foundations of
Statistics (1954). Furthermore, since Morgenstern did not publish on this
subject until the 1970s (Morgenstern 197243 and 1974), it is difficult to
think of his later papers as being stimulated by the Allais Paradox, even if,
as we shall see, they show noticeable similarities to Savage’s writings.
2.4.1 The Allais Paradox and the fading out of the Savagian
positive interpretation of EUT
After 1954, Savage no longer held that his theory was scientific because of
its refutability, nor did he still believe that the theory was able to with-
stand empirical testing. Two years after the Paris meeting with Allais,
Savage no longer presented EUT as “the promising conjecture” that
would probably “fail to be contradicted” (Friedman and Savage 1952,
p. 466). As a positive theory, it had been refuted by his own responses to
Allais’ questions; as a positive theory, it could now at best be a “crude and
shallow” one (Savage 1954, p. 20), a theory that “makes factual predictions
many of which can easily be observed to be false” (Savage 1954, p. 97).
Thus, from the beginning of his Foundations of Statistics, Savage does
not present his postulates as ones relevant for actual behaviour but rather
as “postulates for rational behavior”: “I am, he states, about to build up a
highly idealized theory of the behavior of a ‘rational’ person with respect
to decision” (p. 7). Savage does not make any ambiguous statements:
rational behaviour cannot be considered as a good approximation of
actual behaviour of individuals in choosing among alternatives involving
uncertainty. The aim of the theory is no longer to explain actual decisions
but rather to guide them: his postulates are presented as rational “maxims
of behavior” (p. 7). For Savage, the theory is now unambiguously pre-
scriptive. Henceforth, Savage offers two possible interpretations for
his postulates, a positive – or “empirical” – one, and another he calls
“normative”:
Two very different sorts of interpretations can be made of P1 and the
other postulates to be adduced later. First, P1 can be regarded as a
prediction about the behavior of people, or animals, in decision situ-
ations. Second, it can be regarded as a logic-like criterion of consis-
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tency in decision situations. For us, the second interpretation is the only
one of direct relevance, but it may be fruitful to discuss both, calling
the first empirical and the second normative.
(Savage 1954, p. 19, emphasis added)44
Eighty pages later, he again brings up the same idea and alludes to his
change of mind. He does not clearly mention his own previous opinion,
but cites  von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944: “One idea now held by me
that I think von Neumann and Morgenstern do not explicitly support, and
that so far as I know they might not wish to have attributed to them, is the
normative interpretation of the theory” (Savage 1954, p. 97, emphasis
added). But since Savage doesn’t clearly admit it himself, why do we
suppose that it was the Allais Paradox that forced him to change his mind?
First of all, The Foundations of Statistics was not written in a couple of
weeks: Samuelson refers to its imminent publication as early as 1952, in a
paper written right after the Paris colloquium.45 Secondly, Savage’s last
paper with Friedman, in which he speaks of his theory as positive, was
written just before the Paris meeting, which shows that Savage had not yet
changed his mind. One can, of course, argue that the epistemology in the
1952 paper was Friedman’s only (the same statements were to be found
again a year later in his Essays in Positive Economics). But Marschak
recalls an interesting anecdote that confirms that, at the beginning of the
Paris meeting, Savage still thought of the theory as (mainly) positive:
On a May day in 1952, between sessions of the International Collo-
quium on Risk, Professor Allais drove his luncheon guests to the
Racing Club de France on the outskirts of Paris. The guests – Ragnar
Frisch, L. J. Savage and myself – alighted from his car. Maurice Allais
maneuvered to park it, got out, and began to cross the road hurriedly,
causing the driver of an oncoming car to brake sharply. Allais just
avoided being hit. Instantly, Savage snapped his fingers and
exclaimed, “Bob Thrall should be there!” For our host’s actions con-
tradicted the lexicographical preference ordering that Professor Thrall
had defended in the morning session and that would, of course, rank
“surviving but letting one’s guests wait one more minute” ahead of the
smallest chance of being run over.
Savage was thus arguing from observed behavior. Yet his Founda-
tions of Statistics published two years later profess to be mainly norm-
ative, prescriptive – not descriptive.
(Marschak 1979, p. 163)
Our conclusion is that Savage changed his mind sometime between his
lunch with Allais and the completion of the manuscript of The Founda-
tions of Statistics.
What then, if not the Allais Paradox, could have triggered this change?
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Is it not precisely the beginning of this move that Allais reports 27 years
later in the following passage?
During the 1952 Paris Colloquium, I had Savage respond over lunch
to a list of some 20 questions. His answers to each was incompatible
with the basic axioms of his own theory. He was immediately troubled,
and asked for time to think. A week later he told me that his reactions
during our lunch conversation had indeed run counter to his own
axioms, but that after further reflection, he had concluded that his
responses, contrary to his axioms, were explained by the fact that he
had behaved irrationally.
(Allais 1979, p. 533)46
One can read these sentences as an early enunciation of the Savagian
interpretation of EUT as a theory of rational behaviour, but the specific
meaning Savage gave to this expression partly results from the framework
where Allais inserted his Paradox, when he offered it to a public reader-
ship for the first time (in Allais 1952d and in 1953).47 It is thus necessary to
recall this framework of Allais (1952d, 1953) in order to, firstly, under-
stand why Savage could not be satisfied – and he was not – with presenting
his theory only as a theory of rational behaviour, and, secondly, explain
what Savage meant by “normative”.
2.4.2 The Allais Paradox: an experimental refutation of a
theory of rational behaviour
The Allais Paradox as presented, for instance, in Allais 1952d (or in 1953)
is in fact (and somewhat surprisingly) a test of EUT as a maxim for ratio-
nal behaviour. More precisely, it is a part of a more general “criticism of
the neo-Bernoullian formulation EUT as a behavioural rule for a rational
man” (Allais 1952d, p. 74, emphasis added). Let us here recall this
criticism.
In order to cast doubt on “the validity of the neo-Bernoullian formula-
tion for a rational man” (Allais 1952d, p. 76), Allais first calls on the neo-
Bernoullians to show in which way their theory stands for rational
behaviour. From his point of view, it is not satisfying to define rationality
in terms of obedience of the neo-Bernoullian axiomatics, for this leads to
circular reasoning. The theory is a maxim for rational conduct because
rational conduct is defined as conduct in agreement with the theory. As he
puts it :
The neo-Bernoullian formulation is in fact rigorously equivalent to
anyone of these systems of axioms, the systems of axioms or postu-
lates from which the neo-Bernoullian formulation is derived, and
there is no interest at all in discussing the view that a rational man
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should behave according to the neo-Bernoullian formulation when
rationality is itself defined in terms of obedience to one of the systems
of axioms from which that principle is deduced. This is a tautological
position, and therefore useless scientifically.
(Allais 1952d, p. 78)
In order to contend that EUT is a theory of rational behaviour, one must
have a definition of rationality independent of the theory itself.
Allais then proposes two definitions of rationality – an “abstract defini-
tion of rationality” and an “experimental definition of rationality” –
against which EUT will be gauged (Allais 1952d), and which will be used
to deny that EUT is a theory of rational behaviour.
According to Allais’ first definition, rationality is synonymous with con-
sistency; mutual consistency of ends, on the one hand, and consistency of
ends and means, on the other (Allais 1952d, p. 78).48 Allais uses this defini-
tion to show that some choices can be simultaneously rational and incom-
patible with EUT (“rationality in no way implies the neo-Bernoullian
formulation”, Allais 1952d, p. 82). For the neo-Bernoullian theory is more
restrictive than the conditions one could abstractly assign to rational
behaviour. In particular, Savage’s independence axiom does not allow
certain choices that could nevertheless be deemed rational according to
Allais’ abstract definition.49 Hence one can not think of this theory as a
theory of rational behaviour. Allais understands that this refutation may
seem insufficient, that one may not want to rely on such an abstract defini-
tion of rationality (in Allais 1952d, p. 79, § 53). So he designates another
type of refutation using what he calls “an experimental definition of
rationality”.
According to this definition, the individuals “whom one has reason in
other respects to believe act rationally” (Allais 1952d, p. 79) or, in other
words, “who are commonly considered as rational” (Allais 1952d, p. 80)
are said to behave rationally. Starting with this definition, Allais uses his
paradox as a way of confounding allegedly “rational” individuals (such as
Savage), or more precisely of inducing them to make choices that are
clearly incompatible with EUT (see, for example, Allais 1952d, pp. 86–95).
Let us see how Allais himself introduces his Paradox:
Under Savage’s fifth axiom, the order of preference of two random
prospects . . . having a part in common is left unchanged by any dis-
placement of this part. This can be called the independence
principle . . .
It is easy to build up many examples in which the answer given by
reputedly rational people would run counter to Savage’s fundamental
axiom. One need only, as a general rule, choose extreme cases in
which the advantages (or drawbacks) of complementarity50 may be
particularly strong. This is particularly true of the choice between
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certain and uncertain gains whose value is high with comparison with
the player’s fortune. It is easy here to show the considerable psycho-
logical importance attaching to the advantage of certainty as such.
(Allais 1952d, p. 88)
From all this, Allais concludes: “What one finds, however, is that the
pattern for most highly prudent persons . . . who are considered generally
as rational, is the pairing A>B and C<D. This contradicts Savage’s
independence axiom” (Allais 1952d, p. 89).
It must be emphasized that the refutation at hand is not really backed
by an experimental definition; rather, it seems grounded on reasoning of
the following kind:
1 Some “facts indicated by experience” (Allais 1952d, p. 86) show that
some individuals “who are commonly considered as rational” do not
conform to EUT prescription; it is the case of those who make the
“Allaisian” choice of A and D (see note 31).
2 There is no reason to think that these individuals acted irrationally in
this special case, because, on the one hand, no satisfactory abstract
definition of rationality allows us to do so, and, on the other hand,
these individuals have some good reasons to act as they did: “nobody
could say that persons acting this way are behaving irrationally because
they attach a high value to certainty, but, where the outcome is far
from certain, weigh psychological values by their probabilities. If
somebody does wish to argue the contrary, it would be quite fascinat-
ing to hear his grounds!” (Allais 1952d, p. 92).
3 Thus one cannot think of EUT as a theory of rational behaviour.
From here on, if Savage were to bring back the subject, arguing his first
choice was irrational, he would be obliged to explain why he acted irra-
tionally.
Hence, the Allais Paradox, as well as the reasoning it stems from, was
given a particular role by Allais: it was intended to drive the EUT sup-
porters either to give a new definition of rationality, different from the
three ones we have already recalled, or to lay down their weapons and
acknowledge defeat.
2.4.3 The “more subtle” Savagian “normativity”
By 1954, Savage had become fully acquainted with Allais’ argument.51 He
fully understood Allais’ criticism of the neo-Bernoullian theory, not only
as a positive theory, but also as a theory for rational behaviour (see Savage
1954, pp. 101–102).
Thus, when Savage came to the question of what he calls the “norm-
ative” status of the theory, he seemed on the verge of giving an abstract
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definition (Savage 1954, p. 19), but he didn’t follow this line of reasoning.
For he knew that there is a gap between logic and preferences. He knew
this “important sense in which preferences”, even preferences of “ratio-
nal” individuals like him, who had chosen gambles A and D, “cannot be in
error” (Savage 1954, p. 103). But he knew too, having read Allais, that if
he was to find any experimental definition of rationality, he would have to
find one different from that of Allais, “a more subtle sense” (Savage 1954,
p. 103) in which preferences could be “in error”.
This “more subtle sense” was suggested to him by his own experience.
For if he fell into Allais’ trap, he also acknowledged his error. Modern
utility theory is therefore “normative”, not because it describes the
behaviour of rational individuals, but because, when individuals act so as
to violate it, if the theory is thoroughly explained to them, they acknowledge
their error. Thus, taking the example of the Allais Paradox, Savage (1954,
p. 103) presents a way of looking at the two situations that anyone should
accept:
One way in which Gambles A–D could be realized is by a lottery with
a hundred numbered tickets and with prizes according to the schedule
shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Prizes in units of $100,000 in a lottery realizing gambles 1–4
Ticket number
1 2–11 12–100
Situation 1 5 5 5
{Gamble 1, Gamble 2 0 25 5
Situation 2 5 5 0
{Gamble 3, Gamble 4 0 25 0
Now, if one of the tickets numbered from 12 through 100 is drawn, it
will not matter, in either situation, which gamble I choose. I therefore
focus on the possibility that one of the tickets numbered 1–11 will be
drawn, in which case Situations 1 and 2 are exactly parallel. The sub-
sidiary decision depends in both situations on whether I would sell
have an outright gift of $500,000 for a 10-to-1 chance to win $2,500,000
– a conclusion that I think a claim to universality, or objectivity.
(a) If I prefer the gift of $1,000,000. I should choose Gamble 1 over
Gamble 2 and Gamble 3 over Gamble 4.
(b) If I prefer to gamble for $5,000,000, I should choose Gamble 2
over Gamble 1 and Gamble 4 over Gamble 3.
The theory is then “normative”, according to Savage, as long as it is “con-
vincing”. We are driven back to the “convincing” theory which seemingly
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appeared in Friedman and Savage 1952. It must be emphasized that the
argument at hand is different: now, the convincing character of the theory
no longer derives from Savage’s confidence in a positive theory, it allows
rather claiming the relevance of the “normative” interpretation of the
theory, i.e. to suggest it would convince anybody whom it is suitably
explained to.
The same point of view was endorsed twenty years later by Morgen-
stern (in Morgenstern 1972 and 1974). According to him: “That theory, as
formulated by the von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms, is normative
in the sense that the theory is ‘absolutely convincing’ which implies that
men will act accordingly. If they deviate from the theory, an explanation of
theory and of their deviation will cause them to readjust their behavior”
(Morgenstern 1974, p. 180).52 But Morgenstern’s change of mind is not as
radical as Savage’s. For, even if his vindication of the positive dimension of
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 utility theory is no longer absolute,
Morgenstern reasserts that this theory “is a concrete theory, even
amenable to experiment” (1972, p. 700, n. 2).53
2.5 Conclusion
The Allais Paradox can be summed up in three steps and two interpreta-
tions:
• A lunch with Savage (during the conference). During this lunch, Allais
asked Savage 20 questions including the Paradox, which then
appeared to Savage as a refutation of EUT as a theory of actual
behaviour.
• The publication of Allais 1952d and 1953, where Allais’ argumenta-
tion, in which the Paradox played a key role, appeared as a logical and
experimental critique of EUT presented as a theory of rational
behaviour.
• The experiment itself, that is to say the conception, mailing and pro-
cessing of a questionnaire featuring no less than 400 questions (and
including the Paradox). The whole process lasted from June 1952 to
December 1975 (Allais 1979, p. 453).
Eventually, the main, if not the only, impact of the Allais Paradox on
EUT immediately after 1952 was on Savage’s interpretation of the theory.
More precisely, it seems that, after the Paris conference, Savage’s change
in opinion was concerned more with people than with EUT. For Savage,
EUT was as convincing in 1954 as in 1952. In 1954, though, it had become
necessary to first explain the theory in order to ensure that people would
act accordingly. In 1952, people acted accordingly by themselves, that is,
without previous explanation. The Savagian interpretation of EUT was
consequently modified: EUT was no longer presented as a positive theory
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but as a “normative” one. As a matter of fact, the interpretation of EUT
found in The Foundations of Statistics – and later in Morgenstern 1974 –
suggests that the theory is less normative than prescriptive. More pre-
cisely, it is a theory of rational conduct, where the adjective “rational” is
given a very peculiar meaning. After Allais 1953 (or 1952d), Savage gave
what we can call an “experimental” definition of rationality (which obvi-
ously differs from that of Allais): individuals to whom it is thoroughly
explained will act in accordance to EUT. As a consequence, the theory we
find in Savage 1954 (and in Morgenstern 1974) is, contrary to usual norm-
ative theories, refutable by experiment.54 Savage himself suggests the ade-
quate procedure: “If after thorough deliberation, anyone maintains a pair
of distinct preferences that are in conflict with the sure thing principle, he
must abandon, or modify, the principle; for that kind of discrepancy seems
intolerable in a normative theory” (Savage 1954, p. 102).55 Unfortunately,
the results of an experiment constructed by Slovic and Tversky in the early
1970s show that the explanations of “Dr S.” are less convincing than the
ones of “Dr A.” (Slovic and Tversky 1974). What a beautiful illustration of
the efficiency of the plan set up by Allais to trap the neo-Bernoullian!
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Notes
1 One could also cite Pascal, Daniel Bernoulli, D’alembert, Condorcet, Laplace,
Cournot, Bertrand, Borel and others.
2 The role of the psychologists in the early development of experimental eco-
nomic games is emphasized by the Dimand essay in this volume.
3 From 1947 to 1953, Guilbaud regularly attended not only Allais’ seminar at the
Institut Poincaré but also Roy’s and Darmois’ seminars. EUT and game theory
were regularly discussed since 1948, when he presented von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior at Allais’ seminar.
4 P. Slovic, personal communication (1999).
5 Following a plausible and common interpretation of Knight, decision theorists
generally use the word “risk” to describe a situation in which objective
probabilities are known, and the word “uncertainty” when no objective proba-
bilities are known, in which case it becomes necessary to adopt “subjective”
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probabilities (however, see Fontaine 1999 and Pradier and Teira-Serrano 2000
for important qualifications of this interpretation of Knight). This distinction is
quite important because axiomatization of uncertain decision leads to axiomati-
zation of the formation of subjective probabilities: this amounts to adding
axioms to the case where probabilities are given (see, for example, Arrow’s
1965 two-step axiomatization).
6 Reference is given only to discrete lotteries, as mathematical generality is not
needed.
7 Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s set of axioms appeared in the second edition
of their 1944 book. This presentation was puzzling for many authors (see, e.g.,
Samuelson 1952a, p. 129 of English translation) who alleged the existence of a
“zeroth axiom”. In fact, there was no zeroth axiom in von Neumann and Mor-
genstern’s work, rather a mathematical oddity that Marschak pointed out as
early as 1950, writing that von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theorem is stated
“in terms of entities not susceptible to ordinary arithmetical operations”
(Marschak 1950, p. 136). Fishburn and Wakker 1995 made clear that a problem
arises because von Neumann and Morgenstern considered the space of equiva-
lence-classes of lotteries, where all subsequent authors considered the space of
lotteries. This peculiar feature of the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory
turns out to be so tricky that many authors felt by 1950 the need for new, more
explicit, axiom sets.
8 The von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiom set was, of course, first needed on
mathematical grounds: “A choice of axioms is not a purely objective task. It is
usually expected to achieve some definite aim – some specific theorem or theo-
rems are to be derivable from the axioms – and to this extent the problem is
exact and objective.” Von Neumann was probably responsible for this formal
stance (see Leonard 1995). Nevertheless, these theorems were also intended to
represent risky behaviour as we argue.
9 According to the Innocenti and Zappia essay in this volume, von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1944 is a turning point in Morgenstern’s epistemological stance
toward experimentation.
10 It is a fact that the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory explicitly neglects
some “psychological influences on choice” (as Allais put it), such as the pleas-
ure of gambling. However, this point can not be turned into an objection to a
descriptive interpretation of the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory, for no
positive theory gives an exhaustive description of reality. As Nagel puts it:
“no finitely long statement can possibly formulate the totality of traits embod-
ied in any concretely existing thing” (1963, p. 214). The von Neumann and
Morgenstern attitude in this respect is shared by all alternative positive theo-
ries, including that of Allais: the Frenchman suggested neglecting these “psy-
chological influences” “in a first approximation” (1952d [1979], p. 57), allowing
for them “at a later stage by making appropriate adjustment” (1952d [1979],
p. 47).
11 Although the first point would require further historical-methodological discus-
sion, we will not develop it further (there is some evidence in the Rizvi essay in
this volume). We emphasize the other point because, as we shall see later, the
nature of Friedman and Savage’s confidence (i.e. the interpretation of the
“indirect evidence”) is what changed after the Allais Paradox.
12 For instance, from “the willingness of persons of all income classes to buy
insurance” or from “the willingness of individuals to purchase lottery tickets, or
engage in similar forms of gambling” (Friedman and Savage 1948, p. 285,
p. 286). Similarly “Some recent experiments by Mosteller and Nogee add to the
direct observational evidence and fail to contradict the hypothesis” (Friedman
and Savage 1952, p. 466). It should be emphasized that Mosteller and Nogee
42 S. Jallais and P.-C. Pradier
made real, controlled experiments, thus providing far more sophisticated evid-
ence than Friedman and Savage’s appeal to common-sense observation.
13 The expression “French marginalist school” appears in Dreze 1964 to describe
the French mathematical economists. Unless otherwise indicated, the material
from this and the following sections is based both on the interviews we had
with the witnesses of the 1952 conference, Marcel Boiteux, Georges Guilbaud,
Jacques Lesourne, Edmond Malinvaud and Georges Morlat, and on the Guil-
baud Papers.
14 This expression is Allais’ own invention; Guilbaud (1999, personal communica-
tion) and Malinvaud (2000, personal communication) denied any substance to
it. As we shall see later, Allais included in his American school many European
authors such as de Finetti, Guilbaud, Malinvaud, and others born European
(Marschak, Morgenstern, von Neumann). Therefore, this expression is only to
be used with extreme care.
15 For instance, the 1948 Friedman and Savage paper was discussed in 1949, and
Friedman was invited to present it in 1950. The title of the latter communica-
tion appears in the Guilbaud Papers as “Friedmann [sic], de Chicago: ‘La
mesure de l’utilité et les choix comportant un risque’”.
16 Massé has thus many connections with Robert Gibrat, who had important sta-
tistical interests (see Sutton 1997) and attended the Paris conference.
17 Unfortunately, little of this history has been written. The French Plan is usually
introduced as a macroeconomic practice, with little theory associated with it
(Dreze 1964); moreover, historians are generally fascinated by macroeconomic
aspects of the Plan, overlooking the role of microeconomic theorizing (Lordon
1997).
18 This perspective differs completely from the Planning, Programming and Bud-
geting Systems (PPBS) which tried to implement corporate-management rules
at state level. By the 1950s, state management in France was considered more
efficient, mainly because of the use of economic calculus in the tradition of
Dupuit, Cournot, etc. One can assess the whole production of these economists
by looking at the references in Appendix XI of Allais 1949–1953. Allais wrote
here that “. . . in the field of theoretical studies applied to the management of
public utilities, France is now much ahead” (n. 10, p. 118, our translation).
19 According to one directory in the Guilbaud papers, Massé and Desrousseaux
(director of mining and steel industry with the ministry of industry) attended
the seminar in 1948–49. Dreze thus emphasizes the peculiar nature of the
French economists: “Members of the French Marginalist School did and do
belong to the staffs of the engineering schools or statistics departments, to the
research as well as the executive divisions of the nationalized industries, or to
the administration, but not to the staffs of economics departments or economic
research institutes” (1964, p. 6). It is worth noting that of these high-ranking
civil servants, Hutter (chief engineer with the French railroad company) and
Lavaill attended the Paris conference.
20 In 1956, he was the founder of the Société Française de Recherche Opéra-
tionnelle, SOFRO, and of the Bureau Universitaire de Recherche Opérationnelle
with the ISUP.
21 To which Dreze 1964 refers as “Guilbaud’s”.
22 There is an important exception to this statement: Malinvaud quickly (i.e.
before the Paris conference) acknowledged EUT. The case of Morlat is more
complex: by 1952, he was on Allais and Massé’s side (Massé-Morlat 1952), but
he “changed sides” shortly thereafter (Morlat 1957) to join his fellow mathe-
maticians at the ISUP.
23 Thus, Friedman attacked these theories for not being amenable to refutation;
see Allais 1955, § 44, p. 24.
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24 Guilbaud (1999, personal communication) confirmed this interpretation. As an
example of statements from the period: “However, some psychological tests,
some market observations and personal experience seemed to poorly match
the absolutely general value of the theory as descriptive theory, of course”
(Massé and Morlat in CNRS 1953, p. 163, our translation; see also Massé 1953).
Guilbaud (1954, p. Guilbaud/I-1, written in 1951) added: “The aim of what we
call ‘theory of games’, after Borel and von Neumann, is to prescribe rules for
human action” (our translation).
25 See for instance Allais 1949, Hutter 1950, Boiteux 1956 or Boiteux 1948,
Lesourne 1958, Morlat-Bessière 1971, which are directly connected with risky
decision (and were, with the exception of some applied papers in Morlat-
Bessière with no theoretical aim, at least partially written in 1952).
26 The title of Allais 1955, calling for a “positive theory” may seem to contradict
this statement, and the epistemological stance of Allais may thus seem puzz-
ling. In fact, the 1955 paper must be read carefully, keeping in mind the general
epistemological stance of the French engineer-economists devoted to designing
management rules (i.e. prescriptive theory). Actually, the “positive theory” of
the 1955 paper begins with the consistency assumption (§ 2, p. 10) which is not
perfectly descriptive (see, for example, Rizvi in this volume), and in what
follows, Allais consistently holds a distinction between “real” and “rational”
people (see, e.g., § 47, p. 26, § 51, p. 31, § 53, p. 32, § 60, p. 37). One may be sur-
prised by the anti-refutationist declaration of Allais (§ 44, p. 24) which clearly
indicates that the theory is not positive in the ordinary sense of this adjective.
The confusion arises from the ambivalent expression “rational man” – one can
be rational according to Allais or according to Savage – which is central to
Allais argumentation; see section 2.4.
27 MacCrimmon also noticed the contribution of Morlat and gave a more precise
reference (MacCrimmon 1968, p. 23), although there is a misprint in his refer-
ence (“pp. 156–67” instead of “156–7”).
28 Guilbaud, G.-T., personal communication, 1999.
29 The fact that Allais relied on existing statistics may be put forward as a proof
that Allais was thinking of observation rather than experimentation. In fact,
Allais designed a test and it is pure luck that he found existing statistics match-
ing the data he needed.
30 About his sample, Allais wrote: “Taking into account the scientific quality of
the very great majority of those consulted . . . the results are certainly of the
highest scientific interest” (1979, p. 632).
31 The “Allaisian” choice of A and D contradicts EUT, since (by linearity in
probability):
AB⇔U(100) 0,1U(500)0,89U(100)⇔0,11U(100)0,1U(500)⇔CD.
32 It must be emphasized that we have found no use of the expression “Allais
Paradox” before Allais 1979. Allais himself started to refer to “the so-called
Allais Paradox”, though it was thus called only by him. In particular, MacCrim-
mon (1968, p. 9) wrote “the type of this problem has been suggested by Allais”,
Slovic and Tversky (1974, p. 36) refer to “counterexamples” that “have been
proposed by Allais and Ellsberg”. Then, the expression “common consequence
effect” is sometimes used (after MacCrimmon and Larsson 1975). Finally,
under the heading “Allais Paradox” of the indexes in Allais and Hagen 1979
references are only given to Allais’ contributions. That is to say, neither Mor-
genstern 1974 nor MacCrimmon and Larsson 1975 used this expression. It is
very surprising that, in November 1999, Guilbaud had never heard of the
“Allais Paradox”!
33 Namely Allais 1952c (which contained the questionnaire) and Allais 1952d
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which is an annex to the conference volume that was added later. See, e.g.,
Darmois 1952, p. 13:
Furthermore, even if the work sessions reasonably filled every day, lunches
and dinner were also a place for discussion, but the secretaries could not
record these events. Mr Allais, using all these observations and sugges-
tions, has done considerable work which, while not presented at the Confer-
ence, can be thought of as a consequence and addendum. One may find
this work of Mr Allais as an appendix to this book.
(our translation, emphasis added)
34 M. Boiteux, personal communication (2000).
35 E. Malinvaud, personal communication (2000).
36 Allais quotes the same text various times. This passage can also be found in
Allais (1957, p. 386).
37 Savage gives an account of the lunch discussion in 1954, pp. 102–103, from
which it turns out that he made the “Allaisian choice” (A and D), thus contra-
dicting EUT.
38 This questionnaire was composed of 400 questions overall, among which are
the questions of the Allais Paradox, and was published in Allais 1952c and
Allais 1979.
39 Allais (1979, p. 557, n. 22) recalls that one of his friends said “you kept these
results secret for twenty five years!”
40 (Allais 1979, p. 560, n. 48). Apparently, Arrow and Baumol passed the
test without choosing an a priori utility function. Allais does not go into the
details.
41 It must be remembered that the Keynesian Shackle was a declared opponent of
the EUT (Shackle 1949a, 1949b).
42 Von Neumann’s silence can be explained by the fact that the mathematician,
who was at any rate not an economist, was no longer directly involved with the
subject after 1947: after the second edition of the Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, von Neumann did not write any further economics papers –
with the exception of a one-and-a-half page communication in 1956, and some
very technical contributions to game theory that can be regarded as pure maths
(such as, for instance, the editing of Contributions to the Theory of Games); see
von Neumann 1957. Moreover, EUT, which seemed a minor feature of the
Theory of Games (so that the derivation of representation theorem from the
axioms was not given in the first edition), always remained a minor issue for
von Neumann.
43 About the same time as The Foundations of Statistics was re-issued by Dover.
44 “P1 The relation  is a simple ordering among acts” (Savage 1954, p. 18).
45 (Samuelson 1952b, p. 138). There is also an allusion to the book in Samuelson’s
paper at the Paris conference; see, e.g., English translation, p. 139, n. 2.
46 One must take notice that Allais’ aim is different from ours, because Allais
tried to show that Savage “defined rationality by his axioms, and he judged his
answers irrational because they infringed the axioms!” (Allais 1979, p. 533).
47 Allais 1952d and 1953b are roughly similar papers; they were both published in
1953, although Allais claimed to have written 1952d in late 1952 (after the con-
ference, to be published in the proceedings).
48 Essentially, Allais’ definition of rationality coincides with standard consumer
theory under certainty. The only new axiom Allais adopts in the case of uncer-
tainty is what he calls “l’axiome de préférence absolue de Massé et Morlat”,
which is a restatement of First-degree Stochastic Dominance (Allais
1952d[1979], p. 39).
49 Of course, Savage 1954 is known for the sure-thing principle; but by the time of
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the Paris conference, the “independence axiom” was a more common denomi-
nation; see Fishburn and Wakker 1995.
50 Allais interprets the choice of gamble A against gamble B (in his Paradox) as a
consequence of “complementarity in the vicinity of certainty”: the supplemen-
tal 1 per cent chance to win in gamble A leads to a certain gain. In the other
pair of gamble, this supplemental 1 per cent, as it does not bear certainty, does
not exhibit this complementarity effect. That is why A is often preferred to B
while C is not preferred to D.
51 Allais (1953) is obviously the only of Allais references in Savage (1954).
52 The EUT (as formulated by the von Neuman and Morgenstern axioms) tells
the individual “how he ought to behave”, writes Morgenstern (1972, p. 711).
53 Morgenstern acknowledges now that the theory is only “an approximation to
an undoubtedly much richer and far more complicated reality than that which
the theory describes in a simple manner” (1974, p. 178). In particular, the
domain of the theory is restricted because of phenomena that are somewhat
similar to the Allais Paradox:
one should now point out that the domain of our axioms on utility theory
is also restricted. . . . For example, the probabilities used must be within
certain plausible ranges and not go to 0.01 or even less to 0.001, then to be
compared to other equally tiny numbers such as 0.02, etc. Rather, one
imagines that a normal individual would have some intuition of what 50:50
or 25:75 means, etc. . . . Beside this difficulty of exposing individuals to
almost unrecognizably small probabilities, there is added another one.
And it is difficult to say which is more formidable: that is, the matter of the
objects which are being offered: Millions, even ten of millions of Norwe-
gian crowns, French francs, or even dollars.
But, according to Morgenstern, these restrictions are of trifling significance.
54 Since normative theories (according to John Neville Keynes) concern, not what
is, but what ought to be according to a given ideal – “The object . . . of a norm-
ative science [is] the determination of ideals” (Keynes 1890 [1917], p. 35) – they
are, contrary to positive ones, immune to experimental testing.
55 Notice that a similar test had been suggested earlier in (Strotz 1953, p. 393),
quoted in (Allais 1979, p. 515).
References
Allais, M. 1949–1953. La gestion des houillères nationalisées et la théorie
économique. Second edition: Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1953.
Allais, M. 1952a. Généralisation des théories de l’équilibre économique et du ren-
dement social au cas du risque. In CNRS 1953.
Allais, M. 1952b. Fondements d’une théorie positive des choix comportant un
risque. In CNRS 1953.
Allais, M. 1952c. La Psychologie de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: la théorie
et l’expérience. Journal de la société de statistique de Paris, Jan. 1953: 47–72.
Allais, M. 1952d. Fondements d’une théorie positive des choix comportant un
risque et critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école américaine. In CNRS 1953.
Quoted from English translation in Allais and Hagen 1979.
Allais, M. 1953. Le Comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique
des postulats et axiomes de l’école américaine. Econometrica, XXI: 503–546.
Allais, M. 1955. Fondements d’une théorie positive des choix comportant un risque
46 S. Jallais and P.-C. Pradier
et critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école américaine. Annales des Mines,
pp. 4–55.
Allais, M. 1957. Sur la théorie des choix aléatoires. Revue d’économie politique,
LXXI 3: 381–390.
Allais, M. 1974. La Psychologie de l’homme rationnel devant le risque – la théorie
et l’expérience – résultats du sondage de 1952. Note 3064 du Centre d’Analyse
Economique. 6 mai 1974.
Allais, M. 1979. The so-called Allais Paradox and rational decisions under uncer-
tainty. In Allais and Hagen 1979.
Allais, M., and O. Hagen. 1979. Expected utility hypothesis and the Allais Paradox.
Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel.
Arrow, K. J. 1965. Exposition of the theory of choice under uncertainty. In Aspects
of the theory of risk bearing. Helsinki: Yrjö Jahnssonis Säätio.
Bernoulli, D. 1731. Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis. Reed. In Die
Werke von Daniel Bernoulli. t. II. Basel: Birkäuser Verlag. English translation
1954. Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. Econometrica,
XXI: 223 sqq.
Boiteux, M. 1948 [1951]. Tarification des demandes aléatoires. Cahiers du Sémi-
naire d’Econométrie, 1 (from a 1948 working paper found in the Guilbaud
papers).
Boiteux, M. 1956. Sur la gestion des monopoles publics astreints à l’équilibre
budgétaire. Econometrica, XXIV, 1, 22–40.
Boiteux, M. 1993. Haute tension. Paris, Odile Jacob.
Camerer, C. 1995. Individual decision making. In The Handbook of Experimental
Economics, edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Carré J.-J., Dubois, P. and Malinvaud, E. 1973. Abrégé de la croissance française.
Paris: Le seuil.
CNRS. 1953. Colloque “Econométrie”. Paris 12–17 mai 1952. Paris: CNRS.
Darmois, G. 1952. Introduction. In CNRS 1953.
Dreze, J. 1964. Some postwar contributions of French economists to theory and
public policy. American Economic Review, LIV 4: 1–64.
Fishburn, P. C. and Wakker, P. P. 1995. The invention of the independence con-
dition. Management Science, XLI: 1130–1144.
Fontaine, P. 1999. Classical political economy between two fires: Jean-Baptiste Say
and Frank H. Knight on the enterprise economy. History of Political Economy,
XXXI 1: 1–28.
Friedman, M. and Savage, L. J. 1948. The utility analysis of choice involving risk.
Journal of Political Economy, LVI 4: 279–304.
Friedman, M. and Savage, L. J. 1952. The expected-utility hypothesis and the mea-
surability of utility. Journal of Political Economy, LX 6: 463–474.
Guilbaud, G.-T. 1954. Leçons sur les éléments principaux de la théorie mathéma-
tique des jeux. In CNRS. Stratégies et décisions économiques, études théoriques et
applications aux entreprises. pp. Guilbaud/I-1-Guilbaud/V-15.
Hutter, R. 1950. La théorie économique et la gestion commerciale des chemins de
fer. Paris: Dunod.
Keynes, J. N. 1890. The Scope and Method of Political Economy. London: Macmil-
lan, fourth edition, 1917.
Leonard, R. 1995. From parlor games to social science: von Neumann, Morgen-
The Allais Paradox and EUT 47
stern, and the creation of game theory 1928–1944. Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, XXXIII, 730–761.
Lesourne, J. 1958. Technique économique et gestion industrielle. Paris: Dunod.
Lordon, F. 1997. Le désir de “faire science”. Actes de la recherche en sciences
sociales, 119: 27–35.
MacCrimmon, K. R. 1968. Descriptive and normative implications of the decision-
theory postulates. In Risk and Uncertainty, edited by K. Borch and J. Mossin.
New York: St Martin’s Press.
MacCrimmon, K. R. and Larsson, S. 1975. Utility theory: axioms versus “para-
doxes”. In Allais and Hagen 1979.
Marschak, J. 1950. Rational behavior, uncertain prospects, and measurable utility.
Econometrica, XVIII: 111–141.
Marschak, J. 1951. Why “should” statisticians and businessmen maximize “moral
Expectation”? In J. Neyman, ed., Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Sympo-
sium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Pres, 493–506.
Marschak, J. 1979. Utilities, psychological values, and the training of decision
makers. In Allais and Hagen 1979, 163–174.
Massé, P. 1944. Applications des probabilités en chaîne à l’hydrologie statistique et
au jeu des réservoirs. Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris, LXXXV:
204–219.
Massé, P. 1946. Les réserves et la régulation de l’avenir. Paris: Hermann.
Massé, P. 1950 [1953]. Réflexion sur les comportements rationnels en économie
aléatoire. Cahiers du séminaire d’économétrie, 2: 11–59 (from a 1950 working
paper found in the Guilbaud papers).
Massé, P. 1964. Le choix des investissements – Critères et méthodes. 2nd edn.
Paris: Dunod.
Massé, P. and Morlat, G. 1952. Sur le classement économique des perspectives
aléatoires. In CNRS 1953.
McClennen, E. F. 1990. Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explora-
tions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morlat, G. 1957. Sur la théorie des choix aléatoires – critique des idées de Maurice
Allais. Revue d’Economie Politique, LXVII: 378–380.
Morlat, G. and Bessière, F. 1971. Vingt-cinq ans d’économie électrique. Paris: Dunod.
Morgenstern, O. 1972. Descriptive, predictive and normative theory. Kyklos, IV:
699–714.
Morgenstern, O. 1974. Some reflections on utility. In Allais and Hagen 1979.
Mosteller, F. and Nogee, P. 1951. An experimental measurement of utility. Journal
of Political Economy, LIX: 371–404.
Munier, B. R. 1984. Quelques critiques de la rationalité économique dans l’incer-
tain. Revue économique, XXXV: 65–86.
Nagel, E. 1963. Assumptions in economic theory. The American Economic Review,
53(2): 211–219.
Pradier, P. C. and Teira-Serrano, D. 2000. Frank H. Knight. Le risque comme
critique de l’économie politique. Revue de Synthèse, 4th series, 1–2, 79–116.
Samuelson, P. A. 1950. Probability and the attempt to measure utility. The Eco-
nomic Review (Keizai Kenkyu), 167–173. Reed. In Stiglitz 1966.
Samuelson, P. A. 1952a. Utilité, préférence et probabilité. In CNRS 1953. English
translation. In Stiglitz 1966.
48 S. Jallais and P.-C. Pradier
Samuelson, P. A. 1952b. Probability, utility and the independence axiom. In
Stiglitz 1966.
Savage, L. J. 1954. The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley. Repr. New
York: Dover, 1972.
Shackle, G. L. S. 1949a. A non-additive measure of uncertainty. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 27(42): 70–74.
Shackle, G. L. S. 1949b. Expectations in economics. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. 1974. Who accepts Savage’s axiom? Behavioral science
19: 368–373.
Strotz, R. H. 1953. Cardinal Utility. The American Economic Review, XLIII:
384–397.
Sutton, J. 1997. “Gibrat’s Legacy”. Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV: 40–59.
Von Neumann, J. 1957. Bibliography of John von Neumann. In Complete works
VI. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. 1944. Theory of games and economic
behavior. 1947 2nd edn. New York: Wiley. Reprint 1980. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
The Allais Paradox and EUT 49
3 Experimentation, general
equilibrium and games
S. Abu Turab Rizvi
Being denied a sufficiently secure experimental base, economic theory has
to adhere to the rules of logical discourse and must renounce the facility of
internal inconsistency. A deductive structure that tolerates a contradiction
does so under the penalty of being useless, since any statement can be
derived flawlessly and immediately from that contradiction.
In its mathematical form, economic theory is open to an efficient scrutiny
for logical errors.
Gérard Debreu (1991: 2–3)
3.1 Introduction
The upsurge in the popularity of experimental economics dates from
the early to mid-1980s. By 1985 there was enough writing in this area
for the Journal of Economic Literature to establish a separate biblio-
graphic category, “Experimental Economic Methods” (Roth 1987: 1). This
contrasts with the situation in earlier periods. The first review of experi-
mental economics (Rapoport and Orwant 1962) was able to do justice to
the field in a single article (Roth in Kagel and Roth 1995: 3). And Roth
writes that “. . .when I began my own experimental work about a dozen
years ago, it was most convenient to publish the results in journals of psy-
chology and business” (1987: 1). Thus we can see that prior to the mid-
1980s, experimental methods were not an extensive undertaking in
economics. Roth’s comments further suggest that experimental methods
applied to economic topics had a better reception in fields other than eco-
nomics. This implies that experimentation was not considered to be
“really” economics in this earlier time. This essay tries to answer some
questions that these thoughts raise. Why was experimentation in eco-
nomics not popular in economics in earlier times? What accounts for the
emergence of experimental economics during the 1980s? How are experi-
mentation and game theory related? (For a further perspective on this last
question, in the early years of game theory, consult Dimand’s essay in this
volume.)
To answer these questions, I try to establish a series of claims. I
begin by arguing that economists eschewed experimentation for a
variety of reasons, but experimentation particularly did not make sense
in the framework of general equilibrium theory, which dominated eco-
nomics in the postwar period. Allied to this theoretical approach was a
related approach to empiricism, econometrics. Neither of these styles of
economics was hospitable to experimental economics. In addition, the
opposition to experimentation went well beyond general equilibrium
theory. Theoretical economics generally, for example the Chicago
variant, also did not look to experiments for confirmation. The primary
focus in this essay on general equilibrium theory derives from the ideas
that while most of axioms of general equilibrium theory are eminently
testable, its adherents eschewed experimentation. Moreover, general-
equilibrium theory represents the most sought-after theoretical method
from 1950 to 1985. Thus I explore key aspects of the demise of general
equilibrium theory and its associated econometrics by referring to the
Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu results on the arbitrariness of aggregate
excess demands. These results were published during the 1970s. The
arbitrariness theory was codified and its robustness shown by the early
1980s. Economic theory was in the ensuing ten years transformed from
the realm of general-equilibrium theory into an amalgam of approaches
– and among these were game theory and experimental economics.1
Thus, once general equilibrium theory ran into trouble – during the late
1970s and early 1980s – experimentation began to flourish. Next, to
demonstrate the effectiveness of experimentation, I examine the relation
between experimentation and game theory occurring over ten years
starting around 1985.2 Specifically, at this time, experimental evidence
called into question bargaining results from rational-choice game theory,
and spurred a significant change in the character of the theory, so that
evolutionary game theory emerged. I conclude that the role of experi-
mentation in economics has undergone a profound transformation: from
a field of investigation that was not in the mainstream of economics, to a
method that was an important influence in causing a dominant type of
economic theory to be replaced by another. The vicissitudes of general
equilibrium theory play a key role in how experimental results have been
received by economists, and so we turn to exploring the character of this
theory.
3.2 General equilibrium theory
General equilibrium theory combines an axiomatic approach and Walras-
inspired theory.3 From the inaugural activity in the 1950s – Arrow’s Social
Choice and Individual Values (1951), Arrow and Debreu’s proof of the
existence of a competitive general equilibrium (1954), Koopmans’s Three
Essays on the State of Economic Science on method (1957), and Debreu’s
Theory of Value (1959) – to the consolidation and restatement of Arrow
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and Hahn’s General Competitive Analysis (1971), and the 30 years of
journal articles surrounding this work, formalist general equilibrium
theory reigned supreme in economics. It gave economists a dominant
paradigm to work on. In addition, two specific features of general equilib-
rium theory – the axiomatic, deductive method, and the view that indi-
viduals ought to be considered primarily individually, and not in
interaction or socially – are crucial. The axiomatic-deductive method was
inhospitable to experimental economics, and the competitive-individualist
approach was inhospitable to game theory.
Gérard Debreu, the leading figure in general equilibrium theory who is
quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, simply considers the experimenta-
tion to be unavailable to his approach to economics. By emphasizing the
internal consistency of the theory, general equilibrium distances itself from
empirical reality (its relation to the empirical world is discussed later in
this section). What is clear is that general equilibrium theory in this mode
served as the overarching theory for economics. There is ample evidence
that formalist general equilibrium theory fits this description of an overar-
ching theory. Perhaps the best example is Arrow and Hahn’s General
Competitive Analysis (1971). In this work, the authors clearly use general
equilibrium theory as the basis for a microfoundations project: that is, to
see what macroeconomic and other regularities follow from the microeco-
nomic axiom set of formalist general equilibrium theory (Rizvi 1994b).
Not only did economists look to this theory for the determinateness of
competitive general equilibrium (uniqueness, stability), but they also
wanted to use the theory for adequate comparative statics, identification
of econometric models, approaches to imperfectly competitive general
equilibrium and, importantly, the foundations of macroeconomics. Every
subfield of economics, from public finance to international economics, was
– in the thirty years of journal articles and monographs surrounding
Arrow and Hahn’s book – considered poorly grounded unless its results
could be derived from the overarching general equilibrium theory. Since
all of the formal theory of economics was evidently at the microeconomic
level, and formalist general equilibrium theory became microeconomics
par excellence, no subfield of economics could say it had an adequate foun-
dation without becoming, as it were, an applied field of general equilib-
rium theory.
It is worth remembering that macroeconomics – as a conceptually dis-
tinct field from microeconomics – nearly disappeared, except as serving as
a label, during this time (Rizvi, 1994b). This attests to the power of the
metatheoretical imperatives of formalist general equilibrium theory. Thus
E. Roy Weintraub, in his microfoundations book, stated accurately that
“even those few economists who argue that current microeconomics does
not generate macroeconomics have been extremely shy in their attempts to
convince their colleagues of the seriousness of their concerns” (1979: 5).
Allan Drazen summarized the view of many economists when he held that
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“explanations of macroeconomic phenomena will be complete only when
such explanations are consistent with microeconomic choice theoretic
behavior and can be phrased in the language of general equilibrium
theory” (1980: 293).
So we have a situation in which, from an ascent in the early to mid-
1950s, and solid dominance in the ensuing three decades, formalist general
equilibrium theory served as the overarching theory for economics. It is
not surprising, given this context, that experimental economics did not
thrive during the period of the dominance of general equilibrium theory.
A reason for this is that the method of general equilibrium theory is to
begin with axioms and to proceed deductively, whereas the typical experi-
mental method is that of induction, where hypotheses are easily reformu-
lated because of new evidence and there is a messy interplay between facts
and theorizing. While the axiomatic-deductive method has not been typ-
ically allied to experimentation, this does not mean that it cannot be. In
fact, there is probably no substantive axiom of general equilibrium theory
(or behavioral assumption, such as profit-maximization) that cannot be
tested experimentally: May’s work on transitivity, discussed below, is a
case in point. Thus it is not accurate to state that general equilibrium
theory, by its very nature, has few experimentally testable hypotheses.
However, as the quotation from Debreu shows, the very clear emphasis in
an axiomatic-deductive approach is freeing the axiom set from internal
inconsistency, not on experimentally validating the set of axioms: to see if
a set of axioms can hang together; if it does not, to use a different set. The
axioms, as is established below, are derived from introspection.
Given the self-contained character of formalist theories, and their dis-
tance from an empirical substrate, it is difficult to see where evidence,
experimental or otherwise, should fit in. Koopmans, in his Three Essays,
the leading methodological treatise of formalist general equilibrium
theory, dealt with this problem. He remarked that while there are differ-
ent experimental and theoretical specialties in the physical sciences, in the
“writings representing the best achievements of economics, we find and
expect to find pieces of reasoning and references to facts closely inter-
twined.” Yet by “references to fact” Koopmans meant nothing as system-
atic as experiment: “The facts of economic life are all around us. Hence
much of the factual background of economics can be presupposed without
extensive examination or discussion” (1957: 131). For support in this view,
Koopmans cites Robbins who had written that “We do not need con-
trolled experiments to establish their [i.e., the postulates’] validity: they
are so much the stuff of our everyday experience that they have only to be
stated to be recognized as obvious” (Robbins 1935, cited in Koopmans
1957: 131). Thus the facts needed to justify axioms are merely those that
are seen introspectively.
Accordingly, Koopmans removed facts from the main business of eco-
nomic reasoning:
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We can best keep track of the foundation for each statement . . . if
facts are recognized at the beginning of each piece of analysis by
explicitly formulated postulates, and where appropriate at the end by
confrontation of conclusions and predictions with additional observa-
tions, but are not permitted to enter through a side door when the rea-
soning proper is in progress.
(1957: 144)
Koopmans was direct about the impropriety of experimentation in eco-
nomics. He speaks of “the virtual impossibility of experiments under con-
ditions approaching those of real life” and says that “economics is
handicapped by severe and possibly unsurmountable obstacles to mean-
ingful experimentation” (1957: 140).
However, eventually, once the reasoning process is through, “conclusions
and predictions” might be confronted with observations. How was this to be
done? Koopmans discusses a number of empirical approaches, such as
input–output methods and “measurement without theory,” but the approach
that he championed is econometric testing of behavioral (theory-based)
models. Along with William Hood, Koopmans was editor of the Cowles
Commission monograph Studies in Econometric Method (1953) and he pub-
lished a series of influential publications in econometrics. He joined the
Cowles Commission in 1944 and directed it from 1948 to 1954. The Cowles
Commission (later named Cowles Foundation) was an important nexus for
the development of both formalist general equilibrium theory (Debreu’s
Theory of Value and Arrow’s Social Choice were both Cowles monographs)
and econometrics. Koopmans had followed Jacob Marschak as director of
Cowles; Marschak’s work (with Andrews 1944) introduced Trygve
Haavelmo’s foundational ideas on econometrics. These ideas became the
basis for the Cowles approach to econometrics, which was the dominant style
of econometrics for decades. Haavelmo was very much motivated by making
econometrics consistent with experiments – in a certain sense – as Mary
Morgan (1990, Ch. 8) has pointed out. Given this development, formalist
economics had its own approach to “experimentation” thus defined.
Haavelmo argued that theory “will have an economic meaning only
when associated with a design of actual experiments that describes – and
indicates how to measure – a system of ‘true’ variables. . . . Hypotheses in
the above sense are thus the joint implications – and the only testable
implications, as far as observations are concerned – of a theory and a
design of experiments” (1944: 8–9). Morgan (1990: 245) notes that
Haavelmo saw that this idea of an econometric hypothesis (a theory along
with an experimental design) was problematic. He therefore began by dis-
tinguishing two sorts of experiment:
(1) experiments that we should like to make to see if certain real eco-
nomic phenomena – when artificially isolated from “other influences”
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– would verify certain hypotheses, and (2) the stream of experiments
that Nature is steadily turning out from her own enormous laboratory,
and which we merely watch as passive observers.
(Haavelmo 1944: 14)
The first sort of experiment, the controlled laboratory type, is distin-
guished from what we might not even refer to as an experiment, what the
economy – or Nature, as Haavelmo would have it – conducts every day.4
We can see that experimental economics refers to the first sort of (con-
trolled) experiment. Haavelmo had a further problem since, as he puts it,
the more profound economic theories require the first sort of experiment,
whereas the data we actually have is of the second, “unplanned”, sort
(1944: 15). Here he was acknowledging the prevalent view (expressed, for
example, by Robbins) that controlled experiments were nonsensical to
economists. “Instead, they have to make do with passive observations
(those from Nature’s experiments) which are influenced by a great many
factors not accounted for by the theory” (Morgan 1990: 246). Haavelmo’s
solution to this problem was to complicate the theoretical representation:
“If we cannot clear the data of such ‘other influences’, we have to try to
introduce these influences in the theory, in order to bring about more
agreement between theory and facts” (1944: 18). He proposed to do this
by making all theoretical relations stochastic, by adding an error term to
each, and to do this he employed a microfoundations-based approach,
consistent with formalist general equilibrium theory:
It is on purpose that we have used as an illustration an example of
individual economic behavior, rather than an average market relation.
For it seems rational to introduce the assumptions about the stochasti-
cal elements of our economic theories already in the ‘laws’ of behavior
for the single individuals, firms, etc., as a characteristic of their behav-
ior, and then derive the average market relation or relations for the
whole society, from these individual “laws”.
(1944: 51–52)
We can now see more clearly why economists eschewed experimental eco-
nomics for so long, given the nature of the dominant general equilibrium
theory and the econometric approach. The “facts” that the axioms of
general equilibrium theory were based on were obtained introspectively;
the main process of economic reasoning was insulated from facts; and
when the conclusions of this reasoning were subjected to “experimental”
confirmation, the natural experiments of the economy were explored by
an econometrics based on a stochastic version of general equilibrium
theory. There was then no space at all for experimental economics,
traditionally defined,  in any of these procedures.
This conclusion is buttressed by turning from methodological works to
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a brief look at the reception by economists of experiments during the
establishment period of general equilibrium theory. A number of experi-
ments were carried out during this time that were germane to the validity
of general equilibrium theory. A relatively well-known experiment that
has to do with individual choice is Thurstone’s attempt to construct indif-
ference curves from experimental data. The reception of this experiment
among economists, in the form of Wallis and Friedman’s critique of it,
shows the skepticism that economists have felt about experimental
methods.5 Thurstone asked his subjects to rank various combinations of
hats and coats and was able to fit (hyperbolic) indifference curves through
the data he obtained. Yet even though Thurstone’s data gave confirmation
for the model of individual choice, Wallis and Friedman objected vehe-
mently to the experiment. They argued that the choices asked to be made
were hypothetical, and given the artificiality of the situation – which they
felt extended to cover the entirety of experimental methods in economics
– “It is questionable whether a subject in so artificial an experimental situ-
ation could know what choices he would make in an economic situation;
not knowing, it is almost inevitable that he would, in entire good faith, sys-
tematize his answers in such a way as to produce plausible but spurious
results” (1942: 179–180). This sort of skepticism, based on the artificiality
of the experimental setting and its consequent effect on the subject, came
to pervade economists’ view of experimentation throughout the establish-
ment and dominance periods of formalist general equilibrium theory.6
Another example of the reception of experimental data during the
establishment of formalist general equilibrium theory is May’s (1954)
investigation of intransitivity. At the time, many economists including
Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu had employed transitivity of prefer-
ences in general equilibrium theory as an axiom (Arrow 1951; Arrow and
Debreu 1954). As Koopmans, and Robbins before him, emphasized,
axioms were established introspectively. However, May, who was a mathe-
matician, decided to see if there existed contrary experimental evidence
regarding transitivity. May had long been familiar with the axiom of transi-
tivity since he had been present in 1948 when Arrow publicly presented
the first version of his impossibility theorem (Kelly 1987). He consulted
Warren McCulloch (the cyberneticist and automata theorist who had been
trained in physiology) about such evidence. Based on McCulloch, his own
review of the literature and his own experiments, May presented evidence
against transitivity. In his experiment, he reported on the preferences of
college students for aspects of potential mates (intelligence, wealth, and
beauty). Students saw descriptions of pairs of potential mates who had
varying amounts of these characteristics and were asked to rank them.
Over a quarter of the students showed preferences that violated transitiv-
ity. May thought that overall the evidence against the universality of tran-
sitivity was strong, and that this axiom’s use was questionable. However,
consistent with the view that axioms were established introspectively and
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the bias against experimentation, May’s report on intransitivity was
ignored. This occurred despite its publication in the main journal of eco-
nomic theory at the time. It is quite possible that Kenneth Arrow was one
of the referees of May’s paper.7, 8 Whether Arrow refereed May’s paper or
not, it is clear that evidence against transitivity was ignored for a long
time. Hugo Sonnenschein, writing in 1971, stated “the economics profes-
sion appears to be so well indoctrinated with the concept of transitive pref-
erence that statements about behavior arising from intransitive
preferences are sometimes interpreted as making no sense. Indeed, such
behavior is referred to as ‘irrational.’ Suffice it to say that the rationality of
consumer behavior is not based on empirical observation.” Instead,
“Empirical observations or experimental results frequently indicate
intransitivities of choices” (223). Sonnenschein’s comment is interesting
since one interpretation is that it served the interests of general equilib-
rium theorists to ignore evidence against transitivity just because transitiv-
ity was at that time thought to be an important axiom to the general
equilibrium project. If this is so, it buttresses the idea that the imperatives
of general equilibrium theory acted against the acceptance of experimen-
tal results.
During the period of the establishment of formalist general equilibrium
theory, then, experimental work was not given much attention by econo-
mists, even when it directly contradicted their theoretical presuppositions.9
This deflection of experiment and its subservience to theory was supported
by methodological ideas that were developed by Koopmans and others.
With this background in mind, it is easier to understand why interactions
between experimentalists (largely from a psychology background) and
economic theorists yielded so little. An instance of this mutual misunder-
standing took place at the Santa Monica seminar of 1952.10 The seminar
was partly funded by a Ford Foundation grant to an interdisciplinary
group from the University of Michigan on the theme of “The Design of
Experiments in Decision Processes.” The group, with members from eco-
nomics, mathematics, philosophy, psychology and sociology had been
meeting regularly at Michigan since 1950. Thirty-seven scholars sponsored
by Ford, RAND, the Cowles Commission and the Office of Naval
Research attended the seminar, and it turns out that they presented 37
papers. There are 19 papers in Thrall et al. (1954), which represents the
proceedings of the conference, if we include the two introductory ones.11
The participant list is impressive and clearly interdisciplinary (Smith 1992:
260); it includes (if one doesn’t quibble too much with disciplinary catego-
rization) from psychology, Bush, Coombs, Estes, Festinger, and Simon;
from mathematics, Karlin, Nash, Shapley and von Neumann; from eco-
nomics, Debreu, Hildreth, Koopmans, Marschak, Radner and Morgen-
stern; and from statistical decision theory, Mosteller and Raiffa.
Yet the possibility of rich interaction between experimentalists and
theorists did not come about. In Smith’s assessment:
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What the supporters of the Santa Monica seminar hoped was to
provide a presentation-discussion forum that would stimulate empiri-
cal research and further theory development; quantitatively, its
success in stimulating experiment must be judged much more modest
than in furthering theory. The seminar’s integrating theme was not
experimental design, but the use of mathematics in the social sciences.
(1992: 261)
In this emphasis, the Santa Monica seminar presaged the practice of econ-
omists in the decades to follow.
By focusing on the considerable resistance to experimentation in the
character and aims of general equilibrium theory, I do not mean to imply
that there was no such resistance elsewhere in economics. Indeed, the dis-
cussion so far already indicates a broader resistance to experimentation
among economists. For example, Wallis and Friedman were not general
equilibrium theorists. However, their idea – seen in the Chicago approach
– that the basic framework of economics has a self-evident character that
does not need support from experimentation fits well with the general
equilibrium objections. Similarly, while Robbins’s ideas on introspection
did not derive from general equilibrium theory, its adherents such as
Koopmans adopted them. It is certainly fair to say that opposition to
experimentation ranged widely among economists. The focus here on
general equilibrium theory is important, however, since general equilib-
rium theory came to dominate the methodological aspirations of most
economists. Thus precepts associated with it also came to be widespread.
3.3 The demise of general equilibrium theory
General equilibrium theory’s ascendancy was not to last. The develop-
ments leading to the decline of general equilibrium theory are worth con-
sidering.
While general equilibrium theory in its formative state concentrated on
establishing the existence of competitive general equilibrium, this was not
enough. Other important desiderata were the uniqueness and stability of
competitive equilibrium, a coherent comparative statics, identification of
econometric models, the existence of imperfectly competitive general
equilibrium, and the microfoundations of macroeconomics. All of these
topics were addressed, in a confident tone implying that positive results
were forthcoming, in Arrow and Hahn’s General Competitive Analysis
(1971). For a theory that purported to underpin the whole of economics,
such progress was required. Yet this progress never came and the confi-
dence proved to be unfounded.
This realization occurred as a result of the spectacular series of impos-
sibility results that I have called Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu (SMD)
theory after its main promulgators (Rizvi 1994b, 1997, where details are
provided). In the 1970s, these authors and their collaborators established
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that despite the availability of well-behaved axioms at the individual level,
the aggregate excess demands arising in Walrasian formalist general equi-
librium models were essentially arbitrary, except that they satisfied
Walras’s Law and a form of continuity. These latter two properties were
needed to establish existence of the general equilibrium solutions, but all
of the Arrow–Hahn desiderata mentioned in the previous paragraph
required well-behaved aggregate excess demands. So economists gradually
realized there could be no general results on uniqueness (Mas-Colell
1977), stability (Sonnenschein 1973), comparative statics (Kehoe 1985),
econometric identification (Diewert 1977; Stoker 1984a, 1984b), imper-
fectly competitive general equilibrium (Roberts and Sonnenschein 1977;
Grodal 1996) and microfoundations of macroeconomics (Rizvi 1994b).
Thus the SMD papers showed that formalist general equilibrium 
theory had reached a dead end: no general results beyond existence were
possible.
Consequently, when SMD theory became well known by the early
1980s, it became obvious to many that formalist general equilibrium
theory could no longer serve as an overarching theory for economics. The
great promise of formalist general equilibrium theory that had been
dangled in front of economists for 30 years was finally dashed. This event
had serious and unsettling consequences. Hildenbrand writes that:
When I read in the seventies the publications of Sonnenschein, Mantel
and Debreu on the structure of the excess demand function of an
exchange economy, I was deeply consternated. Up to that time I had
the naïve illusion that the microeconomic foundation of the general
equilibrium model, which I had admired so much, does not only allow
us to prove that the model and the concept of equilibrium are logically
consistent (existence of equilibria), but also allows us to show that the
equilibrium is well determined. This illusion, or should I say rather,
this hope, was destroyed, once and for all, at least for the traditional
model of exchange economies.
(1994: ix)12
Once the status of general equilibrium theory as a basis for economics as a
whole was called into question by SMD theory, a stage of pluralism in eco-
nomics ensued (Rizvi 1994a: 2–6; 1997: 275–276). It is in the early to mid-
1980s that we see the rise of rational-choice game theory and experimental
economics along with other trends. In each case, there were no significant
theoretical or methodological innovations that would have caused this
upsurge. Rather, with general equilibrium theory vacating the scene, there
was more “space” for these alternative approaches to develop and to
receive a hearing on issues that the previous theory could not address.
As an example of this dynamic, the rise of rational-choice game theory
can be seen as a response to the SMD troubles. In a comment on Oliver
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Hart’s review of attempts to found an adequate theory of imperfect
competition on general equilibrium, Sonnenschein wrote that “the Negishi
line [which attempted this founding], which builds on the
Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie theory, has been pretty much played out”
(1985: 175). Here Sonnenschein refers to his own work with John Roberts
which showed how the SMD results blocked progress along Negishi’s lines
(Roberts and Sonnenschein 1977). Instead, Sonnenschein writes that he
“will not confine [his] attention to general equilibrium theory.” He then
argues that “recent results” in game theory (Rubinstein’s work on
repeated games and a Nash approach to auctions) “are useful for the
theory of monopolistic competition. This is the ‘new blood’ that I believe
is much needed” (Sonnenschein 1985: 175). He even provides a list of
questions in game theory that need to be answered for the approach to
make headway, and he refers to his graduate students who have since led
the way in game theory (Dilip Abreu, Vijay Krishna, David Pearce, Motty
Perry and Leo Simon).13
With breaches in the general equilibrium fabric as large as the one
created by the adoption to game-theory methods, the eschewing of experi-
mental approaches – as in Debreu’s remark – no longer made sense. To
understand the interaction between game theory and experimentation, we
need to examine some of the problems rational-choice game theory faced,
and to which experimentation was germane. As will be seen in the next
two sections of this essay, experimental methods were able to shape the
direction of theoretical development. This importance contrasts with the
ignoring of experimentation during the dominance period of general equi-
librium theory (as in the “response” to May’s results). The demise of
general equilibrium theory leads, then, to a period of pluralism. In this
period, game theory and experimental economics, in a close relationship,
thrive. It is this sense in which the demise of general equilibrium theory
leads to a flowering of experimental economics. For hand-in-hand with
general equilibrium theory went the view that experimentation was not
relevant. Once general equilibrium theory, with its methodological dic-
tates not favoring experimentation, was no longer at center stage, experi-
mentation could come to the fore.
3.4 Experimental economics and rational-choice bargaining
theory
The period of pluralism in economic theory beginning around 1985 was
typified by a reliance on game theory in its rational choice and evolution-
ary variants. And game theory, in both of these modes has been closely
associated with experimental economics. Experimentation works well with
game theory in a way that is not imaginable with general equilibrium
theory.14 Games can have a simple structure with few players, are based on
individual decision-making, and are thus conducive to experiment. More-
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over, game theory has never had a settled, overarching style, in the way
that general equilibrium theory does. These features of game theory have
conspired with the atmosphere of pluralism to give experimentation a
boost. In fact, experimentation has played a crucial role in how rational-
choice game theory has been received and in the rise of evolutionary game
theory. In order to see the recent effectiveness of experimentation, it helps
to set the stage by considering the state of rational-choice game theory, to
which experimentation became germane.
While rational-choice game theory became a favored tool of economist
during the latter half of the 1980s, it faced some significant problems
(Rizvi 1994a). The focus in this essay is clearly on the experimental results
and the theoretical transformation they occasioned. However, it may be
relevant to emphasize briefly that the difficulties with rationality in game
theory – that its common solution concepts (prescriptions as to how to
play a game) such as Nash equilibrium are burdened with knowledge
assumptions that are implausible and which make the notion of strategiz-
ing hard to maintain; that the concept of rational play itself becomes
suspect in games with a dynamic structure; and that the folk theorem and
related results mean that there are too many equilibria, so that almost any-
thing goes – have themselves had a great impact on the move to evolution-
ary game theory. (Rizvi 1998, on which the following relies heavily, has
details on these issues and references to other work.)
While there was not a well-established formulation of game-theoretic
rationality overall, one type of conception became immensely influential
and popular. This was the subgame perfect equilibrium. It is one of the
refinements of the concept of Nash equilibrium.15 Consider the following
illustration of the celebrated bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) that
can be said to usher in the rational-choice game-theory era. In particular,
consider bargaining over a fixed sum – the cake division problem. As is
well appreciated, every division of cake (that uses it all up) between two
players is a Nash equilibrium, and thus the concept seems to contribute
very little to an analysis. For Rubinstein, though, there are two innova-
tions. First, as regards the structure of bargaining, he imagines offers of
cake-division alternating between two players until the other party accepts
an offer. Also, since there is passage of time, the payoff (cake) is dis-
counted. Nevertheless, there is a whole host of Nash equilibria. So, to
proceed, Rubinstein employed a stronger solution concept. This is the
second innovation. Rubinstein was able to show that there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. This is because a subgame perfect equilib-
rium prescribes optimal behavior in each equilibrium and out-of-
equilibrium situation. Thus a player cannot increase a demand (beyond
the proposed unique solution) that will cause the other player to prefer to
reject that offer. Consequently, the optimal offer will be one that leaves
the opponent just indifferent.
A serious problem for bargaining model is incompatible experimental
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evidence. An alternating-offer bargaining game that ends after one period
is known as the ultimatum bargaining game if, when the offer is rejected,
the game ends with neither player receiving a division. The game has the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the player moving first pro-
poses a maximally advantageous allocation (all or nearly all of the cake)
and the second player accepts. This is a clear prediction that lends itself
easily to experimental test. Yet it fails that test badly (Güth et al. 1982;
Camerer and Thaler 1985; Güth and Tietz 1990; Davis and Holt 1993: ch.
5; Roth 1994). The first player in the experiments typically offers to keep
between one-half and two-thirds of the cake, not anywhere close to all of
the cake. A player offering to keep two-thirds of the cake stands an equal
chance of having this offer rejected. If the game has two stages, the evid-
ence as to what will be done is not so clear-cut, with some experiments
reproducing subgame perfect equilibrium and others not.
What is clear, though, is that this experimental evidence upset the cen-
trality of the Rubinstein bargaining model and its variants (as well as the
concept of subgame perfection). In fact, the discussion of these results was
quite interesting and led to further confusion. Initially, a number of
authors maintained that the form of preferences assumed of players might
simply have been wrong: perhaps the players “played fair” and did not
seek to maximize personal gain. If this is so, the experimental evidence
may yet reflect a subgame perfect equilibrium being played, though with
preferences that reflect fairness concerns (Camerer and Thaler 1988;
Thaler 1988; 1992). This development opened the gate to evolutionary-
type reasoning, which is amenable in principle to a multiplicity of player
types (own-gain maximizers and those preferring equality, for example).
What resulted was a debate between those assuming strict self-interest and
those advocating a presumption of a norm of fairness. Neither side had
decisive arguments in what promised to be an endless back-and-forth. The
fairness doctrine did not “win” since, among other things, the diligence
with which the norm of fairness that was held by experimental subjects
was shown to vary in successive plays of the game (Ochs and Roth 1989;
Bolton 1991). If preferences are indeed unstable, any constellation of data
can be explained with a suitably specified set of preferences, and one
particular “norm” – self-interest or fairness – cannot be the guide to
explaining choice. At this point, some theorists threw up their hands and
tried to regroup. Neither self-interest rationality nor equality-preferring
rationality was proving to be powerful in handling experimental evidence
in the ultimatum game. In the words of Samuelson (1996: 26), on which
this review is based, the response to this morass was “to abandon the
model of rational players optimizing against stable preferences” of what-
ever sort. “The result has been the development of evolutionary game
theory.”
For at least two broad reasons, then – those having to do with the prob-
lems in the abstract expressions of game-theoretic rationality and those
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resulting from dramatic experimental nonconfirmations of some of the
most popular models and refinements of rational-choice game theory – it
was obvious by the early 1990s that rational-choice game theory was in
trouble. It was exactly in this situation that evolutionary game theory
found a foothold in economics and began its ascent. Evolutionary game
theory, from its inception, had a close relation to experimentation.
3.5 Experimental economics and evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory (despite its own difficulties) succeeded in many
areas where rational-choice game theory had problems (Samuelson 1996;
Rizvi 1998). For us, though, the issue is to see what role experimentation
played in its interaction with evolutionary game theory. As with rational-
choice game theory, there seems to be a close involvement between exper-
imentation and evolutionary game theory, an involvement that flourished
in the pluralistic atmosphere following the problems with general equilib-
rium theory.
Evolutionary game theoretic models conformed well to experimental
evidence. For example, the experimental evidence regarding the ultima-
tum game indicated that players’ choices form a Nash equilibrium but are
not subgame perfect, as the Rubinstein bargaining analysis would suggest.
In other words, there was a difference between the prediction of a theory
and what happened in an experimental setting. To rectify this situation,
evolutionary game theorists sought a model that selected strategies such as
those observed in the experimental setting. Binmore et al. (1995) did this.
They were able to show the survival of strategies that give a substantial
portion of the cake to the second player – the one who is in the position of
replying to an offer. In addition, this equilibrium was stable.
Binmore and Samuelson (1992) took up the idea of boundedly rational
players in an evolutionary model. They assumed that agents were sup-
posed to have lexicographic preferences: in the first instance they pre-
ferred higher payoffs, and in the second place algorithms that are less
complex. The latter they modeled as the number of states of an automa-
ton. For a dynamic they chose a modification of an evolutionarily stable
strategy and applied this to an infinite-horizon alternating-offer bargaining
game to see what strategies would be selected (Binmore et al. 1993). They
found that the strategy selected (in a limiting case) turns out to be the
Rubinstein bargaining outcome from rational-choice theory as the dis-
count factor increases. As Samuelson (1996) notes, the “subgame-perfect
equilibrium in infinite-horizon bargaining games is then rescued by evolu-
tionary models from . . . its most problematic features.” In shorter, finite
games such as the ultimatum game, the results are not subgame perfect
but are closer to the experimental results.
Samuelson (1996) identifies two issues in interpreting these findings.
There is still the ambiguity of whether fairness concerns on the part of the
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players are triggering the outcomes. That is, rational-choice game theory
using fairness preferences could also explain the experimental outcomes.
This concern is allayed since, as we have seen, the norm of fairness was
not adhered to well in repetitions of the relevant game. In addition, the
verification of experimental outcomes does not follow the usual method
of empirical economics. That method is to obtain a comparative static
result and then to test whether a change in an exogenous variable affects
an endogenous variable in the predicted manner. The method used in the
bulk of the experimental literature, on the other hand, is simply to assert
the compatibility of a model outcome with an experimental outcome. Be
this as it may, the evolutionary approach – whatever its shortcomings –
does better than the rational-choice approach (using self-interest) since it
at least does demonstrate this compatibility. Moreover, the fairness
method did not gain very wide acceptance for a number of reasons. First,
for many economists, there was a strong presumption to maintain an
assumption of self-interested behavior. Second, and related to this, was
another presumption, that of the Stigler–Becker approach, which was to
favor a change in the constraints that agents face rather than to allow
preferences that are presumed to have to be altered. This, Stigler and
Becker argued, was so that there was some backbone to the maximizing
model: otherwise, any result could be explained by a suitable change of
preferences. Third, as related earlier, the norm of fairness was not
adhered to consistently in experiments: in this sense, the fairness
approach did less well than the evolutionary approach in conforming to
the evidence. For all of these reasons, incorporating fairness into prefer-
ences did not seem to provide a viable alternative to the evolutionary
approach.16
Despite these problems, it is impressive that evolutionary game theory
was able to challenge (and surpass in important respects) rational-choice
game theory on the strength of its ability better to conform to experimen-
tal evidence.17 As we have seen, this has not always been a criterion for the
success of an economic theory.
3.6 Conclusion
We can now plausibly account for the alterations in the popularity of
experimental work among economists. During the ascendance and domi-
nance periods of formalist general equilibrium theory (the 30-odd years
following 1950), experimental economics was in a hiatus. Economists,
who felt the overarching theoretical force of general equilibrium theory,
were unreceptive to a method that was inductive and which upset the
axiom–result–econometrics model of economic investigation. The axioms
were given introspectively, and were not subject to disconfirmation by
experimental data; the results followed directly from axioms without the
intervention of data; and the econometrics relied on “natural” rather than
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controlled experiment. Theoretical economists outside the general equi-
librium mold, such as those in the Chicago tradition, also did not look to
experiments for confirmation. Even confirmatory work – Thurstone’s –
was argued against, and many experiments and experimental reports,
such as May’s, were ignored. When the SMD results caused a breach the
confidence economists had in general equilibrium theory, however, the
floodgates were open to many currents of alternative approaches. In this
atmosphere of methodological pluralism, experimental economics grew
rapidly. Experiments fit easily with game theoretic methods, which
thrived in this atmosphere. Now, experiments proved crucial in trans-
formation of economic theory, as the success of evolutionary game theory
shows.
Even if this interpretation of experimentation is plausible, in other ways
it is preliminary and tentative. There is certainly scope for asking what
other sorts of evidence can be brought to bear on the concerns of this
essay. For example, many of the principals involved in this narrative could
be interviewed. It would be interesting to ask the economists involved
what their motivations and intentions were, as opposed to focusing on the
written record, as is done here, since the written record can only partially
give insight into the themes which are of concern. The relation between
experimentation and game theory, not just in the past fifteen years, but
throughout the postwar period is another form of inquiry that is worth
pursuing.
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Notes
1 I have explored some of these issues in other work, on which I rely in this
chapter: the arbitrariness results and their impact (Rizvi 1994b), the rise of
rational-choice game theory (1994a), the ascendance of evolutionary game
theory (Rizvi 1998), and the search for an alternative to microfoundations in
the European work on market demand (Rizvi 1997). Mirowski discusses the
alternatives to general equilibrium theory under the rubric of “cyborg sciences”
(2002), and Sent (2004) investigates the related resurgence of the concept of
bounded rationality in the economics literature from the 1980s onward.
2 The relation between game theory and experimentation has often been mutu-
ally supporting. However, experimentation in economics has also occurred
independently of game theoretic formulations as well, e.g., Thurstone’s work
on experimentally derived indifference curves, or May’s work on transitivity
(Thurstone 1931; May 1954).
3 By general equilibrium theory I mean the neo-Walrasian work associated with
the names of Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie and their followers.
4 This view is echoed by Oskar Morgenstern as discussed in Innocenti and
Zappia in this volume.
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5 Thurstone remarks on the genesis of his research (1931, p. 139):
The formulation of this problem is due to numerous conversations about
psychophysics with my friend Professor Henry Schultz of the University of
Chicago. It was at his suggestion that experimental methods were applied
to this problem in economic theory. According to Professor Schultz, it has
probably never before been subjected to experimental study.
Interestingly, the Wallis and Friedman (1942) critique appears in a Festschrift
for Henry Schultz.
6 An editor points out, correctly, that this critique is a reaction to a particular
experiment rather than to experimentation as a whole. Indeed, there is an
experimental literature that follows on Thurstone’s work which tries to rectify
problems in his experimental set-up (e.g., Rousseas and Hart 1951). However,
the ideas that experimentation is too artificial and manipulative to be of use
continued to color economists’ views of experimentation taken as a whole.
7 The details in the next note are from Box 015 of collection B83-0023 (Kenneth
Ownsworth May) at the University of Toronto Archives. I have not consulted
these, but base my account on Bartlow (2000).
8 May submitted his paper to Econometrica after presenting it to a meeting of
the Econometric Society in December 1952. In June 1953 the editor, Robert
Strotz, informed him that the referees had not understood his paper. Strotz
offered to send the paper to a fourth referee. May defended his paper, and
made suggestions for new referees including Arrow. The paper then appeared
in January 1954. May’s experience predates Vernon Smith’s similar frustration
with uncomprehending referees (Smith 1992: 244–247); yet he likewise had a
kind editor (Harry Johnson) and this resulted in the publication of an experi-
mental paper (Smith 1962) in the Journal of Political Economy.
9 As an editor of this collection points out, the hostility to experimentation was
not exclusively from general equilibrium theorists. Robbins and Friedman – in
their work that is quoted – are not part of general equilibrium program. Yet
their attitudes in this regard were adopted by the general equilibrium theorists.
10 This seminar is discussed in more detail in an earlier version of this essay, Rizvi
(1999). For more background on the Santa Monica seminar, including the
larger intellectual currents that resulted in it, consult Leonard (forthcoming,
chapter entitled “Into the Labyrinth: Social Science and the Present Danger,
RAND 1946–1960”). Innocenti and Zappia in their chapter and Dimand in his,
also discuss this seminar.
11 Moreover, the editors included some papers that were not presented at the
seminar, but which they held were relevant (Thrall et al. 1954: v). The partici-
pant and papers lists appear in the appendices to the book.
12 This is now a generally accepted conclusion. Christopher Bliss, who earlier had
defended general equilibrium theory, wrote at around the same time, “The
near emptiness of general equilibrium theory is a theorem of the theory” (1993:
227). He was referring to the SMD results. The idea of using representative
agent models, as a way around the problem, has been effectively criticized by
Alan Kirman (1992).
13 For more on the rise of rational-choice game theory, consult Rizvi (1994a),
from which this is drawn.
14 This point was emphasized by an editor, to whom I am grateful.
15 This concept was developed by Selten (1965, 1975) and requires that Nash
equilibrium hold not only in the original game but also in every subgame of the
original game. Thus what results is a Nash equilibrium that involves no threats
that would not actually be carried out if the players’ bluffs were called. That is,
the strategies chosen specify only actions that players would want to follow if
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called on to do so. The whole refinements project has come to a halt. Refine-
ments refer to plausible strengthenings of Nash equilibrium that reduce the
multiplicity of equilibria with the goal of uniqueness. Uniqueness (in game
theory as opposed to non-strategic economics) is more than just a nice feature:
without it players cannot coordinate on the same equilibrium. Yet Norde et al.
(1996) have shown that there is no solution concept that provides a unique
equilibrium for each finite strategic game that is also consistent. Van Damme,
the author of key works on refinements (1991, 1992), candidly comments on
this: “I don’t know how to deal with this” (Aumann and van Damme 1997: 28).
It is also by now broadly realized that the refined equilibria are extraordinarily
fragile with respect to changes in the underlying data of the problem and hence
to misspecifications of them (Mas-Colell 1996: 184–185).
16 Despite these explanations it may seem odd, as an editor has emphasized, that
it was easier for some economists to jettison fairness-based maximization – for
all of its problems – in favor of no maximization at all.
17 It may seem that this is inevitable since evolutionary game theorists intended to
find models that conformed to the experimental evidence. However, the con-
forming of their models to the experimental evidence is still a considerable
achievement. First, it demonstrates the greater flexibility of the modeling in the
evolutionary approach that this desired conformity can be achieved within it.
This was not possible in the rational-choice model on the assumption of self-
interested preferences. Second, economists using the rational-choice model
incorporating fairness did also try to conform to the experimental evidence,
and they were less successful in this attempt than the evolutionary game theo-
rists.
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4 Thought- and performed
experiments in Hayek and
Morgenstern
Alessandro Innocenti and Carlo Zappia
The necessary consequence of the reason why we use competition is that,
in those cases in which it is interesting, the validity of the theory can never
be proved empirically. We can test it on conceptual models, and we might
conceivably test it in artificially created real situations where the facts
which competition is intended to discover are already known to the
observer. But in such cases it is of no practical value, so that to carry out
the experiment would hardly be worth the expense . . . The peculiarity of
competition – which it has in common with the scientific method – is that
its performance cannot be tested in particular instances where it is signific-
ant, but is shown only by the fact that the market will prevail in comparison
with any alternative arrangements.
(Friedrich A. Hayek 1968, p. 180)
. . . experiments are designed to enable us to predict outcomes under con-
trolled conditions and to make it possible to conclude from those to wider
applications. There are, of course, limits to experiments in economics, but
in a sense any variation in taxation, in foreign exchange rates, in tariffs, etc.
etc., can be viewed as a coarse experiment whose result can lead to new
theories and hence to better prediction when the new occasion comes
around.
(Oskar Morgenstern 1972, p. 710)
4.1 Introduction
It has been argued that the emergence and early progress of experimental
economics are related to the work of Oskar Morgenstern (Schotter 1992).
Although he did not publish any experimental findings, Morgenstern
became involved in the development of experiments in economics in at
least two ways. First, most of his contributions to economics, from the
1928 volume on economic prediction to the 1970 work on the predictabil-
ity of stock prices, were devoted to various aspects of empirical research,
including the promotion of both econometrics and statistical analysis.
Second, in conjunction with John von Neumann, he created game theory,
whose way of modeling the process of decision-making lent itself to exper-
imental applications. Morgenstern was an unconventional kind of thinker,
tending to anticipate “unexpected” turns in the evolution of mainstream
science, rather than contribute to its systematization. And experimental
economics has, indeed, been viewed as a development that has initiated an
important thread in the criticism of neoclassical economics, the full
implications of which are still to be drawn (Smith 1989).
However, curiously, Morgenstern’s early contributions as an economist
were characterized by the view that economics as a science was mainly
deductive, in the sense associated with the Austrian construction of the
thought experiment (Moss 1997).1 The “method of imaginary construc-
tion,” or “thought experiment,” typical of the Austrian tradition, can be
seen as a method to help economists avoid facing complexity in the initial
steps of analysis. Morgenstern (1954, p. 484) describes thought experi-
ments as the method of “imagining conditions that differ from the known
conditions and then attempting to identify the proper factor to which the
imagined variations could be ascribed.” The method proves valuable
mainly when the role of a single important element of a complex system is
to be ascertained, for example the role of the alert entrepreneur in the
Austrian theory of the competitive market.2 The method was intended by
Austrian economists as an instrument for drawing logical lessons with
empirical content from imaginary constructions. In Morgenstern’s (1954,
p. 484) words, “this procedure consists in the drawing of implications and
like other experiments may lead to the discovery of new facts.” For
instance, Friedrich A. Hayek considered general equilibrium theory as a
thought experiment aimed at identifying the causes of intertemporal dis-
coordination (Hayek 1941, p. 26).3
This essay argues that a comparative analysis of Hayek’s and Morgen-
stern’s contributions can suggest why methods as different as thought- and
performed experiments have been advocated in economics. In the mid-
1930s, the two Austrian economists shared the view that the empirical
content of economics was to be sought outside equilibrium theory, by
applying the deductive method. In the 1950s, Morgenstern’s renewed call
for empirical analysis actually signaled a shift towards an inductive
approach, endorsing the methodological value of direct, performed experi-
ments, in contrast to Hayek’s persistent reliance on a deductive approach
to empirical analysis, and on the thought experiment as its main instru-
ment. Essentially, we maintain that they held a common methodological
stance in the 1930s, but Morgenstern later embraced an inductive
approach while Hayek continued to reject it.4 It is worth specifying that, in
stressing the contrast between Hayek and Morgenstern as exponents of
diverging methodologies, our assessment of their respective positions
inevitably neglects other differences between the two authors.5
We shall consider Morgenstern’s definition of a thought experiment,
quoted above, as a point of reference. It is certainly a clear-cut, but also
quite restrictive, definition. Morgenstern, it seems, had in mind qualitative
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results concerning the movements of endogenous variables with respect to
controlled variations in data, something which might resemble an exercise
in comparative statics in a formal model. It is true that the methodology of
thought experiment has been applied by Austrian economists not only to
comparative statics but also to comparisons between the competitive
market and imaginary alternative frameworks.6 However, to contrast the
routes taken by the two Austrian economists, we have found it preferable
to embrace Morgenstern’s definition.
The essay is structured as follows. Section 4.2 argues that a specific
episode in the middle of the 1930s, namely a quite subterranean discussion
about the assumption of perfect foresight in economics, was indicative of
the two writers’ growing dissatisfaction with the concept of equilibrium.
The outgrowth of the exchange between Hayek and Morgenstern is inter-
preted as a plea, shared by both, for empirical analysis. Section 4.3 con-
tends that, in spite of the deductive approach shared by the two
economists, their respective articles on perfect foresight (Morgenstern
1935, and Hayek 1937) laid the basis for future disagreement on experi-
ments. Section 4.4 deals mainly with Morgenstern’s later turn towards an
inductive approach and his recommendation of experimental investigation
in economics, as opposed to the canonical use of thought experiments.
There follows an examination of the intellectual process leading to Mor-
genstern’s position, as stated in the passage quoted at the beginning of the
essay. Section 4.5 considers Hayek’s reliance on a deductive approach in
his subsequent analysis of the market process and of competition as a dis-
covery procedure. The rationale of Hayek’s faith in the method of thought
experiment in the 1960s, with specific regard to his contention that
complex phenomena cannot be dealt with by means of empirical analysis
in the form of performed experiments, is briefly investigated.
4.2 Perfect foresight and thought experiments in the 1930s
In the 1920s and 1930s, the role of time in economic theory was controver-
sial, especially in the Austrian circles of Ludwig von Mises and Hans
Mayer. These were two distinct groups of young economists, including
Hayek and Morgenstern respectively.7 Both groups were aware that a
better understanding of the way individuals plan their actions in an
intertemporal setting was required if the shortcomings of stationary equi-
librium were to be overcome. In Lachmann’s (1990) words, the economists
working on the Austrian variant of the neoclassical approach in the 1930s,
after dealing with the subjectivity of values, were striving to incorporate
the subjectivity of expectations into economic theory.
Despite the common origin of Hayek’s and Morgenstern’s efforts to
make room for expectations by incorporating a time dimension, their
investigations produced conflicting results. Hayek, who is hailed as the
first economist to introduce the notion of intertemporal equilibrium
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(see Milgate 1979, who refers to Hayek 1928), made his first attempt at
explicitly incorporating expectations in equilibrium theory in his 1933 Copen-
hagen Lecture on “Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and Malin-
vestment” (published in German in 1935). From the very beginning of this
essay, he was at pains to define the conditions for expectational equilibrium:
It has become clear that, instead of completely disregarding the time
element, we must make very definitive assumptions about the attitude
of persons toward the future. The assumptions of this kind which are
implied in the concept of equilibrium are essentially that everybody
foresees the future correctly and that this foresight includes not only
the changes in objective data but also the behaviour of all other
people with whom he expects to perform economic transactions.
(1935, pp. 139–140)8
This passage struck Morgenstern, who, in his essay “Perfect Foresight and
Economic Equilibrium” (1935, p. 171), considered it as an exemplar of the
erroneous opinion, prevailing among those dealing with the time element,
that “the theoretical perfection of equilibrium could not be obtained
without the assumption of complete foresight by the economic subjects
and the entrepreneurs.”9 Engaged as he was in reformulating equilibrium
through the application of time and expectations (see section 4.3 below),
Morgenstern argued that, despite being generally viewed as a prerequisite
for equilibrium over time, the meaning of “full,” “perfect” or “correct”
foresight was far from obvious.10 Morgenstern’s statement of what perfect
foresight means in equilibrium theory is worth quoting:
The individual exercising foresight must thus not only know exactly
the influence of his own transactions on prices but also the influence of
every other individual, and of his future behaviour on that of the
others, especially of those relevant for him personally. . . . The impos-
sibly high claims which are attributed to the intellectual efficiency of
the economic subjects immediately indicate that there are included in
this equilibrium system not ordinary men, but rather, at least to one
another, exactly equal demi-gods, in case the claim of complete fore-
sight is fulfilled . . . If “full” or “perfect” foresight is to provide the
basis of the theory of equilibrium in the strict specified sense . . . then a
completely meaningless assumption is considered. If limitations are
introduced in such a way that the perfection of foresight is not
reached, then these limitations are to be stated very precisely.
(Morgenstern 1935, p. 173)11
Here, Morgenstern is not simply questioning the realism of perfect fore-
sight; he is also interested in examining “somewhat closely the conditions
which result if full foresight is posited and especially if there results recipro-
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cal inclusion of foresight about the probable behaviour of others.” Morgen-
stern seems to accept that the hypothesis of perfect foresight can be a
useful tool for analyzing the behavior of an individual taken in isolation.
But once the “Robinson Crusoe economy” is left aside and the interactive
aspects of economic action are considered, Morgenstern strikes a skeptical
note:
The fact is that a calculation of the effects of one’s own future behavi-
our always rests on the expected future behaviour of others, and vice
versa. This can be observed empirically every time. However, the chain
of surmised mutual ‘reactions’ breaks off comparatively soon; often too,
they play no excessive role because of the power of external data of a
physical nature. This may be the case on certain markets, for example as
the stock-exchange. With unlimited foresight, it is something else.
(1935, p. 173)
At this point, Morgenstern (1935, pp. 173–174) takes up the paradox of
Holmes and Moriarty12 featuring in a previous work of his. The paradox is
an argument in support of the view that “an endless chain of reciprocally
conjectural reactions and counter-reactions . . . can never be broken by an
act of knowledge but always only through an arbitrary act – a resolution.”
It follows that “unlimited foresight and economic equilibrium are thus
irreconcilable with one another.” Morgenstern’s use of the paradox clearly
evokes the methodology of thought experiment. The analysis of Holmes’s
chain of deductions is intended to show that the “empirical” information
obtained from a mental, not a performed, experiment allows the theorist
to rule out certain theoretical conjectures, which, in this instance, concern
how equilibrium is to be defined in an interpersonal decision problem over
time. The unfolding paradox is essential for Morgenstern’s claim that it is
logically inconsistent to attempt to solve the problem of strategic inter-
action over time by assuming perfect foresight.
To move on to how Hayek reacted to Morgenstern’s allegations, the rele-
vant text is “Economics and Knowledge.” Hayek presents this article as an
attempt to make equilibrium analysis applicable to intertemporal price rela-
tionships. After giving the celebrated definition of equilibrium as a state of
coordination of individual plans,13 Hayek (1937, p. 42) comments: “These
considerations seem to throw considerable light on the relationship between
equilibrium and foresight, which has been somewhat hotly debated in recent
times.” The footnote reference is to Morgenstern’s 1935 paper. It is
arguable, therefore, that the discussion on the meaning of correct foresight
which follows is, at least in part, an answer to Morgenstern:
Correct foresight is then not, as it has sometimes been understood, a
precondition that must exist in order that equilibrium may be arrived
at. It is rather the defining character of a state of equilibrium. Nor
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need foresight for this purpose be perfect in the sense that it need
extend into the indefinite future or that everybody must foresee every-
thing correctly. We should rather say that equilibrium will last so long
as the anticipations prove correct and that they need to be correct
only on those points, which are relevant for the decisions of indi-
viduals. But on this question of what is relevant foresight or know-
ledge, more later.
(Hayek 1937, p. 42)
As regards Hayek’s partial revision of the relationship between equilib-
rium and foresight, announced in the 1939 English reprint of the 1933
lecture, two points of clarification are brought forward. On the one hand,
correct foresight is now precisely viewed as neither an assumption nor a
pre-condition for equilibrium, but as the defining characteristic of equilib-
rium itself. On the other hand, correct foresight is not equivalent to
perfect foresight, for the requirements for correct foresight are, in a sense,
less strict. Both these arguments implicitly refer to the questions raised by
Morgenstern. In particular, the second point hints at the limited cognitive
and computational capabilities of individuals; hence “demi-gods” are not
necessarily involved. This clarification can be interpreted as entailing that,
contra Morgenstern, accuracy in the anticipation of all future events is not
required. It is only necessary to anticipate the events that could imperil the
validity of the theories of the workings of the economy held by
individuals.14 However, Hayek did not endorse Morgenstern’s point con-
cerning the logical inconsistency of equilibrium with perfect foresight.
Hayek’s revision of the notion of equilibrium shows how the “tautological
propositions of pure equilibrium analysis” regarding the actions of a single
individual could consistently be applied to the explanation of economic
interrelations.
Hayek also refers to Morgenstern’s paper in the 1946 essay “The
Meaning of Competition.” He states that “complete knowledge of the rel-
evant factors on the part of all participants in the market” is the most
“critical and obscure” condition assumed by the theory of perfect competi-
tion. On this, Hayek concludes with a remark on Morgenstern’s point
which one cannot find in the 1937 paper: “I shall here not go into the
familiar paradox of the paralysing effect really perfect knowledge and
foresight would have on all action.” It is apparent that Hayek is maintain-
ing that the logical problems associated with the notion of equilibrium
with “really” perfect foresight do not concern his own 1937 notion of equi-
librium with correct foresight. In particular, he continued to use equilib-
rium with “correct” foresight as a useful logical instrument in The Pure
Theory of Capital, that is, in his last attempt to formulate the model of real
economy on which his theory of the trade cycle was based (Hayek 1941).
Although with different emphases, in their essays of the mid-1930s both
Hayek and Morgenstern, after dealing with the notion of equilibrium over
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time, explicitly addressed the question of the empirical content of eco-
nomic theory. They shared the view that this empirical content was to be
sought outside equilibrium theory. In fact, they seem to outline a two-step
procedure to develop economics. The first step of the procedure aimed to
make economics an exact science: the typical neoclassical practice of using,
in Morgenstern’s (1935, p. 169) words, “neither exact nor complete state-
ments about the assumptions underlying the theory of general equilib-
rium” should be replaced with a method of reasoning, such as the
axiomatic method, which allowed for an exact recognition of all the
implications of a given set of propositions, as well as an exact derivation of
theorems from propositions. As has been noted (Leonard 1995, p. 313),
the 1935 essay signals that, under the influence of a new mentor, Karl
Menger, Morgenstern was eventually escaping the influence of Mayer,
who, following the Austrian tradition of Carl Menger, firmly opposed the
use of mathematics in economics.15 Even if, unlike Morgenstern, he did
not contribute directly to this development, Hayek (1937, p. 35) pointed to
the same issue when he explained that
my criticism of the recent tendencies to make economic theory more
and more formal is not that they have gone too far but they have not
yet carried far enough to complete the isolation of this branch of logic
and to restore to its rightful place the investigation of the causal
processes, using formal economic theory as a tool in the same way as
mathematics.
The second step of the procedure aimed to specify the empirical content of
economics. However brilliant the development of equilibrium theory by
means of the axiomatic method, the process through which equilibrium
can be obtained in actual economies remains to be investigated; and this
task necessarily entails an examination of what foresight and knowledge
mean for individuals acting in actual economies (see in particular Morgen-
stern 1935, p. 178, and Hayek 1937, p. 46).16
In the 1930s, however, Hayek and Morgenstern differed with respect to
the way in which this empirical content was to be investigated. A first
point to note is that both authors were deductive in approach. In particu-
lar, they were trying to deal with the assumption of incomplete knowledge
in actual economies by applying mental chains of deductions and conjec-
tures. That is to say, both were thinking in terms of thought experiments:
they altered one relevant variable at a time and then speculated on the
effects on the economy. But they assumed different starting points for
their thought experiments. On the one hand, Hayek relied on his own defi-
nition of equilibrium as a state of plan coordination over time, a reliance
which made the exercise sensible, in a way not unlike comparative static
analysis. On the other hand, Morgenstern was not convinced at all that a
plausible notion of equilibrium with foresight could be devised; thus he
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showed limited confidence in the mental deductions he was drawing from
the assumption of incomplete knowledge.
4.3 In search of a role for empirical analysis in economics
Although Morgenstern’s 1935 essay is usually referred to for its critical
part, it features a constructive part as well. Morgenstern is aware that, if
equilibrium theory is to be preserved, an alternative formal structure must
be devised to deal with the intricate relationships between economic phe-
nomena involving interpersonal decisions.17 As will be substantiated
below, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, to which Morgenstern
contributed mainly through his criticism of neoclassical economics in the
first chapter, can be interpreted as the chief outcome of Morgenstern’s
search for “exactness” in the analysis of market interactions among
individual agents. However, the 1935 essay contains no substantive hint
at the formal representation emerging later. Here Morgenstern (1935,
pp. 175–179) devises an informal model in which he assumes, first, indi-
vidual agents endowed with different degrees of knowledge. These
agents are interested in subsets of the environment and constantly adjust
their “opinion” about the environment, until “there is no longer any
improvement in the sense of constant welfare.” Second, Morgenstern pos-
tulates the existence of highly knowledgeable individuals endowed
with “purely theoretical knowledge of [economic] relationships,” who are
able to evaluate the “overall” consequences of their behaviour. But he
fails to explain how this purely theoretical knowledge differs from perfect
foresight.18
Although Morgenstern (1935, p. 175) states his intention to investigate
the importance of foresight and knowledge for actual economies, he brings
forward only vague suggestions.19 Individuals endowed with a certain
“degree of foresight,” which is based on varying amounts of insight into
economic relationships, usually revise expectations in response to environ-
mental changes. This means that expectations should be viewed as data of
the economy and that, as for other data, comparative statics are necessary
to understand their role in actual economies. Thus, Morgenstern was
groping for a research strategy that ultimately resembles an exercise in
comparative statics without any consistently defined state of equilibrium
to start from. Moreover, after the “cogent examination” of interpersonal
decision problems in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Morgen-
stern seemed no longer interested in defining, and, what is more import-
ant, using a notion of general equilibrium over time for analysing the
empirical content of economic theory.
After 1945, Morgenstern switched his attention to the second step of
the procedure. Arguably, one reason for this change of interest can be
found in the 1935 essay, which concludes with a reference to the need for a
more inductive approach supported by statistical data:
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a great number of empirical studies may have to be made . . . in order
to obtain some kind of a picture about the range of the element of
expectations . . . It would, for example, be quite conceivable to submit
as the adequate data concrete transactions, going on to prove what this
result would be, compared with the actual, had different coefficient of
expectations been set up. . . . On the basis of these empirical studies
and by means of the materials of experience . . . concrete theorems may
be handled in such a way that there are discovered expectations and
foresight factors, which have been included but generally unexpressed.
(Morgenstern 1935, p. 183)
As will be argued in the following section, Morgenstern’s endorsement of
the experimental turn in economics derived from the methodological
option he favored in the process of giving economic theory empirical
content.
As for Hayek’s approach, his viewpoint is clearly stated at the very
beginning of “Economics and Knowledge:”
I shall contend that the empirical element in economic theory – the
only part which is concerned not merely with implications, but with
causes and effect, and which leads therefore to conclusions which, at
any rate in principle, are capable of verification (or rather falsification)
– consists of propositions about the acquisition of knowledge.
(Hayek 1937, p. 33)
In Hayek’s view, economics can claim the status of empirical science only
to the extent that it is capable of analyzing the conditions under which
“the knowledge and the intentions of the different members of society are
supposed to come more and more in agreement” (Hayek 1937, p. 45), as
the economy is supposed to be, by assumption, in equilibrium. Indeed, it is
in the 1937 essay that one first finds Hayek’s claim about the importance
of dispersed non-price knowledge, as well as of its diffusion through the
market process; this was to become a main recurrent theme not only of his
work (Hayek 1946, 1968), but of the modern Austrian school in general
(Vaughn 1994, Ch. 4).
Hayek’s investigation of the disequilibrium process through which indi-
vidual knowledge is used, and through which it changes, can be considered
as his version of the second step of the two-step procedure. However,
although he makes constant reference to the empirical aspect of his analy-
sis, Hayek never sets out to verify (or falsify by means of empirical coun-
terexamples) the propositions put forward. In fact, he advocates (1937,
p. 55) a strictly deductive approach:
in stressing the nature of the empirical propositions of which we must
make use if the formal apparatus of equilibrium analysis is to serve for
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an explanation of the real world, and in emphasising that the proposi-
tions about how people will learn, which are relevant in this connec-
tion, are of fundamentally different nature of those of formal analysis,
I do not mean to suggest that there opens here and now a wide field
for empirical research. I very much doubt whether such investigation
would teach us anything new.
Here, Hayek’s lasting faith in the principles of the Austrian school (as
compared to Morgenstern’s “heterodoxy”) is clearly expressed. As briefly
recalled in the introductory section, deductivism has been a feature shared
by almost all scholars of the Austrian school, beginning with Carl
Menger’s attack on the German historical school.20 In Hayek’s case, he
commits himself to a deductive approach even in the pursuit of the empiri-
cal content of economic theory.21 The rationale for Hayek’s commitment
to deductivism was the subject of elaboration and revision in later works,
as shown in section 4.5.
4.4 Morgenstern and the postwar rise of performed
experiments
The postwar debate on the relation between theory and empirics in eco-
nomics was influenced by the first performed experiments. The Santa
Monica conference of 1952 played a crucial part in this story; it has been
viewed as the birthplace of experimental gaming.22 The conference, in
which game theorists met experimenters associated with the Rand Corpo-
ration, was promoted by the Ford Foundation and Michigan University
under the title “The Design of Experiments in Decision Processes.”
Among the nineteen essays published in Thrall et al. (1954), two deserve
mention for their influence on subsequent developments, especially in
experimental methodology: the essay by Estes (1954) and that by Kalisch
et al. (1954). Estes’s essay, which aimed to show that learning could be
represented as a converging stochastic process, triggered off a debate on
the informational and computational capacities of economic agents. This
debate featured Flood (1954), Simon’s Models of Man (1957), and Sidney
Siegel, who in the early 1960s carried out a laboratory experiment proving
the importance of monetary incentives to the behavior of experimental
subjects.23 “Some Experimental n-Person Games” by Kalisch et al.,
although far from conclusive, showed how game theory allowed transla-
tion of the hypotheses to be tested into simple and precise models. The
experimental subjects were first instructed in the main principles of game
theory and then submitted to the experiment with predetermined time;
payments consisted of tokens that were converted into dollars at the end
of the experiment. The discussion of results took into account both infor-
mational and environmental conditions and the different personalities of
the subjects.
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These contributions did not go unnoticed by Morgenstern, who
attended the conference. In his presentation, Morgenstern (1954, p. 484)
argued that performed experiment should have a place in the economist’s
toolbox:
I do believe that there exist great opportunities for direct experiments
now and in the future. I am thinking of the actual, physical, experi-
ment, i.e., one in which physical reality is being subjected to desired
conditions, as distinguished from the so-called “thought-experiment.”
Morgenstern’s confidence in the usefulness of experimentation in social
sciences was strengthened by the ensuing experimental activity, which he
correctly perceived as an outgrowth of game theory. In the 1950s there
were two different approaches to experimentation: the socio-psychological
one, represented by experimental gaming, and the economic-managerial
approach, expressed by business games.24 These approaches shared two
main features: firstly, the object of verification was usually represented by
games in normal form; secondly, their theoretical background related to
economics only indirectly, with other social sciences having the lion’s
share.25 In business games, in particular, a multiplicity of factors (like the
subjects’ intellectual ability, patterns of learning, personality traits, and
social origin) matched a variety of types of economic behavior to be con-
sidered “rational” or “maximizing.” As Hoggatt (1959, pp. 192–195) put it:
“we focus on using game situations as a research tool for studying the
behavior of human beings in conflict situations . . . [our aim is] to observe
how the subject’s actual behavior compares with various types of maximiz-
ing behavior as these are visualized in economic theory.”
Hoggatt’s business game was intended to point out the complexity of
human behavior, which did not conform to neoclassical maximizing behav-
ior but was shown to be the outcome of a mixture of conflicting maximum
problems. This conclusion closely resembled the view Morgenstern made
explicit in the first chapter of Theory of Games:
If two or more persons exchange goods with each other, then the
result for each one will depend in general not merely upon his own
actions but on those of the others as well. Thus each participant
attempts to maximize a function (his above-mentioned “result”) of
which he does not control all variables. This is certainly no maximum
problems, but a peculiar and disconcerting mixture of several conflict-
ing maximum problems. Every participant is guided by another prin-
ciple and neither determines all variables that affect his interest.
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, p. 11)
Therefore, it is not surprising that, in 1962, Morgenstern, in assessing the
meaning of the interplay between game theory and business, noted that
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“game theory has clearly established the experimental character of eco-
nomics. Although in a certain sense a by-product only, this nevertheless
heralds a new outlook, a new attitude from which economics in general
cannot fail to profit” (Morgenstern 1962, p. 11). The 1972 passage quoted
in opening this essay, where Morgenstern acknowledges that experiments
were basic both to the establishment and application of new economic the-
ories, amounted to a reference to this development.
The tangle of claims and assumptions from which game theory origin-
ated is relevant to this story. The collaboration with von Neumann had a
momentous effect on Morgenstern’s approach to economics. When the
two authors met in Princeton, they shared the view that neoclassical
theory was not rigorous enough. The “Austrian” Morgenstern embraced
von Neumann’s mathematical rigor, but, at the same time, went further
than von Neumann in arguing for the application of game theory to eco-
nomics (Mirowski 1992; Rellstab 1992; Schotter 1992; Leonard 1995).
Taking advantage of his pre-war criticism of neoclassical theory, Morgen-
stern claimed that game theory had the potential for a radical change in
both the mathematical and the theoretical foundations of economic
science. In particular, game theory could remove the simplifications of the
Walrasian system. But, while in the 1950s economists promptly assimilated
von Neumann’s new mathematical concepts, they neglected Morgenstern’s
claim that the neoclassical postulate of maximization had to be either
weakened or abandoned.26 The application of game theory to economics
was characterized by an emphasis on formal aspects until the 1970s, at
least, when the identification of game theory with the theoretical analysis
of competitive markets weakened. The heterodox potentialities of game
theory have been developed only recently, chiefly through the rejection of
that crucial neoclassical postulate, the coincidence between rational choice
and the solution of a well-defined maximization problem. In the 1950s,
Morgenstern was already aware that game theory was incompatible with
the principle of constrained maximization. Dispensing with this essential
hypothesis would lead economists to focus on empirically meaningful
models of behavior.
In Morgenstern’s view, game theory represented the appropriate foun-
dation for a new analysis of the empirical processes of economic exchange.
Building on the basis of von Neumann’s mathematical apparatus of
Theory of Games, game theory could provide both an abstract environ-
ment for empirical and experimental analysis and counterexamples
leading to a re-examination of the basic postulates of the neoclassical
approach. In the papers of the 1930s discussed in the previous section,
Morgenstern maintained that neoclassical theory made improper use of
mathematics. In particular, the formulation of problems was too inaccu-
rate to render their translation into axiomatic terms possible, statements
were often treated as proofs, and references to actual economic life were
confused and offered no clue as to the relation between theory and empiri-
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cal evidence.27 In order to correct these methodological flaws, Morgen-
stern (1936) proposed the introduction of Hilbertian logic into economics.
He intended this type of logic as a formal tool capable of identifying all
implications of any proposition with exactitude. As already mentioned,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior presented what Morgenstern
meant to be the first step of the procedure outlined in the previous section
− the definition of economics as an exact science. In arguing in favor of a
“process of mathematization” of economics, von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944, p. 4) maintained that the chief reason why mathematics had
not been widely used in economics was that “economic problems are not
formulated clearly and are often stated in such vague terms as to make
mathematical treatment a priori appear hopeless.” Clearly enough, Mor-
genstern’s agenda did not change over the decades, with the need for
empirical analysis intertwining with that for axiomatization, and both
stemming from a comprehensive critique of neoclassical economics.
A reconstruction of Morgenstern’s contribution to Theory of Games
that stresses continuity with his previous work might appear to overem-
phasize Morgenstern’s intellectual consistency.28 However, our point here
is that the formal framework emerging from the collaboration with von
Neumann constitutes one possible alternative (indeed, the main altern-
ative; see Myerson 1999) to general equilibrium with perfect foresight, and
that it signals the definitive turn of modern economic theory towards
axiomatics, as Morgenstern advocated. But, at the same time, both a call
for methodological “modesty”29 and the preponderant role of von
Neumann’s mathematics had the effect of postponing progress in the
analysis of the empirical content of economic theory. Nevertheless, it
remains true that von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944, pp. 4, 5) con-
tention is that “the empirical background of economic science is definitely
inadequate,” and that though “the aim of this book lies not in the direction
of empirical research,” it may be hoped that “as a result of the improve-
ment of scientific technique and of experience gained in other fields, the
development of descriptive economics will not take as much time as the
comparison with astronomy would suggest.”
Morgenstern followed this line of inquiry in his post-Theory of Games
activity, starting with his 1950 volume On the Accuracy of Economic
Observations, an investigation into the reliability of economic data. The
book aimed to found a new research area on the measurement of error; its
second chapter listed many sources of errors in economic statistics, and the
first of these sources was the lack of designed experiments.30 This defi-
ciency was considered as the main cause of an essential difference between
natural and social sciences: while, in the natural sciences, the theorist
could confidently rely on the methods by which data were collected, in the
social sciences, this confidence was lacking, because the collector and user
of data were often different people (Morgenstern 1950, p. 17). Con-
sequently, given the goal of making the interplay between theory and data
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collection in economics as close as it was in physics, it was necessary to add
performed experiments to the tools commonly employed by economists
for the empirical verification of their models.
In 1954, Morgenstern’s took up the point on experiment in “Experi-
ment and Large Scale Computation in Economics,” which addressed two
issues: “first the occasional appearance of strictly planned experiments and
second the ability to compute on large scale (with the aid of electronic
computers) by making use of currently available theory” (Morgenstern
1954, p. 493). Both these new tools suggested the failings of thought exper-
iments:
[The thought experiment] is legitimate but exceedingly difficult to
handle, hence the numerous times when it has given rise to poor
results. It is often restricted to qualitative considerations. When one
thought-experiment follows another new difficulties may arise. Length
of chains of deduction can itself become a serious logical problem as
can be seen from the difficulty of deciding in some mathematical
proofs whether the proof is correct or not, if only because it is of
“great” length.
(Morgenstern 1954, p. 484)
It is noteworthy that while in the 1930s Morgenstern took issue with the
logical consistency of the Walrasian system by means of a typical thought
experiment, in the 1950s, he questioned the efficacy of the method of
thought experiment through a criticism of the feature previously resorted
to, namely, the length of chains of conjectural reactions and counter-
reactions, carried ad infinitum. This was employed to show, in the 1930s,
that perfect foresight prevented any definitive equilibrium resolution, and,
in the 1950s, that the use of thought experiments involved serious logical
problems. If, in the 1930s, Morgenstern’s escape from the indeterminacy
of equilibrium was an arbitrary decision breaking the chain of conjectures,
in the 1950s, the way out of the indefinite deductive procedure of thought
experiment was to perform a laboratory experiment.31
To summarize, Morgenstern made an effort to implement a more realis-
tic attitude in economics. Besides methodological pronouncements and
analytical groundwork, this effort consisted of writings on temporal data
series, statistical errors, and dynamic growth models. Within this frame-
work, he regarded performed experiments as one of the ways to improve
the empirical side of economic analysis. But, in his view, scientific enter-
prise should also have targeted a revision of the theoretical models with
which analysis begun. In fact, the conventional conception of economic
behavior proved sharply different from that entailed by game theoretical
models. This discrepancy has been demonstrated by laboratory experi-
mentation to a degree that goes well beyond Morgenstern’s original
insights; collecting evidence in simple choice settings like games has dis-
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closed, in Morgenstern’s words (1954, p. 496), “some properties of a
nature hitherto unknown.”
4.5 Empirical research in deductive terms: Hayek’s position
In Morgenstern’s case, his intention to uncover the critical points of neo-
classical theory, in combination with his eagerness to provide economics
with fresh empirical content, resulted in an inductive approach, which
explains his advocacy of experimental methods of analysis. On the con-
trary, Hayek’s search for the empirical content of economic theory after
“Economics and Knowledge” shows lasting confidence in the deductive
approach. Starting with the debate on socialist calculation, though,
Hayek’s work became much more wide-ranging than the pure economic
analysis he had pursued in the early 1930s. In this respect, the 1942–44
essay “Scientism and the Study of Society” is of crucial importance,
because it can be argued that nearly all of Hayek’s mature methodological
views are put forward in this essay (Caldwell 1994).
Hayek’s essay on scientism lays the basis for a new argument in favor of
the deductive method. The main point is that scientism in social sciences,
defined as the application of the method and language of natural sciences,
is fruitless because the subject matter of the two forms of scientific know-
ledge is fundamentally different. Namely, the human beliefs studied by the
social sciences cannot be reduced to any “objective fact” about the exter-
nal world, though they constitute a fundamental component of the “exter-
nal” world to be analyzed by a single individual:
the facts of social sciences are merely opinions, views held by the
people whose actions we study. They differ from the fact of physical
sciences in being beliefs or opinions held by particular people, beliefs
which as such are our data . . . and which we can recognise from what
they do and say merely because we have ourselves a mind similar to
theirs.
(Hayek 1942–44, p. 47)
As a result:
It is only by the systematic and patient following up of the implica-
tions of many people holding certain views that we can understand,
and often even only learn to see, the unintended and often uncompre-
hended results of the separate and yet interrelated actions of men in
society.
(Hayek 1942–44, p. 58)
As anticipated through the excerpt from “Economics and Knowledge”
quoted near the end of section 4.3, even this evolved version of Hayek’s
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methodology lends no support to empirical analysis, as the term is com-
monly intended. Hayek’s deductive method still consisted in obtaining, by
means of an effort of imagination, what empirical analysis could, allegedly,
not provide by itself. In this sense, thought experiments had a “purely ped-
agogic” purpose, as Moss (1997, p. 157) points out. But they also represen-
ted a tool designed to fill the gap between theory and reality, according
to an approach that Hayek would define more clearly in the 1950s and
1960s, building on the basis of the essay on scientism. Actually, the full
development of this methodological conception had to await Popper’s
contribution.32
Hayek (1955) holds that the aim of any model is confined to the defini-
tion of a certain range of phenomena, supposedly produced by the type of
situation under consideration. According to this account, “the selection
and application of the appropriate theoretical scheme thus becomes some-
thing of an art where success or failure cannot be ascertained by any
mechanical test” (Hayek 1955, p. 18). Such a vision of scientific work dis-
tanced Hayek from the inductive method based on experiments. Accord-
ing to Hayek, in the social sciences, theories are particularly difficult to
prove or disprove. The multiplicity of factors determining any situation
prevents the validity of deductive reasoning from being established by
direct observation. Therefore, deduction remains the single way to limit
the range of phenomena to expect. Deduction relies upon the application
of our existing knowledge, which is also a base for new knowledge: “that
certain conclusions are implied by what we know already does not
necessarily mean that we are aware of these conclusions, or are able to
apply them whenever they would help us to explain what we observe”
(Hayek 1955, p. 7).33
Later, Hayek (1964) coined a specific word to define this kind of theo-
rizing. He argued that the complexity of social phenomena required that
analysis concentrated on the recurrence of abstract patterns:
Such a theory destined to remain “algebraic,” because we are in fact
unable to substitute particular values for the variables, ceases then to
be a mere tool and becomes the final result of our theoretical efforts.
Such a theory will, of course, in Popper’s terms, be one of small empir-
ical content, because it enables us to predict or explain only certain
general features of a situation which may be comparable with a great
many particular circumstances. . . . The advance of science will thus
have to proceed in two different directions: while it is certainly desir-
able to make our theories as falsifiable as possible, we must also push
forward into fields where, as we advance, the degree of falsifiability
necessarily decreases. This is the price we have to pay for an advance
into the field of complex phenomena.
(Hayek 1964, pp. 28–29)
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From our perspective, this means that, if theory tackles subjects so
abstract and many-sided that they exclude meaningful predictions, the
only viable alternative is to rely upon imagination to distinguish between
what is possible and what is not. Hayek’s corollary, as expressed in the
quotation that opens this essay, was that the usefulness of performed
experiment was invalidated by the consideration that it could be employed
only for facts “already known to the observer” (Hayek 1968, p. 180).
Indeed, Hayek based his analysis of the market process and of competi-
tion as a discovery procedure mostly on deduction and thought experi-
ments. A substantial continuity characterizes his approach, as is
exemplified by its relationship to the Walrasian equilibrium model. In the
1930s, Hayek pointed out its conceptual and methodological flaws for the
analysis of the competitive process in conditions of dispersed knowledge.
In the perspective of the “Scientism” essay, as well as of the following
methodological essays, a Walrasian system of equations is not capable of
mastering the patterns which emerge when certain conditions are satisfied,
because it is designed to provide “point explanations” like those provided
by the natural sciences; but the subject matter of economic analysis is, by
its very nature, different from that of the natural sciences. In fact, when
complex phenomena are investigated, only “explanations of the principle”
can be sensibly formulated. As a result, the notion of spontaneous order
(Hayek 1968) is offered as an alternative to Walrasian general equilibrium
for the analysis of pattern coordination through the market process. Its
purpose is to elucidate the very general conditions under which
coordination holds. But its application necessarily entails overlooking the
particular circumstances that determine pattern coordination. In this
abstract environment, thought experiments can perform their distinctive
function, that is, discovering empirical information through experiments
that cannot be carried out, but only imagined.34
4.6 Concluding remarks
This essay has analyzed how two Austrian economists, Hayek and Mor-
genstern, dealt with the relationship between thought- and performed
experiments. We have maintained that, prior to the 1940s, both Hayek and
Morgenstern applied the deductive procedure of thought experiment. On
such a basis, they claimed that economics could improve its methodo-
logical status if it developed according to a two-step procedure. The first
step was to become an exact science thanks to the analytical power guar-
anteed by the adoption of the axiomatic method; the second step
amounted to a careful and precise definition of the empirical content of
economics.
After the 1940s, and in particular after the advent of game theory,
Hayek and Morgenstern dealt with the empirical content of economics in
different ways. On the one hand, Hayek relied on his own definition of
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empirical analysis as a purely deductive investigation into the process by
which individual knowledge changes. Experiments designed to test “artifi-
cially created real situations” would not work, because the phenomena of
economic life were complex and irreducible to “objective data.” On the
other hand, Morgenstern promoted the introduction of experimental
methods into economics, to take place through the adoption of laboratory
procedures transposed from the natural sciences. This change of perspect-
ive was a consequence of the flourishing of experimental activities stimu-
lated by game theory. An overview of the early years of experimental
economics shows, first, that game theory allowed translation of models
into verifiable hypotheses concerning simple choices, and, second, that it
created an appropriate setting for experiments, disclosing properties of
human behavior that challenged certain basic assumptions of neoclassical
economics. These two considerations explain why Morgenstern, contrary
to Hayek, changed his mind about thought experiments, and encouraged
performed experiments as a useful tool to carry out the empirical step of
economic inquiry.
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Notes
1 The place of Morgenstern in the history of economics is the subject of very dif-
ferent, and sometimes opposite, assessments. For instance, Boettke (1994, p. 2),
who considers Mises and Hayek as the main representatives of the Austrian
school, and views it as an alternative approach to mainstream economic theory,
argues that “individuals like Schumpeter, Haberler, Machlup, Morgenstern and
Robbins would carve out their own unique place within economics for their
theoretical nuances (due in large part to Austrian themes of imperfect know-
ledge, dynamic market process, the importance of time and methodology), but
they were still viewed by most other economists, and most importantly by
themselves, as mainstream neoclassical economists.” In the same volume,
Schotter (1994, p. 556) opens his essay on social institutions and game theory
by observing that “even a casual reading of the introduction of their book
indicates that von Neumann and Morgenstern viewed game theory as a unify-
ing theory for the social sciences and not as a narrow replacement for neoclassi-
cal economic theory.” That Morgenstern’s main contribution to economics is
the abandonment of the orthodox conception of economic behavior is argued
for in Innocenti (1995). Morgenstern’s contribution to the theory of games is
dealt with in Leonard (1995).
2 This is well exemplified by Mises’s “evenly rotating economy.” In Mises’s work
(1963, pp. 244–250), the role of entrepreneurship emerges through a contrast
with individuals operating in a timeless, static economy in equilibrium.
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3 For a recent, similar viewpoint on equilibrium models see Hahn (1996). The
relation between general equilibrium theory and experimentation is discussed
at length in Rizvi’s chapter.
4 As will be shown, this holds true in spite of both Morgenstern’s contribution to
the axiomatization of economics in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
and Hayek’s empirically oriented analysis of alternative institutional environ-
ments.
5 We are referring to their different political positions, underlying personal
rivalry. On this aspect see Leonard (forthcoming, Ch. 3). It is likely that polit-
ical views helped to shape their different attitudes towards economics since the
1930s. Since this essay focuses on methodological themes strictly intended,
these questions will not be considered in what follows.
6 For instance, Hayek, in the tradition of Wieser, repeatedly referred to an imag-
inary centrally planned economy in order to highlight the beneficial effects of
having decisions decentralized among individual agents in actual economies (in
particular, see Hayek 1945).
7 On the relationships between the two circles, and especially on Morgenstern’s late
dissatisfaction with Mayer’s causal-genetic approach, see Böhm (1992). On the
Austrian circles in the inter-war period see also Craver (1986) and Kirzner (1994).
8 In the 1935 essay, Hayek’s main goal was to show how a theory of business
cycle could be based on “expectations inevitably doomed to disappointment.”
The essay was a reply to Myrdal’s allegation that there was no role for expecta-
tions in Hayek’s trade-cycle theory. This focus on trade-cycle theory may
explain why Hayek did not elaborate further the notion of “correct foresight.”
When the essay was translated into English (1939), Hayek added a footnote to
the paragraph just quoted, remarking that “Economics and Knowledge,” pub-
lished in 1937, contained a more elaborate and “partly revised” analysis of the
relationship between equilibrium and foresight. As will be argued later, this
footnote originated from Morgenstern’s attack on this point.
9 Morgenstern quoted the entire passage in the text of his article. Since Morgen-
stern’s article was translated into English (by F. Knight) before the English
version of Hayek’s article was released, there are some minor differences
between the passage as cited from Hayek (1935) and the version given in Mor-
genstern (1935).
10 Moreover, in Morgenstern’s view, the implicit assumption that “there is identity
between foresight and the expectation of the future” shows that those econo-
mists were unaware of the difficulties stemming from the introduction of the
expectation element. In this connection, Hayek’s 1935 essay is quoted once
more as a (negative) example.
11 It is appropriate to remark that the term “demi-gods” is largely equivalent to
both those of “superoptimizer,” as in Winter (1985), and “homo-rationalis,” as
in Aumann (1985). These terms are used to indicate the knowledge abilities
attributed to individual agents in current general equilibrium theory and game
theory respectively.
12 The paradox concerns the paralyzing effect on actual action of thinking
strategically in a two-person game. The example is that of Moriarty’s attempt
to induce Holmes to leave London in order to catch him in Dover. Holmes’s
option to get off the train to Dover at an intermediate stop gives birth to a
chain of mental reactions to the expected behavior of the other player.
However, Morgenstern’s reasoning does not consider the possibility of using
mixed strategies. On this point see Bicchieri (1993).
13 For a society, then, we can speak of a state of equilibrium at a point in
time – but it means only that the different plans which the individuals
composing it have made for action in time are mutually compatible. And
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equilibrium will continue, once it exists, so long as the external data
correspond to the common expectations of all members of the society.
(Hayek 1937, p. 41)
14 In modern equilibrium theory, this point has been made explicit by Hahn
(1984). It has been convincingly argued that Hahn’s definition of equilibrium,
which still sets the standard in current equilibrium theory, is nothing but a sto-
chastic version of Hayek’s definition (Littlechild 1982). On Hayek’s notion of
equilibrium as a state of mutual compatibility of plans, see Zappia (1996).
15 Morgenstern’s endorsement of the axiomatic method figures one year later in
the essay “Logistic and the Social Sciences:” “Beside the axiomatic method
there is the genetic method which may even have a higher didactic value. But in
order to gain rigorous insight into the state of any science, the use of the
axiomatic method cannot be dispensed with” (1936, p. 396). It hardly needs
observing that this shift of approach culminates in the introductory chapter of
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
16 To assess the relevance of this task to current economic theory, compare
Arrow’s remarks (1996, pp. xiii–iv), introducing a recent volume on the status
of the rationality hypothesis:
Interactive rationality is relevant when the payoff of any agent depends on
the action of others. In general, then, the best choice of action by A
depends on the actions of B and vice versa. But how can A know the
actions of B? Is it possible to have knowledge (even probabilistic know-
ledge) of the actions of another? Competitive equilibrium theory provides
an answer to this conundrum, game theory (Nash equilibrium) another,
each with its own assumption. But the deeper logical question is, how do
either of these equilibrium concepts come into being? And, of course, the
second question is, are the answers empirically convincing?
17 Morgenstern (1935, p. 174) argues:
The resulting events are so extremely complicated that only far-reaching
employment of mathematics could help to suggest reciprocal dependen-
cies. The relationship between human behaviours dependent on one
another, even without the assumption of perfect foresight, is almost incon-
ceivably complicated, and it requires cogent examination.
18 It has been noted that Morgenstern’s 1935 essay anticipated the rationale of
rational expectations hypothesis (amongst others, see Arrow 1986, and Schot-
ter 1992). This is certainly correct if reference is made to the informal model
just mentioned. Morgenstern (1935, p. 177) perceptively observes that if it is
maintained that, in order to have equilibrium, “it is enough if every individual
belonging to the economy concerned simply knows what the concrete situation
will be on a certain future market,” then this is incorrect because “it is also
posited by the theory that individual acts rationally. However, this “ ‘ration-
ality’ posits, in its turn, that the economic subjects themselves perceive the con-
nections and dependencies – that they really see through the relationship to a
certain degree.” Nevertheless, Morgenstern seems unaware that the require-
ment of “rationality” attributed to Walrasian (and Paretian) equilibrium, which
he understands as something more than individual rationality, is the equivalent
of the perfect foresight assumption in a context of uncertainty. If the actions of
individual agents vary continuously with foresight and the future realization of
relevant variables is a continuous function of actions, it is possible to show that
there exists a foresight that would cause itself to be true, as happens with a
rational expectations equilibrium. Apart from the information requirement
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that the rationality of agents is common knowledge, this theorization is equival-
ent to Morgenstern’s argument on rationality (Radner 1989). As a result, the
logical impossibility of a rational expectations equilibrium cannot be argued on
these grounds.
19 In an attempt, admittedly provisional, to clarify the meaning of “degree of fore-
sight,” Morgenstern proceeds by distinguishing between an individual’s insight
into mutual relationships, which he terms “technical foreseeability,” and
“effective foresight,” that is “knowledge of individual historical events and
occurrences” (1935, p. 179). But the discussion of these two different notions of
foresight makes it clear that at this juncture Morgenstern did not have a proba-
bilistic notion of perfect foresight, which he actually considered as a synonym
for effective foresight. True, a genuinely probabilistic view of the introduction
of time into equilibrium theory cannot equally be found in other contemporary
authors, such as Hayek, Hicks, and Myrdal, to mention those referred to by
Morgenstern. However, in Morgenstern’s case, this absence has damaging
implications because he does not seem to grasp that, in the 1930s, the generally
accepted meaning for perfect foresight is more similar to “technical” than to
“effective” foresight. A better understanding of the requirements for equilib-
rium over time emerges from Hayek’s (1937, p. 42) definition of “correct fore-
sight,” to which consideration has already been given. This point is dealt with in
detail in Zappia (1999).
20 The achievements and shortcomings of historical empiricism and inductivism,
as opposed to Austrian deductivism, have been recently assessed in Grimmer-
Solem and Romani (1999).
21 One point should be made before moving on. Hayek’s deductivism is substan-
tially different from Mises’s apriorism. Mises based his aversion to empirical
testing on the methodological viewpoint that the fundamental postulates of
economic behavior are to be considered true independently of real experience,
that is, they are Kantian synthetic a priori propositions. Hayek, on the contrary,
does not deny that a priori propositions by and large reflect structures and con-
nections among objects of economic reality; nevertheless, he maintains that
these propositions can be discovered as a result of a mostly deductive theo-
retical effort (see Smith 1994).
22 For the history of experimental economics, see Smith (1992), Roth (1993,
1995), and Rizvi’s essay in this volume. A detailed analysis of the Santa Monica
conference can be found in Dimand’s essay.
23 The influence of Siegel on experimental economics is discussed in Smith (1992).
24 Experimental games were performed mainly by social scientists (psychologists,
sociologists, philosophers and decision theorists) belonging to a closely knit
community, chiefly financed by the military. Deutsch (1958), Flood (1958),
Loomis (1959), and Scodel et al. (1959) tested the Prisoner’s Dilemma; Vinacke
and Arkoff (1957) verified the coalition theory proposed in Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior; Mosteller and Nogee (1951), Allais (1953), Edwards
(1953), Flood (1955) and Davidson et al. (1957) conducted experimental tests of
the utility function proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern in Theory of
Games; Stone (1958) and Schelling (1958, 1959) verified Nash’s bargaining
theory and the theory of focal points. Business games, on the other hand, were
developed by business-school economists as tools for training and selecting man-
agers. The first business game was performed by a group of economists and
managers directed by Richard Bellman, and it was published in 1957. Later,
Andlinger and Greene set up a “business management game” (Andlinger 1958),
and a group of IBM researchers organized a laboratory to make experiments in
decision analysis (International Business Machines 1958a and 1958b). Finally,
Hoggatt (1959) used a business game to test Cournot’s model.
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25 The first feature has been documented by an exhaustive review of experimental
gaming in the 1950s (Rapoport and Orwant 1962). The article discusses over
forty experiments and shows how each of them can be represented as the verifi-
cation of a game in normal form. The second feature has been corroborated by
an authoritative observer, Herbert Simon: “I do not think that the impetus for
experimentation within a game-theoretical framework initially came from
economists, but rather from psychologists (particularly those who had begun to
build mathematical learning theory), statisticians, and interdisciplinary types
close to cybernetics and management science” (quoted in Smith 1992, pp.
253–254).
26 On Morgenstern’s attitude towards this issue, see Innocenti (1995). Von
Neumann’s way forward in the process of abandonment of the neoclassical pos-
tulate is discussed at length in Mirowski (2002).
27 See in particular Morgenstern’s (1941) harsh review of Hicks’s Value and Capital.
28 From both a theoretical point of view (e.g., the static, un-Austrian nature of
von Neumann’s solution to the problem of individuals’ interaction), and a bio-
graphical one (Morgenstern’s moving to the United States due to the degener-
ating political situation in Austria), there occurred dramatic changes which are
not accounted for in our reconstruction.
29 The field covered in this book is very limited, and we approach it in the
sense of modesty. We do not worry at all if the results of our study
conform with views gained recently or held for a long time, for what is
important is the gradual development of a theory, based on a careful
analysis of the ordinary everyday interpretation of economic facts.
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, p. 7)
30 Among these sources, Morgenstern (1950) indicates deliberate hiding of
information, low training of observers, failure of questionnaires, aggregation of
data, lack of definition or classification, errors of instruments, consideration of
discrete rather than continuous intervals of time, and interdependence or
stability of errors.
31 In the 1954 article, Morgenstern stresses that the validity of direct experiments
rest on their similarity with the experiments performed in physical sciences. In
this light, while Chamberlin’s (1948) early experiment can be useful “for peda-
gogical purposes” only, both Mosteller and Nogee’s (1951) and Edwards’s
(1953) experiments on gambling situations are praised because they can
provide “a theory of utility of a truly scientific character, removed from the
realm of pure speculation.” And these experiments, Morgenstern (1954, p. 502)
contends, “are on a borderline of economics; they connect with fields where
experience with experiments has already been obtained.” Again, it was a com-
parison between economics and natural sciences that led Morgenstern to con-
sider performed experiments as a useful tool for economists.
32 However, see Caldwell (1992) for a different viewpoint.
33 Cartwright’s essay in this volume discusses the rationale and limits of the use of
deduction in mainstream economic theory. In particular, her discussion of the
way economic models can teach us “genuine truths about empirical reality” 
(p. 137) is reminiscent of Hayek’s.
34 Boettke (2000) has argued that Hayek’s interest in the impact of alternative
institutional environments on the process of coordination of individual plans
can be interpreted as an empirical investigation in its own right. In Boettke’s
view, the fact that Hayek is not in principle averse to both prediction of “pat-
terns” and the empirical recognition of economic regularities allows for a com-
parison between the implications of a theory and the observation of these
regularities.
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5 Social comptabilism and pure
credit systems
Solvay and Wicksell on monetary
reform
Mauro Boianovsky and Guido Erreygers
5.1 Introduction
In the 1890s the Belgian industrialist Ernest Solvay launched the idea of
replacing the existing “mechanism of money” by a new device, which
would preserve the benefits of the old system, but would avoid its inconve-
niences, such as the instability of the price level. He coined the new system
“social comptabilism”. It would consist of the abolition of (metallic) money
and its replacement by a system of accounts. All economic transactions
would be mediated by appropriate inscriptions on the debit or credit side of
the accounts of those involved. Solvay not only launched the idea, he also
devoted great effort to disseminating it. He founded and financed the Insti-
tut des Sciences Sociales to examine the system in a scientific way. His
collaborators studied the Post Office Saving Bank of Vienna, considered to
be a prototype of a social comptabilist institution, and drafted a law pro-
posal aimed at the creation of a similar bank in Belgium. A pamphlet
aimed at securing their support was sent to famous economists, including
Léon Walras. Solvay himself described in detail how one could gradually
move from the old to the new system, and gave numerous speeches in the
Belgium Senate in a vain attempt to win support for his plans.
A similar proposal was formulated in the late 1890s by the Swedish
economist Knut Wicksell. In Chapter 6 of his book Interest and Prices,
Wicksell introduced the “purely imaginary case” of a “pure credit
economy”, in which money does not circulate and “all domestic payments
are effected by means of the Giro system and bookkeeping transfers”.
Wicksell had advanced the notion of a pure credit economy in manuscript
form in 1889 (see Wicksell 2001 [1889]). Wicksell returned to this idea
more than once in later works, including Volume II of his 1906 Lectures.
With a background quite different from Solvay’s, Wicksell conceived of
the pure credit economy as part of his study of the demand for money and
its velocity of circulation, which he considered to be a crucial element in
the explanation of the determinants of the price level. He came to the con-
clusion that the existing monetary system of his time was gradually
approaching the pure credit case, where the price level is decided only by
the rate of interest, since what we now call the “real balance effect” is
absent from every market. Wicksell pointed out that such a process was
being delayed by the use of gold as the standard of value (which was in
contradiction with its replacement by credit as store of value and medium
of exchange) and suggested the abandonment of the gold standard, to be
followed by a law giving power to the central bank to attract interest-
earning deposits and make loans at the same rate of interest, which itself
would become the basic rate of interest of the system. As discussed below,
according to Wicksell, price-level stability could be a feature of a pure
credit economy with a central bank, in contrast with a laissez-faire pure
credit system.
Solvay’s and Wicksell’s view that the existing monetary system should
be reformed is consistent with the importance of “experiments” in their
frameworks, albeit for different reasons, as we shall see below. We will
also consider the links between Solvay’s and Wicksell’s monetary views
and those expressed in the 1980s as part of the “New Monetary Eco-
nomics”.
5.2 Solvay’s social comptabilism
5.2.1 Solvay on experiments
The young Ernest Solvay must have had a great confidence in the experi-
mental method. In his earliest recorded writing on social questions he
wrote, “You choose the positive, sure, egalitarian way, the experimental
method, the foundation of all modern scientific advances” (1871; NLD, II,
p. 9).1 This attitude may have been influenced by his successful experi-
ments with chemical processes. Solvay amassed a huge fortune on the
basis of a number of patents that he obtained from 1861 onwards for the
industrial fabrication of soda (sodium carbonate, Na2CO3) by means of
ammoniac. Solvay did not “invent” the process, but he was the first to find
a way to exploit the process on an industrial scale. He managed to do so by
a combination of intuition and tenacity (Elkhadem and Mayer, 1997,
p. 143) and a number of trials and errors in the gas factory of his uncle.
Solvay & Cie, the company founded by Ernest and his brother Alfred in
1863, had a difficult start, but began to thrive in the 1870s.
In the late 1870s, Solvay launched himself fully into investigations of a
purely scientific character. As he recalled much later, in 1858 he arrived at
an intuition that gripped his mind with “une intensité extraordinaire”
(NLD, I, p. 280):2 not only matter has mass, but also heat (energy). For
about twenty years, he kept the idea to himself, but then he decided both
to submit the idea to at least one renowned scientist – the Belgian chemist
Jean Servais Stas, who reacted quite sceptically – and to try and prove it
by means of experiments. A first experiment consisted of provoking, in a
closed copper cask, a chemical reaction releasing an enormous amount of
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heat; the cask exploded, however, as described in detail in a paper by
Ernest Solvay and René Lucion (1877). Other experiments soon followed,
one of which involved a specially constructed “shocking machine” (a
description is given by Lucion and Brichaux, 1924; cf. also Dony-Hénault,
1942). All of these experiments failed, however: it seemed impossible to
prove that energy had a material support and to determine by measure-
ment that the production of energy went together with a loss of mass. As
he explained later in his secret mémoire of 1896:
These unsuccessful attempts did not discourage me. On reflection, the
experiences which I had done proved once more that the material
equivalent of heat could not be detected in the circumstances in which
I had been working, nothing more. On the other hand, various consid-
erations led me to think that this equivalent had to be so small that
only reasoning, aided by calculations, would allow it to be determined,
if it can be determined at all.
(NLD, I, pp. 282–283)
This episode in Solvay’s life is interesting in three respects. First, it
raises the question of whether he, in some sense, anticipated the basics of
the relativity theory of modern physics. After his death, Lorentz and
Herzen – both active members of Solvay’s Conseils de Physique, the first
as its president and the second as one of Solvay’s close collaborators –
politely judged that his guess was a “fortunate intuition” (NLD, I, p. 283).
In the light of present-day scientific criteria, Isabelle Stengers (1997, p.
154) has characterized it more bluntly as a “simple homonym”. Secondly,
the episode reveals Solvay’s lifelong preoccupation with the notion of
energy. In the later stages of his life, he maintained that energetics was the
fundamental science, the science upon which all other sciences had to be
based. Around the turn of the century, he began to describe his views on
social questions first as “social productivism” and then as “social energet-
ics”. He found an ally in Wilhelm Ostwald, the 1909 laureate of the Nobel
Prize in Chemistry, who dedicated his book Energetische Grundlagen der
Kulturwissenschaft (1909) to Solvay. When Max Weber reviewed this
book, however, he included a truly devastating footnote of five pages long
on Solvay’s energetic approach.3
Thirdly, we believe that Solvay’s disappointing experience with scientific
experiments pushed him in the direction of research primarily based upon
deduction, a preference that he retained until the end of his life. This is
clearly illustrated by his declarations on the occasion of the first Conseil de
Physique, held at Solvay’s invitation in Brussels between 29 October and 3
November 1911. He handed over to the participants – the leading physicists
of the time – a note with his “théorie gravito-matérialitique” (Solvay,
1911b). In the opening address, he declared that he had followed the deduc-
tive method, and candidly described his approach as “physical philosophy”:
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(. . .) this study is more of the nature of physical philosophy than of
ordinary physics. For over forty years I have advanced the opinion
that with regard to the essential mental reconstitution of the active
Universe, on which all of us are working with conviction, the last word
of supreme enlightenment will be spoken by the philosopher rather
than by the experimenter: on this road, as a general rule it will no
longer be experience that will continue to incite calculation, but from
now on it will mainly be calculation that will incite experience.
(Solvay, 1911a; NLD, I, p. 117)
He was convinced that the role of the experimental method in the “science
of principles” was transitory or at least of secondary importance, and that
the lead would soon be taken by the “chastened philosophical method”.
Nevertheless, closing the Council, he expressed the wish that the experi-
ments he had in mind for the confirmation or rejection of hypotheses
could take place, and he kindly invited the specialists to help him with this
(ibid., pp. 120–121).4
Solvay’s position and wealth allowed him to adopt what he considered
to be the high and comfortable position of a pure theorist and to relegate
to his collaborators the low tasks of experimentation and verification.5 He
could easily afford to define and pursue his own research projects without
having the need to conform to the scientific habits then prevailing. Both in
his physical and social and economic research, he was proud of his
independence. In an article in which he summarized his views on the social
question, he stressed: “I have worked impartially and without prejudice,
but nevertheless having a feeling of the result that I should obtain: I have
acted like an experimenter in his laboratory” (Solvay, 1898b; NLD, II,
p. 212). Taken in isolation this quotation could suggest that Solvay gave
prominence to the experimental method in his social and economic
research, but this is certainly not the case. The message he wanted to
convey was that his research was guided by principles in which he strongly
believed, and which he had adopted after a long period of internal reflec-
tion, rather than on the authority of an external instance. As soon as his
convictions were solid enough, he announced the general principles of his
thoughts and let his collaborators deal with the facts. The foundation of
the Institut des Sciences Sociales in 1894 serves as an example of this
approach.6 In May 1894, Solvay had urged the Minister of Finance to
create a specialized organism to study social and economic questions
(Solvay, 1894a; NLD, II, pp. 71–72). Since the Minister did not take any
initiative in that direction, Solvay decided to do it all by himself, taking
charge of all the expenses. Perhaps he rushed things somewhat; later he
would declare that he had founded the Institut des Sciences Sociales “à
titre d’essai”, characterizing it as “provisional” in comparison to the
“definitive” Institut de Sociologie, founded in 1901 (Dejongh and
Hanssens, 1901, p. 17). Nonetheless, he intended the Institute to be heavily
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oriented towards his own preoccupations, and more precisely to comple-
ment his own deductive way of reasoning with a more inductive approach:
Independently of more general studies, extending to the whole of soci-
ology, this institute will undertake, by means of the observation and
study of facts, to examine impartially and thoroughly the a priori
notions which I believed I had to formulate, and to submit them to the
scrutiny of the inductive method.
(Solvay, 1894b, p. 3)7
5.2.2 The initial social comptabilist proposal
Among the issues that Solvay put on the agenda of the Institut des Sci-
ences Sociales, his idea for the reform of the monetary system known as
“social comptabilism” ranked very high. Contemporaries such as May
(1896) and Walras (1897) perceived the Institute as a think tank founded
mainly to study and to prepare the practical realization of Solvay’s social
comptabilism. Although Solvay’s initial plan was somewhat broader, it is
true that social comptabilism dominated the activities of the Institute.
Solvay, who was at that time a senator for the liberal party, entrusted the
direction of the Institute to three famous Belgian socialists (and scientists):
Guillaume De Greef, Hector Denis and Emile Vandervelde. Other
collaborators included Henri La Fontaine, the 1913 laureate of the Nobel
Peace Price, and Paul Otlet, the famous bibliographer. The foundation of
the Institute was accompanied by the creation of a new journal, the
Annales de l’Institut des Sciences Sociales, in which the results of ongoing
research were published. All in all, 33 issues, or 6 volumes, of the Annales
came out, covering the period from 1894 to 1900.8
No systematic study of the activities of the Institut des Sciences Sociales
exists. We have partial information gathered by a contemporary observer –
an 1897 article by Dick May, the pseudonym of Miss J. Weill – and another
by a later collaborator of Solvay, Warnotte (1946, pp. 520–529). More
recent accounts have been provided by de Bie (1988, pp. 61–90) and Crom-
bois (1994, pp. 25–33). Vandervelde (1895, p. 230) indicated that, certainly
in the beginning, Solvay and his collaborators at the Institute worked ‘col-
lectively’ around Solvay’s research programme. From La Fontaine’s notes,
we can indeed infer that the members of the Institute met for discussions
on a weekly basis, but it is also clear that Solvay rarely, if ever, attended the
meetings. Apparently he communicated his views mainly by means of inter-
mediaries. Despite his absence at the meetings, he was certainly doing his
part of the thinking. Compared to what he published on social questions
before 1894, Solvay’s output in the period 1894–1900 exploded. In the
Annales he published altogether 17 notes and articles, while his collabor-
ators at the Institute and others contributed about 20 notes and articles
which are more or less connected with Solvay’s ideas.
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In the very first article published in the Annales, “Comptabilisme et
proportionnalisme social”, Solvay strongly connected his ideas on money
to the issues of inheritance and inheritance taxation. It was not the first
time that he made this link;9 he also stressed it in a speech before the
Belgian Senate, in which the first reference can be found to “un certain
comptabilisme social” (Solvay, 1894a; NLD, II, p. 68). The main proposi-
tion of “Comptabilisme et proportionnalisme social” is that, in order to
have the intended effect, the introduction of an inheritance tax has to be
combined with the abolition of “exchange money” (“monnaie
d’échange”). As regards inheritance tax, Solvay had in mind a very ambi-
tious project. He proposed in fact to replace all existing taxes by a single
tax on bequests (in later articles, he specified that the inheritance tax
should be progressive with relation to the number of generations between
the original creator of the capital and the inheritor, the so-called “impôt
successoral réitéré”). It is in the course of an examination of the criticisms
that might be raised against his proposal that money appears. Two of
those critiques were that high inheritance tax rates might encourage fraud
on a large scale, and that a system based on a single tax might be inferior
to a system based on multiple taxes, since in the second case the errors and
the inequalities caused by fraud compensate one another in a certain
degree. Yet Solvay was not impressed by these critiques and thought that
it would be possible to find a way to eliminate fraud. The miracle solution,
so to speak, would be to replace the existing monetary system by a system
of accounts managed by the state:
in order for fraud to become completely impossible, and for the single
tax to appear to be practically feasible, it is necessary that the citizens
have a direct interest in making known the exact amount of their
assets. This leads us to our second formula: the replacement of money
by a system of accounts introduced by the State.
(Solvay, 1894b, p. 14)
Solvay’s idea was to introduce a system that would enable the state to per-
fectly monitor the economic transactions of its citizens, and hence to
determine exactly the wealth of each individual. In Solvay’s own words,
the system would be “une sorte d’appareil enregistreur de toutes les trans-
actions, qui permettrait de constater à chaque instant, avec une exactitude
suffisante, le droit et l’avoir de chacun” (ibid., p. 5).
5.2.3 The mature proposal
In 1896, however, Solvay began to have second thoughts and openly
regretted the “premature” publication of the article “Comptabilisme et
proportionnalisme social”. He therefore decided to return to the question,
but this time “en restant sur le terrain monétaire et comptabiliste pur”
Solvay and Wicksell on monetary reform 103
(Solvay, 1896; NLD, II, pp. 229–230). The resulting article, “Principe et
raison d’être du comptabilisme social”, is a key reference for Solvay’s
social comptabilism.10 Although, in the following years, Solvay refined his
propositions on several occasions, the basic ideas remained the same. The
main question that he tried to answer in the article was the following:11
Would it be possible, in a society constituted as ours is, to replace the
agency of money by another agency which would have its advantages
without its inconveniences, and which could be considered as
theoretically perfect, – in other words would it be possible to replace
the agency of money by a system which would be the final expression
of possible improvement in this matter and the definitive point to
which social economics ought necessarily to tend?
(Solvay, 1897a, p. 1)
The main inconvenience of the monetary system to which Solvay alluded
is that it entails the use of a unit of measure that is variable over time. In a
gold-based monetary system, gold serves as the unit of value. Since gold is
a commodity, it is subject to variations in value in response to shortage or
excess of the money supply, or due to speculation. The “real value” of the
unit of measurement therefore changes over time.12 Hence, the change in
the money value of a good does not adequately reflect the change in its
real value, which is determined by the state of supply and demand for that
good. The use of commodity-based money, therefore, entails confusion
and distortion; it is a “defective instrument” (ibid., p. 11) which should be
replaced by something better.
The alternative to the money system should be a system with an invari-
able unit of value. Solvay maintained that such a system could be devised
by choosing a unit of value at a given moment of time, t =0, say, and
expressing all values at all dates in terms of this once-and-for-always unit
of measurement. Society could for example decide to take the value of
gold at time t0 as unit of value. This would eliminate any distortion
between the ratio of actual prices and the ratio of real values. Put differ-
ently, Solvay argued that in order to avoid the distortions related to the
use of money, it would be necessary to use a unit of measurement which
had a material existence at the moment when the unit of value was
defined, but which lost its material support thereafter:
it will be seen how absurd it becomes to persist in the custom of repre-
senting materially a unity which should be detached from the support
which has served to define it at a given moment, and which no longer
appears as anything but an abstraction permitting in a homogenous
manner the arithmetical representation by figures, of the value of
things, relatively and individually. This abstract unity ought to be
detached from every material tie.
(ibid., p. 8)
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But would it really be possible to replace the monetary system by a new
system based upon an invariable unit of value? Solvay’s answer is based
upon an analysis of the functions of money. He attributed two functions to
money: first, it is “an indispensable instrument for effecting transactions
which are not mere acts of barter”, and second, “it presents itself as having
rendered possible . . . the registering, the writing down or account-keeping
of the transactions, if one may say so, which barter did not permit” (ibid.,
p. 2). In other words, Solvay stressed the role of money as a “means of
transaction” and as a “means of accounting”, but neglected its role as a
“store of value”. As a result he believed that, in order to replace the exist-
ing monetary system, it would suffice to find an alternative way to perform
the first two functions, which is exactly what he thought his social compt-
abilism would do.
The central idea of social comptabilism is that every economic transac-
tion be mediated by appropriate entries on the accounts of those involved
in the transaction. A central organization (“le comptable général”, e.g. the
National Bank) would be entitled to attribute these accounts; everyone
who proves to be solvent would have the right to obtain such an account.
All economic transactions would be recorded as debit and credit opera-
tions. Solvay stressed that the replacement of the monetary system by
social comptabilism would not be a revolutionary development, but the
accomplishment of a tendency already present in the actual system:
It is evident that in this way society as it is at present organised, can
demonetize the precious metals and establish social comptabilism
without in principle having to make any revolution whatever in its
present position, it has only largely to increase a portion of its
machinery, already existing and in full swing. To sum up, it is a ques-
tion of a simple change in the machinery of transactions and all society
is interested in the realization of such a progress purely mechanical
and functional, which moreover has no connection with any doctrine,
opinion or party, and is no new invention whatever.
(ibid., p. 13)
By way of example, as a first approximation of a comptabilist institution,
Solvay referred to the Post Office Bank of Vienna (Austria), which had
links with all the post offices in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.13 Hector
Denis wrote an article about this bank for the Annales (“Le service de
chèques et de virements à la caisse d’épargne postale de l’Empire
d’Autriche”), and drafted a parliamentary bill with the aim of creating
such a bank in Belgium too.14
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5.2.4 The Walras critique
By 1896, then, a few modest steps were taken in the direction of a compt-
abilist experiment in Belgium. At the same time, the theoretical examina-
tion of social comptabilism continued, and in 1897 it even shifted to a
higher level when the Institute decided to send the brochure Le Compt-
abilisme Social to a number of economists who might be interested in
Solvay’s theory. In Volume 3, issues 4 and 5, of the Annales, the reactions
of Charles Gide, John K. Ingram, Ladeslas Zaleski and Léon Walras were
reproduced. Gide’s response was brief, but very positive; he indicated that
Solvay’s propositions were quite close to his own: “I think that this is the
system of the future. . . . in advance I am in favour of the thesis of Mr
Solvay” (Gide, 1897, p. 220).15 The reactions of Ingram and Zaleski, on the
other hand, were negative. Ingram stressed the “indispensable” character
of metallic money and concluded: “. . . I do not share any of the ideas that
are expressed in it. In my opinion, the abolition of metallic money is not
only undesirable, but also impracticable” (Ingram, 1897, p. 311). Zaleski
(1897, p. 312) referred to the Russian situation and predicted that both
international trade and national conflicts would endanger the comptabilist
system.
The most stimulating reaction came from Walras. In his letter, he con-
gratulated Solvay for his efforts:
I shall express in one word what I really think about the importance
and the interest of such a creation by saying that it was no exaggera-
tion to found an “Institute of Social Sciences” with the sole purpose of
studying this principle and its implications, and that Mr Solvay
deserves at the same time our highest esteem for having launched this
idea into science and our most sincere gratitude for having prepared
its practical realization.
(Walras, 1897, p. 219)16
Moreover he promised to think more thoroughly about Solvay’s proposi-
tions and to communicate his observations to the Institute.
Walras’s reflections were published in the article “La Caisse d’épargne
postale de Vienne et le comptabilisme social” in the Revue d’économie
politique of 1898.17 Although Walras recognized a high degree of similarity
between his own monetary equations and those provided by Solvay, he
challenged the validity of Solvay’s assumptions. Walras rejected, in
particular, the hypothesis that the value of the monetary unit – even if it
were a purely conventional unit – could be fixed once and for all.18 He
argued that the value of any monetary unit (be it gold, paper, or simply a
unit of account) was directly proportional to its utility (as money), and
inversely proportional to its quantity. In this connection, Walras easily
spotted a weakness in Solvay’s reasoning, since he affirmed that an excess
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of comptabilist units would have no effect on prices, while a shortage
would lead to a fall (Solvay, 1897a, p. 10). According to Walras (1898, 
p. 213), Solvay’s position contradicted the quantity theory of money pre-
cisely in the case where it was the most incontestable. Walras furthermore
predicted that the introduction of social comptabilism à la Solvay would
lead to a cours forcé of the unit of account. As soon as a war or a major
crisis occurred, people would be tempted to convert their assets into pre-
cious metals. As a result, the unit of account would depreciate and
account-holders would be ruined and lose all faith in the future. In short,
the comptabilist system would collapse and economic life would be seri-
ously damaged.
This perspective suffices for me, along with the economists, to refuse
to follow Solvay with regard to the mobilisation of the entire social
wealth or with regard to the cours forcé of the money of account. But
moreover I have reasons not to follow the economists themselves with
regard to the mobilisation of circulating capital or of paper money.
(Walras, 1898, p. 218)19
Walras’s critique was taken very seriously at the Institute. The discussion
centred around the third section of Walras’s article, entitled ‘Le comptabil-
isme social: l’unité fixe de valeur’ (ibid., pp. 210–215). A substantial part of
Volume 4, issue 4, of the Annales was devoted to Walras’s analysis. Apart
from a reproduction of the relevant section of Walras’s article, it contained
an article by Solvay (1898a) on the invariable unit of value, and critical
remarks by Denis (1898), Henri Vanderrydt (1898) and Paul Otlet (1898).
These articles were reprinted in a pamphlet called A Propos du Comptabil-
isme Social, published by the Institute in 1898. In his reaction, Solvay noted
that others seemed to have three difficulties with his theory; it appeared to
be hard to understand (i) that the value of goods is “absolutely independ-
ent” of money, (ii) that, in society, money is in principle “absolutely
useless”, and (iii) what the exact function of money happened to be. Solvay
did not modify his position but reaffirmed his previous statements. For him,
commodity-money was in essence a “means of transaction”:
The money object thus became a means of transaction, the tool of the
transaction. It has no other function and, basically, no other grounds
for existence. If transactions were not required, there would be no
need for money; if people could make transactions just as well in
another way, it would become useless.
(Solvay, 1898a; NLD, II, pp. 258–259)
He thought it would be possible to perform economic transactions without
using commodity-money at all. The system of accounts introduced by
social comptabilism would make commodity-money simply obsolete.
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The main point of divergence between Solvay and Walras concerned
the possibility or impossibility of having a comptabilist unit of account
with a constant value. Solvay was not impressed by Walras’s critique:
The mathematical fiction that I used to prove, in my previous notes,
the invariability of the comptabilistic unit was legitimate. It is true that
a being with unlimited capacities could, at an exact moment in time,
fix at every place the value – a value which is evidently constant for an
infinitely short time – of an indefinite number of things with variable
value, in relation to the value of one of those things chosen as a unit.
From then onwards, this unit which is chosen and used in that way and
which has indeed got nothing but an instantaneous reality, would
remain nevertheless indestructible in time and in space. It would be
the abstract unit that we have tried to define and that could be used in
the future, in a constant and indefinite way, to register the relations of
the variable values of things, to account all transactions while radically
excluding the notion and the act of exchange.
(ibid., p. 261)
Moreover, he was of the opinion that Walras had misunderstood his posi-
tion on the asymmetric effects of an excess and a shortage of monetary
units. Yet Solvay simply reaffirmed what he had written before, adding
only that under a comptabilist regime it would be highly unlikely that
there would ever be a shortage (ibid., pp. 269–270). On this issue, Denis
dissented from both Solvay and Walras. Denis agreed with Walras that
Solvay’s position was in conflict with the quantity theory of money, but he
disagreed with Walras on the practical possibility of an excess or a short-
age. According to Denis, the issue that divided Solvay and Walras would
never be pertinent:
I think, however, that in Mr Solvay’s comptabilistic system –
completely leaving aside the issue of its realisation – neither inde-
pendent quantitative variations of comptabilistic money in the direc-
tion of an excess (hausse), nor independent quantitative variations in
the direction of a shortage (baisse), are conceivable. Mr Walras’s
formula, which in itself is indisputable, would have no application in
practice.
(Denis, 1898, p. 284)
Denis was convinced that under social comptabilism the emission of mon-
etary units would be subordinate to the number and the value of economic
transactions. The quantity of monetary units would always be exactly suffi-
cient to cover the needs of exchange and production; in Walras’s terms,
comptabilist money would have a constant and invariable rareté. Denis
concluded:
108 M. Boianovsky and G. Erreygers
In fact the relationships of causality are definitely and irrevocably
fixed. The supply of comptabilistic money is from now on always
determined and measured by the quantities of commodities and ser-
vices which are exchanged. Under the comptabilistic hypothesis, the
servant – money – definitely follows the master – the resources and
services which are exchanged –, thereby finally putting into practice
Boisguillebert’s profound idea.
(ibid., p. 285)
Denis’s explanation might be seen as an attempt to reconcile Solvay’s and
Walras’s views, and as an invitation to further reflection. But apart from
Walras’s acknowledgement that Denis had apparently very well grasped
his monetary theory (see Jaffé, 1965, vol. III, p. 28), the discussion was not
pursued.
5.2.5 The final phase
At least partially as a result of the Walras critique, enthusiasm at the Insti-
tute for social comptabilism cooled down. Solvay himself continued to
advocate his proposal, but he became more and more isolated. In 1899, he
wrote a series of three “open letters” to the members of the Belgian Par-
liament, to inform them about the aims of social comptabilism and suggest
practical ways of realizing it.20 But the letters did not have the intended
effect. In a speech delivered on 22 March 1900 before the Belgian Senate,
Solvay acknowledged his failure to convince his fellow members of parlia-
ment – not really unexpected in view of the fact that Solvay belonged to
the opposition. More significantly, he even admitted that he had serious
difficulties in directing the research of his collaborators at the Institut des
Sciences Sociales towards “a truly comptabilist application”, and launched
an offer to financially support “any competent researcher who would
produce a serious work on the realization of comptabilism” (Solvay,
1900a; NLD, II, p. 121). He thought that his ideas were not as appreciated
as they should have been, and he was certainly frustrated by the lack of
any practical result. Not surprisingly, soon thereafter he decided to cease
the activities of the Institut des Sciences Sociales and to replace it by the
Institut de Sociologie, under the command of his new protégé Émile
Waxweiler. This also put an end to all attempts to bring about a compt-
abilist experiment. However, Solvay was apparently unaware that a similar
exercise in monetary theory and monetary experiments was being con-
ducted at the time in Sweden by Knut Wicksell (1898), in a book that, in
contrast with Solvay’s own contributions, would become a classic a few
decades later.
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5.3 Wicksell on monetary reform experiments
5.3.1 Wicksell on experiments
Wicksell discussed experiments in economics in his inaugural lecture on
“Ends and Means in Economics” delivered at the University of Lund in
September 1904 (1958 [1904], pp. 58–60). That lecture was, to a great
extent, an attack on the methodology of the German Historical School and
its criticism of abstract economic theory in general. After stating the case
for the methodology of verificationism in economics (see Henriksson,
1991, p. 35), Wicksell disputed the claim, put forward by “both friends and
foes of systematic or theoretical economics”, that it is in general impos-
sible “to give a strict verification of the propositions or rules which we for-
mulate as hypotheses, as tentative abstractions from experience, because it
is impossible to isolate economic phenomena to the extent necessary for
such verification. Unlike the natural sciences, economics is not in a posi-
tion to carry out experiments, they say.” Wicksell did not accept these
early displays of “methodological dualism” and sustained that experiments
are often made in economics, albeit in a specific form:
It seems to me that this contention is to a great extent exaggerated; as
a matter of fact, such experiments are constantly being made in the
realm of our science and they are of the most incisive character con-
ceivable, because one economic element is altered discontinuously
while everything else remains the same – and the experimenter is the
economic legislator. These experiments are frequently even direct and
quite deliberate: the measures introduced by the legislation are based
upon the supposition that some abstract proposition or other is valid,
and the result is either confirmation or refutation of the proposition in
question.
(1958 [1904], pp. 58–59)
Wicksell did not name the “friends of economic theory” who had ques-
tioned the possibility of carrying out experiments, but he probably had in
mind J.S. Mill’s (1992 [1844], pp. 146–147) statement that moral sciences,
in contrast with physical sciences, cannot make controlled experiments,
which means that they cannot generally obtain what Francis Bacon used to
call an experimentum crucis, and, by that, cannot be based on inductive
methods (see also Blaug, 1980, pp. 64–69; see, however, section 6.3 of
Cartwright’s essay in this volume for the broad argument that Mill’s
notion of “stable tendencies” is compatible with the importance of experi-
ments in economic theory). It should be noted that Wicksell was not the
first to regard changes in economic legislation as equivalent to experi-
ments. John Neville Keynes (1973 [1891], pp. 182–184) entertained that
notion, but dismissed it in the end, on the feeble grounds that “it is not the
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case that the primary object of every new law is to afford means of study-
ing the effects which a change of conditions or the introduction of a new
agency is capable of producing”. He conceded, however, that what Jevons
(1883, pp. 253 ff.) had called “tentative legislation” could be regarded as
experiments; the former being tentative measures that introduce new eco-
nomic legislation only temporarily or in a few sectors or regions of the
economy “with the express object of gaining insight into their social and
economic effects” (see also Ferber and Hirsch, 1982).
It is remarkable that all instances of economic experiments given by
Wicksell in his 1904 lecture (1958 [1904], pp. 59–60) belong to the realm of
monetary theory and policy (e.g. Gresham’s Law; the success of the Aus-
trian government in keeping its inconvertible paper money, by means of
the purchase and sale of public bonds, at a higher value than that of the
silver into which it was once redeemable; the increase of the value of silver
currencies in Holland and India in relation to gold by means of the expedi-
ent of ceasing to mint silver coins on private account). This can be ascribed
to Wicksell’s view that, in contrast to relative prices, the conditions that
decide the price level are defined by the monetary system set up by society
and its government:
In all other economic spheres other circumstances, such as technique,
natural conditions, individual or social differences, play a role which
science can only imperfectly survey and control. But, with regard to
money, everything is determined by human beings themselves, i.e., the
statesmen, and (so far as they are consulted) the economists; the
choice of a measure of value, of a monetary system, of currency and
credit legislation – all are in the hands of society, and natural con-
ditions (e.g., the scarcity or abundance of the metals employed in the
currency, their chemical properties, etc.) are relatively unimportant.
Here, then, the rulers of society have an opportunity of showing their
economic wisdom – or folly.
(1935 [1906], pp. 3–4)
While attempts to change relative prices (by means of tariffs, state subsi-
dies, export bounties, and so on) “almost inevitably involve some loss of
utility to the community” and should, by that, “be regarded as opposed to
all reason”, money prices “are a matter in the last analysis of pure conven-
tion, depending on the choice of a standard of price which it lies within our
own power to make” (Wicksell, 1936 [1898], p. 4).21 Wicksell’s monetary
thought was aimed at the study of the determination of the price level,
which provided the analytical basis for his suggestions as to how to stabi-
lize the price level through a reform of the gold-standard system. The
choice of the monetary system and of the goals and instruments of mone-
tary policy was, therefore, understood as a socially controlled experiment
designed by economists and policy makers.
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A few years after his 1904 inaugural lecture, Wicksell again mentioned
economic experiments as part of an article on the verification of the law of
diminishing returns to land, published in the German Thünen Archiv in
1907. According to Wicksell, it was difficult to confirm the law by observ-
ing the actual yield of agriculture in different estates, for
either an economy is managed in a rational way, in which case its
intensity has already reached the limit of profitability and one never
obtains information on the amount by which the relative gross yield
would increase as a consequence of a decrease in the degree of intens-
ity . . . or the economy is not managed in a rational way, in which case
it is obviously impossible to decide to what extent the lack of know-
ledge of the management, independently of the intensity-level chosen,
has caused a smaller relative gross yield.
(1998 [1907], p. 117)
The way out is to carry out controlled experiments: “The only reliable
method would be to conduct experiments or to compare the agricultural
results of two or more countries, where the basic conditions of agricultural
profitability, i.e., the level of wages or the level of product prices, differ
widely – if one is not willing to accept the logic common sense as the basis
of the law” (ibid.). Here, in contrast to Wicksell’s 1904 emphasis on the
connection between experiments and economic legislation, experiments
are used to establish a proposition in economic theory, concerning the
influence of “natural” or physical conditions on production. In a passage
added in 1911 to the second Swedish edition of Volume I of his Lectures,
Wicksell discussed again the problems involved in the attempt to verify
the law of diminishing returns to land, and pointed out that it could
be done only by means of controlled experiments: “It must, indeed,
be quite easy to prove it by direct experiment, and in so far as such
experiments have been made – unfortunately all too few and on too
small a scale – the results undoubtedly tend to confirm the law” (Wicksell,
1934 [1901], p. 122). Hence, the notion of economic experiments was
an important element of Wicksell’s methodology, both in the realm
of monetary economics and in the theory of production. Wicksell’s
rejection of the opposition between economics and natural sciences was
shared by Solvay, as discussed above, and was a common feature under-
lying their respective proposals to carry out experiments in the monetary
field.
5.3.2 The pure credit economy
In order to tackle Wicksell’s concept of a “pure credit economy” and the
monetary reform proposal associated with it, it is necessary to discuss
briefly how it grew out of his study of money demand and its relation to
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the determination of the price level. The main feature of Wicksell’s
approach to price-level determination is the investigation of the develop-
ment of credit as a means of superseding the function of money (gold) as
store of value, based on four models of a monetary economy: “pure cash”,
“simple credit”, “organized credit” and “pure credit” (1936 [1898],
Chapter 6; see also Boianovsky, 1998, Sections II and III). In the case of
the “pure cash economy” there are no bonds; the size of cash balances is
decided by the need to meet anticipated future purchases and to have a
reserve for unforeseen liabilities (what we now call “transactional” and
“precautional” demand for money; cf. Laidler, 1991, p. 125). The stability
and determinacy of money prices depend on the existence of what Don
Patinkin (1965) would later call a “real balance effect” in the markets for
commodities. Assuming a monetary economy with “simple credit between
private individuals” (Wicksell, 1936 [1898], pp. 61–62), the necessity for
holding cash balances can be reduced as far as anticipated expenditures
are concerned, but this does not normally affect the precautionary demand
for money. The real balance effect can now also be found in the bond
market.
In the case of an “organized (or developed) credit economy”, indi-
viduals keep most of their transactions and precautionary balances as
interest-earning deposits with the competitive banking system. In contrast
with “simple credit”, in an organized credit system the “subjective element
of risk [of not recovering the money entrusted] disappears in proportion as
the wealth which affords the guarantee is great in relation to the amount
at stake, so that only the mathematical risk remains” (Wicksell, 1935
[1906], p. 72). Building on Francis Edgeworth (1888; see Wicksell, 1936
[1898], p. 66, n. 1), Wicksell explains that, thanks to the “Law of Large
Numbers” of probability theory22 and to the fact that quite often the
bank’s customers have business relations with one another, the bank’s
demand for cash reserves will be just a fraction of its liabilities (1935
[1906], pp. 83–84; 1936 [1898], pp. 66–68), which means an increase in the
“virtual” velocity of circulation of money (gold) when compared with both
the pure cash and simple credit economies. A fortuitous increase of the
price level in a developed credit economy brings about a higher demand
for cash, which will in part provoke an “immediate reaction against the
price movement” to the extent that individuals reduce their demand for
commodities in order to restore their real cash balances. But the reaction
comes “above all” in the form of the effects of an increase in the demand
for loans (supply of bonds) on the reserves of the banking system. The
reaction is not “immediate”, but after a period of time banks will be forced
to raise their rate of interest in order to protect their reserves, which helps
to bring money prices back to their original and stable level.23
Wicksell’s last and quite influential model of a monetary economy is the
“pure credit economy”, where there is no demand for outside currency
and all payments are carried out by means of transfers in bank accounts.
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Banks, which are supposed to be connected by a common clearing house,
do not demand reserves for domestic cash payments. Nevertheless, since
Wicksell is still assuming a gold standard economy, they must maintain a
stock of gold in order to meet foreign and industrial demand for gold. “For
the sake of simplicity”, Wicksell (1936 [1898], p. 71) imagines that the
whole monetary system of a country is in the hands of a single “Bank”. He
further assumes that the average value R of the Bank’s gold reserve “com-
prises the property of the bank itself”. On this assumption, as far as
domestic transactions are concerned, “the Bank’s claims on the public
must be exactly equal to its debts to the public. If the sum of the credit bal-
ances is K, the sum of the debit balances must be K, or rather –K; so that
the algebrical sum of all balances always remains equal to zero”. The
stability of money prices under these circumstances, however, does not
result from the demand by the non-banking public for gold as store of
value, but (assuming a closed economy) from the industrial demand for
gold as a commodity, as Wicksell explains on p. 113 of Interest and Prices.
Assuming that the credit system has been “fully developed in every
country”, a fortuitous increase of the price level “discourages the produc-
tion of gold, and, other things being equal, it increases the consumption of
gold in industry. As soon as consumption began to outstrip production, the
deficiency would have to be supplied out of the banks’ stocks, for no other
source is allowed for”. This long process would eventually prompt banks
to raise their interest rates and bring money prices back to their original
level. This mechanism was behind Wicksell’s criticism of the view – put
forward by Adolf Wagner (1862, p. 127) and other supporters of “free
banking” – that one could dispense with gold as a means of payment and a
reserve of value and base the monetary system on credit alone (see also
Hernandez-Aramburo, 1996, pp. 264–266):
It is sometimes said to be feasible to base a monetary system upon
gold and yet to dispense entirely, or almost entirely, with the employ-
ment of gold both in circulation and in the banks’ reserves. This would
be done by extending the use of cheques, by the issue of notes of
which the cover is of a purely banking nature, and so on. This view,
which is held by some of the most prominent writers on monetary
questions, must be regarded as utopian. In such a system the value of
money would be directly exposed to the effects of every fortuitous
incident on the side of the production of the precious metals and every
caprice on the side of its consumption. It would undergo the same
violent fluctuations as do the value of most other commodities. But it
would be quite possible to maintain a stable value of money without
the use of reserves of a precious metal. Only would be necessary for
the metal to cease to serve as a standard of value.
(Wicksell, 1936 [1898], pp. 34–35, see also p. 46; 
and Wicksell, 1935 [1906], pp. 123–124)
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According to Wicksell, the progressive replacement of gold as store of
value as the economy converges to a pure credit system would make the
price level behave increasingly as a relative price, since the monetary
demand for gold tends to nil. This “contradiction” could only be overcome
by “completely divorcing the value of money from metal, or at any rate
from its commodity function, by abolishing all free minting, and by making
the . . . unit employed in the accounts of the credit institutions both the
medium of exchange and the measure of value” (Wicksell, 1935 [1906], p.
126). Nevertheless, still assuming a competitive banking system formed by
profit-maximizing banks, such a pure credit economy without a material
substance as standard of value would feature indeterminacy of the price
level, as Wicksell (1914, pp. 145–146) made clear. Under these circum-
stances, the equilibrium of general prices “can occur for any level they
may have” and “should be constructed on the analogy with the so-called
neutral equilibrium in mechanics: it does not change by itself, but nor do
any fortuitous changes in it generate forces which would necessarily estab-
lish again its previous condition”. What is behind Wicksell’s contention
that bank loans increase together with the price level (so that the rate of
interest does not move and prices do not come back to their original level)
is the implicit assumption that the credit-supply function of profit-maxi-
mizing banks is homogeneous of degree zero in nominal values (cf.
Sweeney, 1988, pp. 160–162, 173, 180; see also Hawtrey, 1934 [1919],
pp. 11–13).
The level of prices in pure credit economies after the monetary reform
depicted above is decided entirely by the bank rate of interest, according
to Wicksell’s well-known “cumulative process” of price change as a result
of the difference between the bank rate and the “normal rate of interest”
(that is, the interest rate that equilibrates saving and investment).
However, the profit-maximizing banks described by Wicksell would have
no incentive to set their interest rates at a level consistent with price
stability. Such a monetary policy can be carried out only if a central bank
is introduced into the picture.24 Assuming there is no outside currency in
circulation (banknotes, coins, etc.) – and, by that, no opportunity for the
central bank to affect through open-market policy the interest rate
charged by private banks – a public central bank could be introduced as an
institution that remunerates its deposits at the same rate charged for its
loans (Wicksell, 1917, 1919a). In a competitive banking system, the dif-
ference between the rate of interest that is paid on deposits (including
current accounts) and the rate charged on loans covers the banks’ running
costs, the holding of “liquid securities which carry only a moderate of
interest”, the holding of a stock of metallic money which earns no interest,
and, above all, the “trouble and risk involved” (Wicksell, 1936 [1898], pp.
139–140). According to Wicksell (1919a), the margin between these two
rates far exceeded that amount in the post-war Swedish financial system.
This reflected not only the circumstances surrounding the war, but also the
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natural tendency to “concentration” in the bank business because of
economies of scale.25 Wicksell (1919a, p. 185) was aware that if central
banks were allowed to remunerate their deposits at the same rate charged
for their loans, in principle nobody would be able to lend at a higher rate
or to deposit money at a lower rate of interest, which means that there
would be no margin of profit for commercial banks. The intermediation of
credit would apparently be completely in the hands of the central bank.
But, as Wicksell points out, this conclusion is precipitate, since there
would still be opportunity for private financial intermediation in areas and
sectors of the economy where risk evaluation by the central bank is diffi-
cult. Such intermediaries would then be able to charge a rate of interest
higher than the central bank’s, which becomes the basic rate of the pure
credit system (see also 1917, p. 182; cf. 1936 [1898], pp. 74–75).26
5.3.3 A “pure credit” experiment
In April 1917, Wicksell was invited to give a lecture at the Norwegian Eco-
nomic Association. The topic of his talk was the “Scandinavian Monetary
System”, and it included a proposal to implement a pure credit economy.
Wicksell (1917, p. 184) described the exercise as a “thought experiment”
(“tankeexperiment”), but at the same time pointed out that it was motiv-
ated by the cessation of free minting of gold and by the end of the central
bank’s obligation to accept gold at a fixed price in the Scandinavian coun-
tries since February 1916. He explained the transition to pure credit using
as an example the balance sheet of the central bank of Norway, which is
supposed to be, for now, the only bank of the economy. For the sake of
illustration, Wicksell (p. 179) imagines that the bank has before the reform
assets consisting of gold reserves (100 million krona) and claims (200
million krona), and liabilities in the form of deposits (100 million krona,
which also includes the capital of the bank) and notes in circulation (200
million krona). With the permission of the Norwegian parliament, the
central bank calls in its notes; half is paid out to note holders in gold and
the other half is put down as a deposit at the individual’s bank account, on
which he or she has the right to draw cheques. Cheques cannot be paid out
in cash (gold or notes), but only be transferred to other accounts. At the
same time, the bank stops issuing notes and accepting gold as deposit or in
payment. The bank’s total assets have now been reduced by 100 million
krona (the gold reserves that were given out) and comprise, on one side,
claims (200 million krona, as before) and, on the other, deposits (200
million krona, including the bank’s capital). That sum can increase
through new loans (which bring about directly or indirectly corresponding
deposits in the bank) and can be reduced through payment of debts to the
bank. Wicksell acknowledges that at the beginning gold coins would prob-
ably be used as means of payment between individuals, but – since they
are no longer received by the bank, nor (“let us assume”) held as cash
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balance – they would soon cease to be used as means of payment and,
instead, be melted down and absorbed by industry. In such an economy,
“money means henceforth only the unit in which the bank’s accounts are
kept” (1917, pp. 180–181). Under these circumstances, the only “regula-
tor” of the price level (and of the exchange rate as well against other coun-
tries) is the level of the bank’s rate of interest.
One of the main features of pure-credit economies is the absence of
outside currency. This is true not only of coins, but also of banknotes,
which “can be obtained only on payment of interest (or in exchange for
commodities), but they earn no interest for their owners. Private indi-
viduals are therefore unwilling to stock them in large quantities, and they
flow back to the banks in the shape of deposits or are lent to others on
return for interest” (Wicksell, 1936 [1898], p. 69). Nevertheless, Wicksell
(1935 [1906], pp. 88–91) was aware that not all payments can be made by
cheque and mentioned often that bank notes are “far more convenient”
for small payments (see, e.g., 1936 [1898], p. 70). More importantly, the
use of credit “presupposes a certain amount of confidence” that is lacking
in times of “crises”, when the demand for medium of payment turns more
to hard cash (see 1935 [1906], p. 90; and especially 1902, p. 40).27 Wicksell
acknowledged the existence of inconvertible notes issued by a central
bank in his more “realistic” scenarios for monetary reform. In this case,
the measure of value is the central-bank paper money, which is the unit
employed in the accounts of the banking system (1935 [1906], p. 126), but
the bank rate of interest (on deposits and loans alike) is still the key instru-
ment to regulate the amount of notes in circulation and the price level, as
in the pure-credit economy (see 1917, p. 184 and 1919a, pp. 183–185; see
also Woodford’s (2003, pp. 112–114) notion of a “cashless limiting
economy” in which the money balances held to facilitate transactions
become very small relative to national income and inflation is a function of
the Wicksellian gap between the natural and market rates of interest).
Wicksell’s 1917 “thought experiment”, published in Swedish in a relat-
ively unknown journal, has never been mentioned by commentators and it
evoked no reactions from his contemporaries. However, as discussed below,
his 1898 model of a pure-credit economy has had a significant influence on
the development of monetary economics, especially after the realization
that the post-gold-standard monetary system was gradually coming closer to
the framework envisaged by Wicksell in his thought experiment. In 1934,
during the successful policy carried out in Sweden to stabilize the price level
and counteract the effects of the world economic depression, Bertil Ohlin
wrote an article entitled “Knut Wicksell – Father of the Swedish Monetary
Experiment”. According to Ohlin (p. 161), “Knut Wicksell was the origina-
tor of this development of ideas”, based on the abandonment of the gold
standard in 1931 and the implementation of a monetary policy based on the
use of the bank rate of interest as an instrument to stabilize the price level,
as opposed to the stabilization of the rate of exchange.
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5.4 The influence of Solvay’s and Wicksell’s monetary ideas
5.4.1 Differences in appraisal
Solvay’s social comptabilism and Wicksell’s pure credit have many points
in common, and yet they never referred directly to one another. Wicksell
did notice that the “ideal banking system” (a phrase Wicksell sometimes
used to describe the pure-credit economy) had “in recent times engaged
the attention of many writers under the name of ‘universal comptabilism’,
and various proposals for its realization have been made” (1935 [1906],
p. 87). Both Wicksell and Solvay mentioned the Austrian Post Office
Savings Bank as an important illustration of payments by bookkeeping
transfers, or the “Giro system”.28 Nevertheless, they drew different conclu-
sions from their respective theoretical constructions, as far as the stabiliza-
tion of the price level is concerned. While Wicksell stressed bank
interest-rate policy, Solvay insisted that social comptabilism would make
possible the definition of an “abstract unit of account” separated from the
medium of exchange, which apparently would be enough to render the
price level constant.
The respective fates of Solvay’s social comptabilism and Wicksell’s pure
credit have been quite different, as far as economic theory is concerned.
Wicksell’s construction has been used as a benchmark in monetary eco-
nomics by authors such as von Mises, Lindahl, Hicks and Patinkin, among
others (see Trautwein, 1995), while Solvay’s concept has remained largely
unknown to the profession (or strongly criticized whenever mentioned, as
witnessed by Rist’s (1938) reference to the “Solvay School”). This is well
illustrated by von Mises’s classic Theory of Money and Credit, which refers
to Solvay and to Wicksell in connection with social comptabilism and pure
credit. Von Mises (1980 [1912], p. 112) labelled Solvay a “money crank”
who thought that an elastic credit system automatically adapted to the
need for currency is “the cure to all human ills”. Von Mises suggested that
Solvay’s theory was an application of the monetary views of the English
“Banking School” of Tooke and Fullarton, and maintained that “the rejec-
tion of schemes such as Ernest Solvay’s ‘social comptabilism’ is to be attri-
buted solely to the practical man’s timidity and not to any strict proof of
the weakness of the schemes, which has indeed not been forthcoming”.
But, despite writing that “Solvay’s theories also contain various other fun-
damental errors”, von Mises did not come back to that in the rest of his
book and did not provide any “strict proof” of the weakness of social
comptabilism, other than a general criticism of the Banking School. Von
Mises’s (pp. 394–395) reference to Wicksell’s “hypothetical bank” in a
pure-credit economy was, on the other hand, accompanied by a detailed
examination of the “limits” to the creation of credit by the banking system
in these circumstances, which became part and parcel of his explanation of
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the upper turning point of the business cycle (and was, by the way,
rejected by Wicksell; see Boianovsky, 1995, Section 5).
Another example of an economist criticizing Solvay is Pareto (1965
[1903], pp. 280–284), who used the terms “fundamental error”, “illusion”
and “sophism” when analysing Solvay’s theory. He concluded that the
proposed system might have perverse effects, and that its formulation was
the result of an ignorance of the laws of economics:
What is wrong in the projects that we have been talking about, are the
difficulties that spring from the abuses of the issuing of a new sort of
money. These difficulties can be observed where paper money is
issued that pushes gold completely out of circulation.
The issuing of paper money has in general as a result that it permits
the rich to despoil the poor, for a more or less long time, and it is a
curious thing to see how some persons, who claim to have and who
really have a sincere desire to do the right thing for the people,
propose measures that would contrive to despoil it. This is a con-
sequence of not knowing the laws of economics.
(ibid., p. 284)
Loria (1902, pp. 119–122) also strongly doubted that social comptabilism
would be feasible.
In all fairness, we must add that a more positive attitude towards social
comptabilism was displayed by a number of less well-known authors in the
French and German literature on money of the beginning of the twentieth
century. In a book in which he tried to show that a socialist system of
exchange cannot co-exist with a non-socialist system of production, Marc
Aucuy (1908, pp. 276–349) devoted a whole chapter to a discussion of
social comptabilism and even annexed to it a short unpublished paper by
Solvay (Note inédite de M. Solvay sur le comptabilisme, dated 6 September
1906, pp. 349–354). Like many others, Aucuy too thought that the impossi-
bility of fixing an invariable unit of measurement was one of the main
weaknesses of social comptabilism. Furthermore, he compared and con-
trasted Solvay’s monetary ideas with those of Robert Owen, François
Vidal, François Haeck and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. In the same line of
thought are the comments of Roche-Agussol (1903, pp. 90–114) and
Poudou (1919, pp. 308–315). In the German-speaking countries, Solvay’s
“comptabilité sociale” was mentioned in Joseph Schumpeter’s (1917–1918,
p. 637) review of monetary theory. Walter Wegelin (1921, pp. 34–37,
48–56, 90), and to a lesser degree also Hans Langelütke (1925, pp. 12–13,
40, 82n), compared Solvay’s social comptabilism with the monetary theo-
ries of Silvio Gesell and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Arthur Wolgang Cohn
(1920, pp. 90–92) noted parallelisms between social comptabilism and
some proposals of Friedrich Engels, Edward Bellamy and Justus Recht.29
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5.4.2 The new monetary economics
From the perspective of the history of economic thought, an interesting
comparison can be made between, on the one hand, the concepts of social
comptabilism and pure credit advanced by Solvay and Wicksell and, on the
other, the ideas put forward by Black (1987 [1970]), Fama (1980), Green-
field and Yeager (1983, 1989) and Cowen and Kroszner (1994), all of which
have attracted attention under the label “New Monetary Economics”.
According to the New Monetary Economics, in completely unregulated
payment systems all media of exchange would be bank-issued or “inside”
money, which would be separated from the unit of account, defined as a
single commodity or, preferably, as a commodity bundle. In such a system,
its proponents claim, the price level would be stable and the quantity of
money would be demand determined at its optimal amount. Accordingly,
the New Monetary Economics has been associated with thought experi-
ments involving reform of the currently regulated monetary system.
The historical survey of the (pre)history of the New Monetary Eco-
nomics carried out by Cowen and Kroszner (1994, Part III) considers
Wicksell’s pure credit, but overlooks Solvay’s contribution and the French
literature in general. Nevertheless, there are strong similarities between
the New Monetary Economics and the proposals put forward by Solvay
and Wicksell (especially as far as Solvay’s notion of an “abstract” unit of
account is concerned), as well as important differences, including their
divergent views towards laissez-faire payment systems. In the following
two sub-sections we briefly analyse two aspects of the relationship of
Solvay and Wicksell with the New Monetary Economics.
The Kitson connection
On the issue of the invariable unit of value, there is a striking resemblance
between the work of Solvay and that of his contemporary Arthur Kitson
(1859–1937), who, as an inventor with over 500 patents (including work
with Thomas Edison on the electric light), was not far from Solvay’s
notion of experiments in monetary economics and elsewhere. This was
already noticed by two of Solvay’s close collaborators at the Institut des
Sciences Sociales. Not only De Greef (1899, pp. 35, 94, 127, 129), but espe-
cially Denis (1901), drew attention to the similarity between the monetary
ideas of Solvay and those of Kitson. Denis wrote an extensive study of
Kitson’s (1895a) book and, although he never said so explicitly, it may well
be that he was more impressed by Kitson’s arguments than by Solvay’s.30
More recently, the interpretation of Kitson (1895b) by Cowen and
Kroszner perhaps applies even better to Solvay:
An abstract medium of account can be defined by setting the value of
any commodity on a given day equal to “one” and pricing all com-
modities in terms thereof. For all succeeding market periods, however,
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this link is severed and only the abstract medium remains. Market
participants set prices (in terms of abstract media) by reference to the
abstract medium-denominated prices of the preceding period. The
abstract medium is derived from a sequential process which ultimately
refers back to an original commodity value.
(1994, p. 126)31
Different opinions have been voiced on the precise nature of the unit of
account suggested by Kitson (see especially Sumner, 1990, p. 114). In con-
trast to Solvay, however, Kitson did at least once attempt to define the
unit of account explicitly (Kitson, 1895b, pp. 6–7; see also Bilgram, 1895,
p. 2). Solvay failed to state clearly that his proposed abstract unit of
account should be defined by a bundle of commodities with a fixed price of
1 unit. Solvay’s ambiguity on this crucial aspect of his plan for monetary
reform may explain the difficulty that commentators experienced when
trying to make sense of his “abstract unit”. Walras was by no means the
only economist who considered this to be a major stumbling block. Achille
Loria (1902, p. 120) pointed out that the measure of value in Solvay’s
system “is fixed by the determination beforehand of the value of a given
good at a particular time. But this initial value, how is it expressed?”
Instead of purchasing power in terms of a given basket of commodities à la
Kitson, Loria suggested that the “initial value” of the commodity should
be measured in labour time. According to Loria, convertibility in terms of
labour time was essential in avoiding nominal changes in the amount of
credit in Solvay’s economy.
Whatever the difficulties, it is clear that on this issue Solvay and Kitson
were, to a much greater extent than Wicksell, close to the view put
forward in the 1980s by the New Monetary Economics that the key to
price-level stabilization is the separation of the function of money as the
unit of account from its function as the medium of exchange in pure
accounting systems of exchange. On at least one other issue there are
important differences. Both Kitson and the New Monetary Economics
supported “free banking”, with banknotes issued competitively by private
banks. Solvay’s social comptabilism, on the other hand, was of an
extremely centralist character:
In the place of a true economic anarchy of individuals acting within
society for their own sake, in a separate way, distinct from one
another, in all possible directions, it puts unity of action, concentra-
tion, supreme social organisation, and by consequence, simplification
and economy. Society, taken as a whole, . . . thus becomes a true
organism that is brought to the utmost perfection, with the minimal
amount of cogwheels, organs and specific movements, and that, as a
result, is capable of performing the maximal amount of useful effects.
It thereby saves for each individual the maximum of time, it provides
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him with the maximum of leisure, it gives him the full disposition of
his productivist initiative and at the same time incites it, and finally it
neatly and impeccably deals with all issues.
(Solvay, 1900d; NLD, II, p. 278)
Solvay stressed that, in social comptabilism, all transactions would be
legally guaranteed by the State. This would be the result of the fact that
the State would make sure that no person received more comptabilist
units than the value of his or her possessions: “under no circumstances
would the account manager deliver a number of units which would exceed
the present value of the pledge” (Solvay, 1900c; NLD, II, p. 271). Eco-
nomic transactions would become completely separated from any form of
exchange:
The social account should be considered as a truly authentic balance
kept by the State on behalf of each individual, a copy of each indi-
vidual’s private balance, in which only purely abstract units, represen-
ted by numbers and having no characteristics which might suggest a
link with exchange, are recorded as entries and exits.
(ibid., pp. 271–272)
Compensated dollar and indirect convertibility
In contrast to Solvay, the unit of account in which bank accounts are kept
in Wicksell’s pure-credit economy (after monetary reform and assuming
away outside currency) is not “abstract” or “separated” from the medium
of exchange, in the sense that the nominal value of exchange media is not
fixed in terms of the unit of account. There is no suggestion in Wicksell
that the unit of account should be defined in terms of a commodity bundle,
with a value independent of the amount of media of exchange. This is
behind the crucial role of bank-rate policy in Wicksell’s proposal to stabi-
lize the price level. But Wicksell also discussed critically other plans
designed to eliminate or diminish price-level fluctuations, which are closer
to the general framework of Solvay’s social comptabilism: Irving Fisher’s
(1913, Ch. xiii) famous “compensated dollar plan” and especially Ben-
jamin Anderson’s (1917) suggestion that it would be feasible, by means of
“indirect convertibility”, to use as the standard of value a commodity that
is not itself either the medium of exchange or the medium of redemption
of notes and deposits.
Fisher (1913) assumed a gold-standard economy where all gold coins
have been replaced by gold certificates which can be redeemed upon
demand from the government for a certain quantity of gold bullion, but
with a variable seignorage, determined according to changes in the price
level: if the price level increases by, say, 1 per cent, then the purchasing
power of a dollar gold-certificate would be restored by increasing the
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“gold content” of a dollar by 1 per cent, which means to decrease the
dollar price of a given quantity of gold. This way, Fisher claimed that any
change in the gold price of the basket of commodities that defines the
price index can be compensated by an appropriate change in the dollar
price of gold, thereby keeping the dollar price of the basket constant (see
Patinkin, 1993). Wicksell (1913, 1935 [1906], pp. 225–228) discussed
Fisher’s plan in detail. He pointed out that the plan assumes that the
exchange value of the metallic gold in terms of goods is not affected by the
seignorage, an assumption that is valid only for an individual country. But,
in this case, the country’s metallic gold would flow to other countries
where it could be minted without seignorage, that is, changing the dollar
price of gold actually meant changing the foreign-exchange rate. If all
countries should adopt the same plan, the effect of the seignorage on the
exchange value of metallic gold would constitute a hindrance to the
planned increase of the purchasing power of gold. Wicksell further argued
that a change of the mint price can only influence directly the production
flow of new gold, which is a small fraction of the total stock of money, and
that thereby the impact of Fisher’s plan on the price level would be close
to nil (1913, pp. 135–137 and 1935 [1906], pp. 226–227; see also Patinkin,
1993, pp. 7–9 and 10–11). Wicksell (1935 [1906], p. 228) noticed that
Fisher’s plan involved a separation between the medium of exchange and
the unit of account, as “the very substance of (Fisher’s) proposed reform is
to raise something else to the position of a measure of value, and not gold
as is now the case”, and asked, “Why not, therefore, go the whole way,
and choose something different by which the goal in view, a stable price
level, may be secured with reasonable certainty?” His answer (1913,
p. 138) was the replacement of gold as standard of value for banknotes, or,
more generally, the unit in which bank accounts are kept, and its stabiliza-
tion through bank-rate policy.32
Wicksell’s (1919b) criticism of B. Anderson (1917) has attracted atten-
tion recently in connection with the suggestion of Greenfield and Yeager
(1989, p. 410) that prices should be quoted in terms of bank-issued
exchange media convertible into some medium of redemption (such as
gold) “actually worth, at prevailing market prices, as many standard
bundles as the Unit denominations of the banknotes and deposits being
redeemed”. This way, the medium of exchange would be “indirectly con-
vertible” into the commodity bundle that defines the unit of account. As
Wicksell pointed out, however, in his comments on a similar proposal by
Anderson (1917, pp. 150–151), indirectly convertible systems suffer from a
“paradox of indirect convertibility” that would prevent their practical
implementation (see Trautwein, 1993, pp. 103–104; Dowd, 1995, pp.
76–78): if the price of the unit of account (the commodity bundle in
Greenfield and Yeager, or 23.22 grains of gold in Anderson) should
diverge from unity, then self-reinforcing movements in the price of the
redemption medium (silver in Anderson’s illustration) might destroy the
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indirectly convertible system. Anderson, as part of his argument against
the quantity theory of money, imagined a “hypothetical case” in which the
value of money would be entirely decided by the value of the commodity
chosen as the standard of value, so that the “value of money would control
the quantity of money”, instead of the other way around. He assumed that
the standard of value is defined as 23.22 grains of pure gold, but that no
gold is coined and that the medium of exchange consists of paper money
redeemable not in gold, but in silver at the market ratio of silver to gold.
In this case, the amount of silver in which paper is redeemable is variable,
but always just enough to procure 23.22 grains of gold. There would be no
monetary demand for the standard of value, only non-monetary demand
as a commodity. Anderson claimed that in this situation “the value of the
paper money would be tied absolutely to the value of gold. . . . The quan-
tity of gold [and silver as well] would be absolutely irrelevant as affecting
its value.” A higher value of money (lower price level) would reduce the
transactional demand for paper money, which would be sent for redemp-
tion.
Wicksell (1919b, pp. 59–62) started his assessment of Anderson’s thesis
by assuming that the value of gold and silver are regulated by their respec-
tive production costs and that the market prices are one dollar per unit of
weight of gold (23.22 grains) and five cents per unit of silver (one dollar
for 20 units), which means that, according to Anderson’s framework, the
government buys and sells silver at a price of one (paper) dollar for 20
units of weight. If the cost of production should, say, double, then the
immediate market price of a unit of gold would be two dollars (40 units of
silver). In order to try to keep its notes at parity with gold, the government
would now buy and sell silver at a price of one dollar for 40 units of silver.
However, this would interrupt the production of silver, while the produc-
tion of gold would continue as before, but, because of the higher costs, a
unit of gold would fetch in the market two dollars, which means that its
price in silver will now be 80 units of silver. The government will then have
to increase the redemption price for its notes to 80 units of silver for one
dollar, but then a unit of gold will fetch in the market 160 units of silver,
and so forth, with the price of silver in the process falling in the limit
toward zero because of the initial change in the relative price of gold.
Wicksell concluded that indirectly convertible systems would feature the
“seeming paradox” that a rise in the price of the standard of value leads to
a collapse in the price of the medium of redemption. Accordingly, a “sepa-
ration” of the unit of account and the medium of exchange does not
provide a key to price-level stabilization.33
5.5 Concluding remarks
Initially, Solvay and his collaborators presented the case for social compt-
abilism as a constituent part of a more wide-ranging, and controversial,
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economic and social reform proposal. Later, they decided to advocate
social comptabilism as a purely monetary-reform experiment. In both
cases, however, the idea was not developed from a careful study of the
determinants of the demand for money and its relationship with the
aggregate demand for goods, which was precisely what caught the profes-
sion’s attention in Wicksell’s approach to pure credit. Furthermore, there
is no reference by Solvay to the stability analysis of the price level, a key
concept in Wicksell’s neoclassical framework. Understandably, economists
have treated Wicksell’s carefully elaborated monetary theory much more
respectfully than Solvay’s rudimentary intuitions about the future of the
monetary system.
Respect from fellow economists, however, is no guarantee for imme-
diate practical success. Economic legislators did not carry out the experi-
ment Wicksell described in 1917. Yet, since the abandonment of the gold
standard, monetary systems have gradually become increasingly similar to
his pure-credit economy (see, e.g., Hicks, 1989; Leijonhufvud, 1997;
Woodford, 2003). In the same vein, Solvay did not succeed in carrying out
the social comptabilism experiment in Belgium, despite his propaganda
effort. Nevertheless, as our discussion of the New Monetary Economics
has shown, his notion of an abstract unit of account is back on the research
agenda of monetary economics.
Despite their different backgrounds, Solvay and Wicksell shared the
view that experimentation is an important part of economics and social
sciences in general. From that perspective, social sciences do not differ
from natural sciences, but there is a crucial difference concerning the pos-
sibility of carrying out social experiments that could affect the working of
the socio-economic system. This is especially true of economic legislation
in general and of monetary reform in particular, as shown by their respec-
tive proposals to adopt a comptabilist or pure-credit system in order to sta-
bilize the price level. Although their monetary experiments differ on the
specification of the connection between the unit of account and the media
of exchange, Solvay and Wicksell shared the same ground insofar as they
stressed the interpretation of the workings of the credit system as the key
to their suggested experiments of price-level stabilization.
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Notes
1 With respect to Solvay’s writings, the date given in the text corresponds to the
year of the first publication. For publications included in Solvay (1929), Notes,
Lettres et Discours d’Ernest Solvay [NLD], we refer to the volume number and
page numbers of that edition; for the remaining ones, the page numbers refer
either to Solvay (1900b), Etudes Sociales. Notes sur le Productivisme et le
Comptabilisme [NPC], or to the original publication. See References for more
detailed information. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the French
and Swedish are our own.
2 Solvay explained this in a secret mémoire which he deposited at the Académie
des Sciences de Belgique; excerpts have been published by Lorentz and Herzen
(1923) (NLD, I, pp. 273–283).
3 See Max Weber (1922 [1909], pp. 378–382). An echo of these statements can be
found in Friedrich Hayek (1979 [1952], pp. 90–91, 171–172n), who reacted very
critically to Solvay’s energetics. On Solvay and the energetics movement, see
also Warnotte (1946), Mirowski (1989, pp. 52–59, 266–270) and Erreygers
(1998, pp. 253–254).
4 He returned to the same theme in a speech held a year later, declaring that his
scientific action for almost 30 years had been dominated by “a great philosophi-
cal preoccupation, which consists of finding for the science of the universe a
simple interpretation, by means of deduction, starting from perfectly estab-
lished postulates like the one that governs universal gravitation” (Solvay, 1912;
NLD, I, p. 261). Hence mathematics was his great example, and certainly not
the experimental, inductive sciences, like chemistry, whose “abundance of
hypotheses, complicated theories and limited ways of doing experiments” he
abhorred (ibid., pp. 261–262). His mathematical abilities seem to have been
rather limited, however.
5 He did occasionally cease to cooperate with collaborators who did not go far
enough in his direction; cf. Solvay (1895); NLD, I, p. 16.
6 For a more detailed analysis of the foundation, see Crombois (1994, pp. 23–33)
and Erreygers (1998, pp. 228–229).
7 Two years later, he referred to his own contribution as “an exposition, in an
exclusively theoretical form, of the conception which we have submitted to the
examination of our collaborators, and to which their inductive investigations
are related” (Solvay, 1896; NLD, II, pp. 230–231).
8 The Annales are our main source of information. Only for the years 1894 and
1895 did we find some internal notes and reports of the discussions. This mater-
ial is located in the archives of Henri La Fontaine, Box HLF 121, conserved in
the Mundaneum in Mons, Belgium. La Fontaine was the administrateur of the
Institute in 1894–95.
9 Tassel (1920, pp. 45–46) had access to a draft of letter of March 1890 in which
Solvay mentioned “la taxe à la mort, le compte social” as solutions to the social
and economic questions of his time.
10 Together with an article and a bill written by Hector Denis, the article was
reprinted in 1897 as a “propagandistic pamphlet” under the title Le Comptabil-
isme Social; the pamphlet was also published in English and German.
11 We will quote from the English translation of the article as it appeared in the
pamphlet Social Comptabilism.
12 Solvay specified that the real value of a good, E(t), could be seen as a function
of d(t), the “average desire to possess the good”, h(t), the “number of those
who demand the good”, and o(t), the “supply of the good”. He returned to
these equations in Solvay (1899c; NPC, pp. 111–112n), where he tried to
connect them to his energetics doctrine.
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13 Solvay (1897b; NLD, II, p. 255) was nevertheless sceptical about the institution
since it was not “entirely comptabilist”, based as it was upon metallic money.
14 In La Fontaine’s archives we found another undated draft entitled “Clauses
fondamentales d’un avant-projet de Loi”. It begins as follows: “Article 1. – A
partir du 1 Janvier 1900 la monnaie sera supprimée. Article 2. – Le système
monétaire sera remplacé par le système comptabiliste.”
15 In their book on the history of economic thought, however, Gide and Rist
(1915, p. 319) were much more critical of Solvay’s ideas. Later Rist (1938,
p. 260) even said that they contained “a lot of phantasmagoria”.
16 A slightly different version of this letter, addressed to Emile Vinck, the Insti-
tute’s secretary, was published by Jaffé (1965, vol. II, pp. 722–724).
17 Afterwards, the article was included in Léon Walras’s Etudes d’Economie Poli-
tique Appliquée: Théorie de la Production de la Richesse Sociale; cf. Walras
(1992 [1898], pp. 343–361).
18 Cf. Bourguin (1913, p. 85n) for a similar viewpoint.
19 Walras himself advocated the creation of a “Banque de virements à base de
monnaie métallique” (1898, p. 219).
20 The occasion to write these letters was the proposal to renew the privileges of
the Belgian National Bank. In the first letter, Solvay urged the members of Par-
liament to ask the Government to make a study on the transformation of the
National Bank into a “Établissement Comptabiliste National” (1899a; NPC, p.
89). In the second, he indicated more precisely how one could gradually move
towards social comptabilism (including designs of comptabilist booklets and
accounts), with the clear message that Parliament and Government should
without further delay decide “à tenter un essai du système comptabiliste”
(Solvay, 1899b; NPC, p. 101). The third letter deals mainly with the issue of
interest in a comptabilist regime; Solvay considered it to be his last contribution
on social comptabilism and hoped that “les intéressés à compétence spéciale”
would continue his work (Solvay, 1899c; NPC, p. 124).
21 Hutchison (1953, p. 240) has contrasted Wicksell’s notion of “conscious
control” in the monetary realm with Carl Menger’s well-known hypothesis
about the origins of money as a “spontaneous social phenomenon”. Such a con-
trast, however, does not apply, as Wicksell did not dispute Menger’s descrip-
tion of the origins of money as the most saleable commodity, and the latter did
take part in the monetary reform debate in Austria in the late nineteenth
century (see also Boianovsky, 1998, pp. 583–584). It should also be noted that,
despite Wicksell’s apparent restrictions to tariff policy, he made it clear that it
could bring about, under certain circumstances, a higher utility for the
community as a whole (see Wicksell, 1997 [1896], pp. 104–105).
22 This is the famous “square root formula” advanced by Edgeworth (1888) to
explain banks’ demand for reserves. It was used by Wicksell in his account of
precautionary demand for money by individuals and banks alike. It is based on
a stochastic model in which sampling from an infinite population generates a
normal distribution (cf. Wicksell, 1898, appendix). If an individual holds a
reserve r (proportional to the standard deviation of his excess of payments), the
aggregate holding of one hundred independent individuals would have to be
just √10010 times as great, and the aggregate reserve would be 10r (Wicksell,
1936 [1898], pp. 66–67).
23 Such a comparative-statics exercise (where there is a once-and-for-all change in
the price level, followed by a return to its previous level) should be distinguished
from Wicksell’s dynamic cumulative process proper. In this case, a (say)
increase of the “natural rate of interest” brings about excess demand for com-
modities and an ensuing continuous process of rising prices. “Business requires
greater cash holdings, bank loans increase without corresponding deposits, bank
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reserves, and often bullion reserves, begin to fall and the banks are compelled to
raise their rates somewhat, though this does not prevent the continuous rise in
prices, until the interest rates have reached the level of the normal rate” (Wick-
sell, 1935 [1906], pp. 206–207, italics added). The price level does not return to
its original level when the rate of interest approaches the normal rate, which is
precisely what gives the process its “cumulative” character.
24 Wicksell (1936 [1898], p. 118) pointed out that a pure credit system without a
central bank would feature a deflationary tendency, for profit-maximizing
banks would prefer to set interest rates at a level higher than the natural rate,
as “banking activity would expand relatively to the level of prices”.
25 See Laidler (1992, p. 197), who maintains that “free banking” is inconsistent
with the economies of scale that result from the pooling of reserves, as this
would prompt unregulated banks to merge into one institution or to centralize
their reserve holdings with a central bank.
26 Wicksell’s (1917, 1919a) notion of the pure-credit economy as a system with a
central bank (that sets the basic rate on deposits) plus specialized intermedi-
aries is remarkably close to Hicks’s (1989, Ch. 12) “revision” of the pure-credit
models of Interest and Prices and Lectures. (It should be noted, though, that
Hicks completely ignored the fact that Wicksell’s models applied most of the
time to a gold-standard economy.) Hicks (p. 104) suggested that a “monocen-
tric” pure-credit system would emerge naturally if there was just one central
entity whose “promises to pay have superior quality” than those of any other
entity. He did not explain, however, why any of the independent private banks
in a competitive system should have a better “reputation” (or more confidence)
than the others. Alternatively, assuming, as Hicks does, that this central entity
is a non-private central bank, it remains to explain why such an institution
would remunerate deposits, as it would be under no competitive pressure to do
so. Cowen and Kroszner’s (1994, pp. 144–147) description of Wicksell’s pure
credit as a system with an “abstract medium of account” à la Fama (1980) is
unwarranted and inconsistent with Wicksell’s suggestion on how to render the
price level determinate through the central bank’s interest-rate policy.
27 As Hoover (1988, pp. 102–103) pointed out, an important characteristic of
financial assets of a developed financial system in a non-Walrasian economy is
the “absence of direct connection between the claims represented by the asset
and the underlying goods against which it is a claim”, which opens up the possi-
bility of default and reinforces the importance of money as a single good which
is generally accepted as settling accounts.
28 Wicksell (1936 [1898], p. 68, n. 1; see also 1935 [1906], p. 87) referred to the
Austrian Post Office Saving Bank as a “quite unique institution” formed by
banks that are branches of one single monetary institution serving the whole
country. See Cowen and Kroszner (1994, p. 144) for references to the “Giro
system” used in continental Europe at the time.
29 The list of authors with similar ideas has even been extended to Major
Douglas; cf. Baudin (1947, p. 623) and Warnotte (1946, Vol. I, pp. 323–327).
30 Denis (1901, p. 125) was well aware of both the similarities and the differences
between the two approaches:
One is struck by the similarity between the monetary conception of Mr
Kitson and the comptabilist one of Mr. E. Solvay. By different paths, at the
same time, two men greatly endowed with the gift of abstraction managed
to conceive of a final form of money which would no longer be wealth, but
the sign, the symbol of wealth, and which, losing forever its material char-
acter, would appear as an ideal money . . . a symbolical money, in the
words of James Steuart beginning in the 18th century.
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31 Cf. the “psychological explanation” of Solvay’s abstract unit of account by
Aucuy (1908, pp. 335–336).
32 As pointed out by Patinkin (1993, pp. 16–17), Fisher (1920, pp. 129–131) intro-
duced a major modification in his 1913 plan, that is, he added a “definitive-
reserve system” in which changes in the price of gold also revalue the existing
monetary stock of gold and, by that, bring about changes in the quantity of cer-
tified gold that can be issued. According to Fisher, this would increase the
speed of the plan, but, as shown by Patinkin, that change marks the start of
Fisher’s movement away from the compensated dollar, until eventually he gave
it up in the mid-1930s. In any event, despite similarities with the New Monetary
Economics, Fisher’s compensated dollar did not really “separate” the unit of
account” from the redemption medium, since the dollar was legally defined as a
certain amount of gold (see also Patinkin, 1996).
33 The paradox was independently rediscovered by Schnadt and Whittaker
(1993). See also Dowd’s (1995, pp. 78–81) attempt to establish conditions that
could prevent the paradox and render indirect convertibility feasible.
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6 The vanity of rigour in economics




My topic in this essay is the old and familiar one of the unrealism of
assumptions in economic models. For a long time I have maintained that
economics is unfairly criticized for the use of unrealistic assumptions (see
Cartwright 1989, 1998). I can summarize my view by comparing an eco-
nomic model to a certain kind of ideal experiment in physics: criticizing
economic models for using unrealistic assumptions is like criticizing
Galileo’s rolling-ball experiments for using a plane honed to be as friction-
less as possible. This defence of economic modelling has a bite, however.
On the one hand, it makes clear why some kinds of unrealistic assump-
tions will do; but, on the other, it highlights how totally misleading other
kinds can be – and these other kinds of assumptions are ones that may be
hard to avoid given the nature of contemporary economic theory.
The theme for this volume is experiments in economics. My project is not
to understand experiments but rather to use experiments to understand
theorizing in economics; more specifically, to understand one particular
mode of theorizing that is prominent in economics nowadays – theorizing
by the construction of models for what Robert Lucas describes as ‘analogue
economies’ (1981, 272). Lucas does not define exactly what an analogue
economy is. What I have in mind is theorizing by the construction of
models that depict specific kinds of economies and depict them in a certain
way. We do not in this kind of theorizing simply lay down laws or principles
of a specific form that are presumed to obtain in the economy, as we might
in setting out a large-scale macroeconomic model whose parameters we
aim to estimate. Rather we justify them from our description of the agents,
or sectors, or other significant causal factors in the economy and our
description of their significant actions and interactions. Economic prin-
ciples are employed of course, of necessity, such as the demand for equilib-
rium of some kind, or the assumption that economic agents act to maximize
what they take to be their self-interest. But the detailed form of any prin-
ciples or equations used will be peculiar to the kind of economy described
and the kinds of interactions that occur in it.
Analogue economies generally have only a small number of features, a
small number of agents and a small number of options for what can
happen, all represented by thin concepts. I call the concepts ‘thin’ because,
although they are often homonymous with everyday economic concepts or
occasionally with concepts from earlier economic theories, little of their
behaviour from the real world is imported into the model. Seldom, for
instance, do we make use of ‘low-level empirical’ relations established by
induction. Instead, as we shall see, the behaviour of the features they
represent is fixed by the structure of the model and its assumptions in
conjunction with the few general principles that are allowed without con-
troversy in this kind of theorizing.
Lucas is a good spokesman in favour of this kind of theorizing, and that
is why I cite him. But the method is in no way peculiar to his point of view.
Modelling by the construction of analogue economies is a widespread
technique in economic theory nowadays; in particular, it is a technique
that is shared across both sides of the divide between micro- and macro-
economics. It is the standard way in which game theory is employed; the
same is true for rational expectations theory and also for other kinds of
theorizing that rely primarily on the assumption that agents act to maxi-
mize their utility. As Lucas urges, the important point about analogue
economies is that everything is known about them – i.e. their character-
istics are entirely explicit (Lucas 1981, 7–8) – and within them the proposi-
tions we are interested in ‘can be formulated rigorously and shown to be
valid’ (Lucas 1981, 67). With respect to real economies, generally there is a
great variety of different opinions about what will happen, and the differ-
ent opinions can all be plausible. But for these constructed economies, our
views about what will happen are ‘statements of verifiable fact’ (Lucas
1981, 271).
The method of verification is deduction: we know what does happen in
one of these economies because we know what must happen given our
general principles and the characteristics of the economy. We are,
however, faced with a trade-off: we can have totally verifiable results but
only about economies that are not real. As Lucas says, ‘Any model that is
well enough articulated to give clear answers to the questions we put to it
will necessarily be artificial, abstract, patently “unreal” ’ (Lucas 1981, 271).
How then do these analogue economies relate to the real economies
that we are supposed to be theorizing about? Here is where experiment
comes into play, ideal experiments, like Galileo’s balls rolling down a
smooth inclined plane. For a long time I have maintained that experiments
like Galileo’s are the clue to understanding how analogue economies can
teach us about empirical reality. They show us why the unrealism of the
model’s assumptions need not be a problem. Indeed, to the contrary, the
high degree of idealization involved is essential to the ability of the model
to teach us about the real world, rather than being a problematic feature
we had best eliminate. But I will return then to the feature of these models
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that is generally thought to be unproblematic – their use of deduction. For
my overall suspicion is that the way deductivity is achieved in economic
models may undermine the possibility I open up for them to teach us
genuine truths about empirical reality. So in the end I may be taking back
with one hand what I give with the other.
As I mentioned at the start, this essay is about a very familiar topic: the
unrealism of assumptions in economic models. Section 6.2 will put this
problem in a somewhat less familiar perspective by identifying it with the
problem of external validity, or parallelism, in experiments. Section 6.3
explains why experiments matter: because many models aim to isolate a
single process to study on its own, just as Galileo did with his studies of
gravitational attraction. Using the language of John Stuart Mill (1836,
1843), models aim to establish tendencies to behave in certain ways, not to
describe the overall behaviour that occurs. For this job, it is essential that
models make highly unrealistic assumptions, for we need to see what
happens in the very unusual case where only the single factor of interest
affects the outcome. Section 6.4 raises the question of how we can draw
interesting and rich deductive conclusions in economies given that we have
so few principles to use as premises; Section 6.5 answers that often it
seems we fill in by relying on the detailed structure of the model. But then
it takes back the solace offered in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. For in that case the
conclusions are tied to these structural assumptions, assumptions that go
well beyond what is necessary for Galilean idealization; the results do not
depend just on the process in question but are rather overconstrained.
This means that Galilean inference to tendencies that hold outside the
experimental set-up is jeopardized. So in the end the problems involved in
using highly unrealistic assumptions can loom as large as ever.
6.2 External validity: a problem for models and
experiments alike
Lucas speaks of the analogue economies of contemporary economic theo-
rizing as stand-ins for experiment:
One of the functions of theoretical economics is to provide fully artic-
ulated, artificial economic systems that can serve as laboratories in
which policies that would be prohibitively expensive to experiment
with in actual economics can be tested out at much lower cost.
(1981, 271)
As we know from Mary Morgan, many of the originators of economet-
rics viewed their econometric models in a similar way, for they thought of
situations in which the parameters of their structural models could be
identified as situations in which by good luck nature is running an experi-
ment for us (see Morgan 1990).
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Francesco Guala too talks about the similarities between laboratory
experiments in economics and the kinds of theoretical models I am dis-
cussing here (see Guala 1998). Guala has been studying how experiments
work; I have been trying to understand how theoretical models work. We
have both been struck by the structural similarities between the two. I am
particularly interested in the fact that both laboratory experiments and
theoretical models in economics are criticized for the artificiality of the
conditions they set up. As Lucas says, the assumptions of our theoretical
models in economics are typically ‘artificial’, ‘abstract’ and ‘patently
unreal’.
Thinking about this very same complaint with respect to the laboratory
experiments we perform nowadays in economics provides us with a useful
vocabulary to describe the problems arising from the unrealism of assump-
tions in theoretical models – and to see our way around them. When we
design an experiment or a quasi-experiment in the social sciences, we aim
simultaneously for both internal validity and for external validity. An
experimental claim is internally valid when we can be sure that it has gen-
uinely been established to hold in the experimental situation. External
validity − or ‘parallelism’ as economists call it − is more ambitious. For
that the experiment must be designed to assure us that the result should
hold in some kinds of targeted situations or populations outside the exper-
imental set-up.
It is a well-known methodological truism that in almost all cases there
will be a trade-off between internal validity and external validity. The con-
ditions that we need in order to increase the chances of internal validity
are generally at odds with those that provide grounds for external validity.
The usual complaint here is about the artificiality of the circumstances
required to secure internal validity: if we want to take the lessons, literally
interpreted (you should note the ‘literally interpreted’ – I shall return to it
below), from inside the laboratory to outside, it seems that the experimen-
tal situation should be as similar as possible in relevant respects to the
target situation. But for the former we need to set up very special circum-
stances so that we can be sure that nothing confounds the putative result,
and these are generally nothing like the kinds of circumstances to which
we want to apply our results.
This is exactly what we see in the case of economic models. Analogue
economies are designed to ensure internal validity. In an analogue
economy we know the result obtains because we can establish by deduc-
tion that it has to obtain. But to have this assurance we must provide an
analogue economy with a simple and clear enough structure that ensures
that deduction will be possible. In particular we need to make very special
assumptions matched to the general principles we use: we must attribute
to this economy characteristics that can be represented mathematically
in just the right kind of form, a form that can be fed into the principles
in order to get deductive consequences out. And this very special kind
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of dovetailing that can provide just what is needed for deduction is not
likely to be provided by conditions that occur in the economy at large, as
Lucas and all other theorists using these methods admit. In this kind of
theorizing it looks as if we buy internal validity at the cost of external
validity.
Nor is the problem confined to the ‘thought experiments’ we conduct
with our constructed models. It also appears in the real experiments we
conduct nowadays in economics; and it reveals a significant difference in
concerns between economics and many other branches of social science.
Experimental economists report astounding confirmation of a number of
economic hypotheses they have been testing recently (cf. Plott 1991 and
Smith 1991). These experimental economists are also very proud of their
experimental designs, which they take to have minimized the chances of
drawing mistaken conclusions. Yet, apparently, it is difficult for them to
get their results published in social-science journals outside their own field,
because, referees claim, they have virtually no guarantees of external
validity (conversation, Charles Plott, California Institute of Technology,
May 1997). So the results, it is felt, lack general interest or significance.
6.3 Tendencies and Galilean idealizations
Now I should like to argue that a great many of the unrealistic assump-
tions we find in models and experiments alike are not a problem. To the
contrary, they are required to do the job; without them the experiment
would be no experiment at all. For we do not need to assume that the aim
of the kind of theorizing under discussion is to establish results in our ana-
logue economies that will hold outside them when literally interpreted. Fre-
quently what we are doing in this kind of economic theory is not trying to
establish facts about what happens in the real economy but rather, follow-
ing John Stuart Mill, facts about stable tendencies. Consider a stock
example of mine – a model designed by my colleague Chris Pissarides to
study the effects of skill loss on unemployment (see Pissarides 1992). What
we want to learn from the analogue economy described by Pissarides is
not whether there will be persistence in unemployment in the real
economy but instead what skill loss will contribute to persistence – what
skill loss tends to produce, not what is produced whenever skill loss occurs.
So what I maintain is that the analogue economies described in
contemporary economic models look like experiments, where the experi-
mental aspect matters. The models almost always concentrate on a single
mechanism or causal process. For example, Pissarides’ model studies the
effect (if any) of skill loss during unemployment on the persistence of
unemployment shocks via the disincentives arising from loss of skills in the
labour pool for employers to create jobs in areas where skill affects pro-
ductivity. The idea is to isolate this process; to study it in a setting where
nothing else is going on that might affect the outcome as well. The model
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is constructed to assure us that whatever result we see is indeed due to the
process under study.
Consider the skill-loss model. Loss or not of skill during unemployment
is the only exogenous variable. Firms act to maximize profits and only to
maximize profits. We can trace through the model to see that the only
variation in profits will be due to the number of jobs that firms decide to
create in the face of a labour pool containing unemployed workers and to
the productivity of the workers hired. For this model we can derive rigor-
ously that unemployment in one period is dependent on unemployment in
the previous period if and only if skills are lost during unemployment. It
looks as if this model allows us to see exactly what effects loss of skill has
on unemployment persistence via the disincentive it creates for job cre-
ation.
What can we conclude? Can we conclude that we have learned a fact
about skill loss per se, a fact we can expect to be generally true, true not
just in this analogue economy but in other economies as well? Certainly
not if we try to read the conclusion as one about the association between
loss of skill and unemployment persistence with some kind of quantifier in
front: always, or for the most part, or even sometimes, if there is skill loss in
sectors where skills matter to productivity, there will be unemployment per-
sistence. Clearly a good deal else could be going on to offset the effects of
skill loss, even to swamp them entirely; indeed we might never see persis-
tence in any case of skill loss, even though the model shows correctly that
‘skill loss leads to unemployment persistence’.
This is why we turn to the notion of stable tendencies:1 in any situation
skill loss tends to produce persistence in unemployment shocks. What does
this mean in terms of what actually happens? There does not seem to be
any general rule in economic theory that answers, as vector addition does
on Mill’s account of the tendencies of different forces in classical mechan-
ics. Nevertheless, if economic theory is to aspire to be an exact science,
there had better be at least a case-by-case answer. And presumably this
answer can in general be generated by the specific model that testifies to
the tendency, in conjunction with any general economic theory we are in a
position to assume (Cartwright 1989, 1998, 1999).2 For the skill-loss tend-
ency, I take it that we assume roughly that, in any situation where skills
matter to productivity and the decision to create new jobs by a firm is in
part determined by its expected profit, unemployment at one period will
depend on previous levels of unemployment if workers are thought to lose
skills during unemployment and not otherwise, even if this dependency on
past levels plays only a small part in determining present levels.
Probably no-one thinks we have established even that, though, because
economists, like other social scientists, are alert to the possibility of inter-
action, as Mill himself warned. In some situations some factors may distort
the skill-loss mechanism so much that loss of skill behaves differently in
those situations from the way it behaves in our analogue economy. Of
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course if we are going to avoid manoeuvres that are entirely ad hoc we
shall have to ensure that ‘interaction’ is given real verifiable content when-
ever it is invoked. In principle this should be possible since the theoretical
model is supposed to lay bare how the process operates in the first place –
‘distortions’ are judged relative to it.
We can see the general points more clearly by thinking again about the
kind of laboratory experiment that aims to establish a tendency claim.
Perhaps rather than thinking of economics experiments, which tend to be
controversial, we should take an illustration from physics, let us say
Galileo’s famous experiments to establish the effect of the attraction of
the earth on a falling body, one of which is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Galileo’s experiments aimed to establish what I have been calling a
tendency claim. They were not designed to tell us how any particular
falling body will move in the vicinity of the earth; nor to establish a regu-
larity about how bodies of a certain kind will move. Rather, the experi-
ments were designed to find out what contribution the motion due to the
pull of the earth will make, with the assumption that that contribution is
stable across all the different kinds of situations falling bodies will get into.
How did Galileo find out what the stable contribution from the pull of the
earth is? He eliminated (as far as possible) all other causes of motion on
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Figure 6.1 Leaning tower (designed by Emily Cartwright).
the bodies in his experiment so that he could see how they move when
only the earth affects them. That is the contribution that the earth’s pull
makes to their motion.
Let us call this kind of idealization, that eliminates all other possible
causes to learn the effect of one operating on its own, Galilean
idealization. My point is that the equivalent of Galilean idealization in a
model is a good thing. It is just what allows us to carry the results we find
in the experiment to situations outside – in the tendency sense. We need
the idealizing assumptions to be able to do this. Otherwise we have no
ground for thinking the behaviour we see in the experiment is characteris-
tic of the earth’s pull at all. Indeed, we know it will not be.
We can contrast these Galilean experiments with experiments that have
a quite different aim and, correlatively, a quite different structure. Con-
sider what happens when we build a prototype of a new device and experi-
ment on it to ensure that it will work correctly when put to use. In this case
we do not aim to learn an abstract tendency claim. Instead we want to find
out what actual behaviours occur. So the experimental conditions should
be very realistic to the conditions in the target situations and vary appro-
priately across them. And, without more said, we have no reason to expect
the results in the experiment to obtain in any situations except those that
resemble the conditions in the experiment.
Here we see another trade-off. If an experiment is very, very unrealistic
in just the right way, its results can be applicable almost everywhere. But
they will not be able to tell you what happens anywhere else since they
only establish the contribution or tendency of the factor in question.
Experiments that are very realistic can tell you what happens. But they are
highly limited in their scope, for they can only tell you what happens in
situations that look like the experimental set-up. And experiments in
between are usually pretty uninformative on both matters. Of course we
may be very lucky. It may be, for instance, that the cause or small set of
causes that we isolate in our experiment (or in our model) is also the
dominant cause in the real situations we want to know about. In that case
our Galilean experiments (and the corresponding models) will not only
give us tendencies but will be approximately descriptively accurate as well.
Back to models again. If the deductions have been carried out correctly
and the general principles employed are true in the target situations, the
results of the model will obtain in any real situations that fit the descrip-
tion that the model provides. And in general we have no reason to think
they will obtain anywhere else. But if what the model describes satisfies
the requirements to be a Galilean-style experiment, it can do more. It can
tell us what happens in an experimental situation and thereby tell us about
the tendency of the features in question. So Galilean idealization in a
model is a good thing.
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6.4 How deductivity can be secured and at what cost
The problems I worry about arise when not all of the unrealistic assump-
tions required for the derivations in a model are ones that characterize an
ideal experiment. What I fear is that in general a good number of the false
assumptions made with our theoretical models may not have the form of
Galilean idealizations. Before I go into details about these kinds of extra-
Galilean assumptions, I shall first lay the groundwork by explaining why
we might expect to find them as features of our analogue economies. The
need for these stronger constraints – the ones that go beyond Galilean ide-
alization – comes, I believe, as a result of the nature of economic theory
itself. To see how, let us look again at what kinds of theory are available in
economics to aid in the construction of models and at what kinds of con-
cepts they deploy.
The bulk of the concepts used in these models are concepts naming
socio-economic quantities that are familiar to the layman, not only as the
targeted results to be explained but also as the proposed explanatory
factors, concepts like persistence in unemployment and loss of skill during
unemployment, or current price, tax, demand, consumption, labour, wages,
capital, profit and money supply, or assessment of skills, private informa-
tion and in-firm training, or, to take an example from game-theoretic polit-
ical economy, power to redistribute, incentives for credible information
transmission and political failure in the transmission of information.
This is my first observation: most of the concepts employed in these
models are highly concrete empirical concepts. My second observation is
that the task is to establish useful relations among these via deduction.
The problem comes with my third observation: the theory that is pre-
sumed is very meagre. There aren’t many principles available to use in the
deductions. We have only a handful of very general principles that we
employ without controversy in economics, such as the principles of utility
theory. Nor are there usually many concrete empirical principles imported
into the models either. I take it that this is part of the strategy for the
models. Almost any principle with real empirical content in economics is
highly contentious and we try to construct models that use as few contro-
versial assumptions as possible. But this makes difficulties for the scope of
the theory. If the results are supposed just to ‘fall out’ by deduction from
the principles, where there are not many principles, we will not get many
results either. How can we, then, deduce results in our models when we
have few general principles to call on?
To answer, let us consider what typical models for analogue economics
look like. These models tend to be simple in one respect: they usually have
only a few agents with few options and only a narrow range of both causes
and effects is admitted. Yet there is another way in which they are
complex, at least by comparison with physics models doing the same kind
of thing: they have a lot of structure. The list of assumptions specifying
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exactly what the analogue economy is like is very long. Consider one of
Lucas’s own models, from his 1973 ‘Expectations and the Neutrality of
Money’ (1981, 66–89). I choose this example because it is a paper whose
‘technically demanding form’ is explicitly defended by Lucas (1981, 9).
Section 2 is titled ‘The Structure of the Economy’ – i.e. the structure of the
analogue economy that Lucas uses to study money illusion. What follows
is section 2 in its entirety:
In order to exhibit the phenomena described in the introduction, we
shall utilize an abstract model economy, due in many of its essentials
to Samuelson. Each period, N identical individuals are born, each of
whom lives for two periods (the current one and the next). In each
period, then, there is a constant population of 2N: N of age 0 and N of
age 1. During the first period of life, each person supplies, at his dis-
cretion, n units of labor which yield the same n units of output.
Denote the output consumed by a member of the younger generation
(its producer) by c0, and that consumed by the old by c1. Output
cannot be stored but can be freely disposed of, so that the aggregate
production-consumption possibilities for any period are completely
described (in per capita terms) by:
c0 c1 n, c0, c1, n0 (1)
Since n may vary, it is physically possible for this economy to
experience fluctuations in real output.
In addition to labor-output, there is one other good: fiat money,
issued by a government which has no other function. This money
enters the economy by means of a beginning-of-period transfer to the
members of the older generation, in a quantity proportional to the
pretransfer holdings of each. No inheritance is possible, so that
unspent cash balances revert, at the death of the holder, to the mone-
tary authority.
Within this framework, the only exchange which can occur will
involve a surrender of output by the young, in exchange for money
held over from the preceding period, and altered by transfer, by the
old. We shall assume that such exchange occurs in two physically
separate markets. To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume
that the older generation is allocated across these two markets so as to
equate total monetary demand between them. The young are alloc-
ated stochastically, fraction /2 going to one and 1  (/2) to the other.
Once the assignment of persons to markets is made, no switching or
communication between markets is possible. Within each market,
trading by auction occurs, with all trades transacted at a single, market
clearing price.
The pretransfer money supply, per member of the older generation,
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is known to all agents. Denote this quantity by m. Posttransfer bal-
ances, denoted by m′, are not generally known (until next period)
except to the extent that they are ‘revealed’ to traders by the current
period price level. Similarly, the allocation variable  is unknown,
except indirectly via price. The development through time of the
nominal money supply is governed by
mmx, (2)
where x is a random variable. Let x denote next period’s value of this
transfer variable, and let  be next period’s allocation variable. It is
assumed that x and x are independent, with the common, continuous
density function f on (0, 	). Similarly,  and  are independent, with
the common, continuous symmetric density g on (0, 2).
To summarize, the state of the economy in any period is entirely
described by three variables m, x, and . The motion of the economy
from state to state is independent of decisions made by individuals in
the economy, and is given by (2) and the densities f and g of x and .
(Lucas 1981, 67–69)
But this is not an end to the facts set to obtain in Lucas’s ‘abstract model
economy’. Section 3 continues, ‘We shall assume that the members of the
older generation prefer more consumption to less, . . .’ and so on for
another page; and more details are still to be added to the economy in
section 4. There is nothing special here about Lucas though. Just write out
carefully in a list the assumptions for almost any of your favourite models
and you will see what I mean. For example the skill-loss model of Pis-
sarides contains some 16 assumptions and that is just for the first of six
increasingly complex economies that he describes.3
I believe there is good reason why economic models must give a lot of
structure to the economies they describe: if you have just a few principles,
you will need a lot of extra assumptions from somewhere else in order to
derive new results that are not already transparent in the principles. In the
models under discussion the richness of structure can fill in for the want of
general principles presupposed. The general principles can be thought of
in two categories, familiar to philosophers of science (cf. Hempel 1966):
internal principles and bridge principles. Internal principles make claims
about the relations of abstract or theoretical concepts to each other, like
the axioms of utility theory. But the results we want to know about gener-
ally involve not abstract or theoretical concepts, but empirical ones. The
bridge principles of a theory provide links between the two sets of con-
cepts. (The usual example is the identification in an ideal gas of the theo-
retical concept mean kinetic energy of the molecules with the empirical
concept temperature.)
The theory presupposed in our economics models tends to employ few
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principles of either category and often no bridge principles at all. This
means that the additional assumptions put in via the description of the
model must do two jobs. On the one hand they must provide sufficient
constraints to serve as premises to increase the range of deductive con-
sequences. On the other hand they must establish an interpretation of the
terms that appear in the theoretical principles. They must tell us, for
instance, what utility amounts to in terms of an employer’s opening a job
and of work versus leisure for the employee, or of entrepreneurs investing
in a project and of managers defaulting on their contracts, or of fair treat-
ment for one’s fellow citizens and of the cost of demonstrating or con-
tributing to the American Civil Liberties Union.
Sometimes the job left open by the want of bridge principles is done by
an explicit assumption: we will assume that the only source of utility is . . .
Sometimes the abstract principles themselves are explicitly given a con-
crete form: we will assume that firms act to maximize profits and labourers
to maximize wages . . . Often the interpretation is implicit: perhaps there is
nothing else in the model for agents to care about except power or profit
or leisure and wages, and the very choice of these words indicates that the
agents’ utility should depend on them in certain characteristic ways.
My claim then is that it is no surprise that individual analogue
economies come with such long lists of assumptions: the model-specific
assumptions can provide a way to secure deductively validated results
where universal principles are scarce. But these create their own problems.
For the validity of the conclusions appears now to depend on a large
number of very special interconnected assumptions. If so, the validation of
the results will depend then on the detailed arrangement of the structure
of the model and is not, prima facie at least, available otherwise. We opt
for deductive verification of our claims in order to achieve clarity, rigour
and certainty. But to get it we have tied the results to very special circum-
stances; the problem is how to validate them outside.
Consider for example the Lucas model from ‘The Neutrality of Money’
(1981, 70). We begin with the fairly vacuous claim:











where c is current consumption; n, current labour supply; , a known
quantity of nominal balance acquired; p and p, price levels in the current
146 Nancy Cartwright
and successor period; and F, an unspecified distribution function. Despite
the fact that there is not much that is controversial yet, we can see that
even at this stage the exact form of the equation depends on the details of
the economy. This is even more obvious by the time we get to the con-
dition for equilibrium in each separate market (equation (16), which is
derived from (9) plus the more detailed assumptions about the analogue




















dF(x, p; m, p) (16)
Sections 6 and 7 of the Lucas paper are entitled, respectively, ‘Positive
Implications of the Theory’ and ‘Policy Considerations’. Yet the results he
establishes are about this economy: they follow from equation (16), which
is an equation specific in form to the economy that satisfies the lengthy
description laid out in Lucas’s sections 2, 3 and 4. How can they teach us
more general lessons, lessons that will apply to other, different, economies?
The view that I have long defended is that such model results teach us
about general tendencies (in my own vocabulary, ‘capacities’), tendencies
that are nakedly displayed in the analogue economies described in our
economic models but that stand ready to operate in most economies. On
this view the analogue economy that Lucas describes is like an experiment.
We know that an experiment of the right kind, a Galilean experiment that
isolates the tendency in question,4 can teach us lessons that carry outside
the experimental situation. If we are lucky, however, we will not need to
carry out the experiment. We can find out what would happen were we to
conduct it because we can find out by deduction what must happen. But
for that to work, the analogue economy must be of just the right kind:
were we to construct it in reality, it would meet the conditions of Galilean
experiment. This whole strategy is threatened, however, if non-Galilean
idealizations play a role in our deductions – which looks to be the case
with Lucas’s equation (16).
From the perspective of establishing tendencies, it becomes crucial then
to look carefully into the deductions used in our economic models to see if
all of the unrealistic assumptions required for the derivations are ones that
characterize an ideal experiment. Let us look at another simple physics
example for an analogous case.
In classical Newtonian mechanics massive bodies have an inertial tend-
ency: a body will remain in motion unless acted on by a force. When it is
acted on by a force the actual motion that occurs will be a combination of
the inertial motion and that due to the force. So, what is the natural
behaviour of a body when inertia acts on its own? Say we do some experi-
ments to find out. We know that forces cause motions. So eliminate all
forces and watch the bodies move. What will we see?
Imagine that our experimental mass has been confined for reasons of
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convenience to move on a particular surface, but that we have been very
careful to plane the surface to eliminate almost all friction. Then what we
will see will depend on the geometry of that surface. For example, if all our
experiments are done on a sphere, we always get motion in great circles, as
in Figure 6.2. But that is not the ‘natural’ motion in other geometries. Look
for instance at Figure 6.3. There, motion on great circles is available, but it
is not the motion that inertia will contribute. The results in our experiment
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Figure 6.3 Geodesic on the sphere geometry with space–time singularities
(designed by Sang Wook Yi).
think of as causes of motion – all the forces – we would see the results of
inertia by itself. Instead what we see is a result of inertia-plus-geometry.
This can always happen in an experiment: we never know whether
some features we have not thought about are influencing the result. But in
a good many of our analogue economies we are not even this well off. In a
real experiment we are after all in a position to assume with good justifica-
tion that the fact that there are, for instance, only two markets or only two
generations does not matter because the number of markets or of genera-
tions is not relevant to the conclusion: it has no causal bearing on the
outcome, and what happens in the real experiment is just what is caused to
happen. Analogue economies are different. What happens in them is
exactly what is implied deductively. The problem is that we often know by
looking at them that the specific derivations made in our models depend
on details of the situation other than just the mechanism itself operating in
accord with our general principles. So we know that in the corresponding
experiment there are features other than the mechanism itself determining
the outcome. That means that the experiment does not entitle us to draw a
conclusion about the general tendency of the mechanism under study.
We now know what would happen – indeed, what must happen – in
some very particular constrained real experimental situation in which the
features of interest really occur. But we know it for exactly the wrong
reason. We know that the results obtain because we know that they follow
deductively given the formal relations of all the factors that figure in an
essential way in the proof. But the whole point about an experiment
designed to establish the tendency of a factor is that the background
factors should not matter to what happens. We are supposed to be isolat-
ing the effects of the feature or process under investigation acting on its
own, not effects that depend in a crucial way on the background.
So, were such a set-up to occur, it would turn out not to be a good
experiment after all. It may have seemed to be a good design because our
independent causal knowledge told us that in general none of the back-
ground factors should have any bearing on the effect. But by bad luck that
would not be true of the particular arrangement of them we chose. The
formal relations of the background and targeted feature together are
enough to guarantee the result – and that is one of the things our design is
meant to preclude. We would have to judge the result (even if by chance it
should turn out to be correct) to be an artifact of the experiment.
6.5 Conclusion
Let us look at Lucas’s own conclusion in his paper on the neutrality of
money:
This paper has been an attempt to resolve the paradox posed by
Gurley, in his mild but accurate parody of Friedmanian monetary
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theory: “Money is a veil, but when the veil flutters, real output sput-
ters.” The resolution has been effected by postulating economic
agents free of money illusion, so that the Ricardian hypothetical
experiment of a fully announced, proportional monetary expansion
will have no real consequences (that is, so that money is a veil). These
rational agents are then placed in a setting in which the information
conveyed to traders by market prices is inadequate to permit them to
distinguish real from monetary disturbances. In this setting, monetary
fluctuations lead to real output movements in the same direction.
In order for this resolution to carry any conviction, it has been neces-
sary to adopt a framework simple enough to permit a precise specifica-
tion of the information available to each trader at each point in time, and
to facilitate verification of the rationality of each trader’s behavior. To
obtain this simplicity, most of the interesting features of the observed
business cycle have been abstracted from, with one notable exception:
the Phillips curve emerges not as an unexplained empirical fact, but as a
central feature of the solution to a general equilibrium system.
(1981, 84)
I have argued that in a model like this the features ‘abstracted from’ fall
into two categories: those that eliminate confounding factors and those
that do not eliminate confounding factors but rather provide a simple
enough structure to make a deductive study possible. The former I claim
are just what we want when we aim to see for rational agents, what effects
inadequate information about money disturbances has on the short-term
Phillips curve, that is, when we want to establish the tendency it has
independent of the effects anything else might have on a Phillips curve as
well. But the assumptions of the latter kind remain problematic. They not
only leave us with the question still unanswered, ‘Can we think that what
we see happen, literally happen, in this economy, is what the combination
of rationality and limited information will contribute in other economies?’
Worse, they give us reason to think we cannot. For inspection of the
derivation suggests that the outcome that occurs in the analogue economy
does depend on the particular structure the economy has.5
Does it? This is a question that is generally not sufficiently addressed.
Frequently of course we do discuss how robust the results from a specific
model are. But, not surprisingly, these discussions usually refer to assump-
tions in the first category, for these are the ones that are of concern to eco-
nomic theory. Notice for instance that Lucas notes in the passage just cited
that ‘most of the interesting features of the observed business cycle have
been abstracted from’ (my italics). In the end we want to know what
happens when other causes are at work, either because they may interfere
with the one under study, or because we are starting down the road
towards a model that will be more descriptively accurate when the results
are read literally, i.e. more descriptively accurate about the real economies
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we want to study. But my central point is that we need robustness results
about the second category of assumptions as well if our results are to be of
use in the tendency sense.
I realize of course that economists do not use just models to find out about
tendencies. The models are merely one strand in a net of methods used
together for establishing, testing, expanding and revising economic hypothe-
ses. Moreover, it is often the general lesson rather than the precise form of
the conclusion that is taken seriously (even when the conclusion is under-
stood in a tendency sense). Nevertheless, rigorously deriving a result in a
model is supposed to provide prima facie evidence in favour of that result.
My concern is about just this relation of evidence to hypothesis. To the
extent that the derivation in a model makes essential use of non-Galilean
‘idealizing’ assumptions, then I do not see how the fact that the result can be
derived in such a model can provide any evidence at all for the hypothesis.
If we aim to establish conclusions interpreted in a tendency sense, there
is a good reason why the derivation of a conclusion in a model that makes
Galilean idealizations, and no others, should count as evidence in favour
of that conclusion: to the extent that the general principles employed in
the derivation are true to the world, behaviour derived in the model will
duplicate to behaviour that would obtain were a Galilean experiment to
be performed. But when non-Galilean idealizations are made as well, this
reason no longer has force. So we need another reason to show why this
procedure has evidential force. And I do not know one that can be stated
clearly and defended convincingly. Hence I think we should be concerned
to ensure that non-Galilean idealizing assumptions do not play an essential
role in our derivations.
What, then, does this tell us about the demand for rigorous derivations?
I have here been discussing one of the central and highly prized ways that
economics theory is done today: by the construction of models for simple
analogue economies in which results about issues of interest can be
derived rigorously, employing as general principles only ones whose use is
relatively uncontroversial within the discipline. The achievement of rigour
is costly, however. It takes considerable time. It requires special talents
and special training and this closes the discipline to different kinds of
thinkers who may provide different kinds of detailed understanding
of how economies can and do work. And rigour is bought at the cost of
employing general concepts lacking the kind of detailed content that
allows them to be directly put to use in concrete situations. What are its
compensating gains? Unless we find different answers from the one I
offered here,6 the gains will not include lessons about real economic phe-
nomena, it seems, despite our frequent feeling of increased understanding
of them. For we are not generally assured of any way to take results out of
our models and into the world.
There has been some tendency to blame our failures on the attempt to
make economics rigorous. I am inclined to go the other way. If it is rigour
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that we want, the problem with economic theorizing of this sort is that
rigour gives out too soon. For the models themselves, though abstract and
mathematized, are not formal theories. To see why I say this, consider
again the structure of my argument in this essay. I have raised questions
about the external validity of the results established in these kinds of
models. My worries focus not on the unrealism of the assumptions but on
the model-dependence of the results. The kind of model-dependence
involved seems to undercut not only the claim that the results can be read
literally, but also the hope that they can be read as facts about tendencies.
But I have to say ‘seems’ here because the models themselves are not
presented in a way that allows this question to be taken up easily or
answered rigorously. What exactly are the assumptions that are really
necessary for the derivations to go through; and what is the range of cir-
cumstances across which these assumptions can be relaxed and qualita-
tively similar results still follow? We cannot generally answer that question
given the way the models are presented. To answer it we need to formalize
our models. Supposing then that my worries about the model-dependence
of the results are valid. What should we conclude about the need for
rigour in economic theory? It looks as if the natural conclusion is this:
should economics stick to mathematizing rather than formalizing, it will
not be easy to know whether the models it constructs can teach us general
facts about concrete features of the economy or not; the trouble with this
kind of theorizing is not that it is too rigorous, but rather that it is not rig-
orous enough.
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Notes
1 I have myself defended the importance of tendencies throughout the social and
natural sciences, wherever the analytic method is in play (see Cartwright 1989)
and have specifically maintained, possibly incorrectly given the arguments here,
that we can learn about them via our formal models (see Cartwright 1998).
Daniel Hausman (Hausman 1992) in his arguments that economics is a separate
but not an exact science also sees tendencies as standard in economics theory.
2 I have elsewhere (Cartwright 1999) described a variety of rules for combining
tendencies besides vector addition, as well as explaining what we can do with
tendency knowledge even when there are no general rules available for combin-
ing tendencies.
3 Economists, I think, get used to models with lots of assumptions. But I am often
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talking to mixed groups, people who study economics and people who study
physics; those whose background is in physics are often astounded at the rich-
ness of description provided in models in economics.
4 If such a tendency exists.
5 Notice that we still have this problem even if we are lucky enough to have
selected a few causes to study that for most real situations will be the dominant
causes. For we still need to see why the very behaviours that occur in the ana-
logue economy when these causes are present are behaviours that reveal the
tendency of this arrangement of causes and hence will approximate the behav-
iours that occur in the real economies.
6 There are of course a variety of other accounts of the use of models that do not
demand either predictive accuracy or the correct isolation of a tendency. See for
instance the studies found in Morgan and Morrison 1999.
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